Ethical confidence and education : beyond doubt and deflection by Keys, Martyn John Selby
ETHICAL CONFIDENCE AND 
EDUCATION: 
BEYOND DOUBT AND DEFLECTION 
By Martyn John Selby Keys 
Institute of Education, University of London 
Thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
I hereby declare that, except where explicit attribution is made, the work presented 
in this thesis is entirely my own. 
M arty IA/ John/ Selby Key 
20 July 2013 
Word count (exclusive of appendices, list of reference and bibliography): 
74, 354 words 
2 
Abstract 
I begin this thesis in the classroom, and with a depiction of a particular, quite 
prevalent, approach to moral education. My aims are then as follows: (1) to trace 
how certain influential positions in philosophy of education bolster such an 
approach, (2) to critique the picture of ethics and ethical development shared by 
these positions, and (3) to suggest an alternative conception of the ethical life 
which promises to offer a richer, more fruitful, approach to moral education. My 
first aim is met through an examination of the works of Robert Dearden and 
Michael Hand on teaching controversial issues. From these writers I draw out what I 
describe as a 'rationalistic' approach; where a particular vision of rationality is (a) 
called on to provide definite foundations for the ethical life, and where by 
implication, (b) teachers are encouraged to teach various ethical concerns as 
'issues' which are resolved, or potentially resolvable, by 'rational' means. My 
critique of this approach focuses on the deeper but unacknowledged senses of 
unease that underpin both its vision of rationality, and the justificatory role reason 
is supposed to play in ethics and moral education. The challenge considers the idea 
that its conception of rationality is ethically deflective (e.g. that it can constitute an 
attempt to avoid dealing directly with ethical doubt and disquietude). I go on to 
explore whether there might be a non-deflective philosophical engagement with 
the ethical: an approach which avoids succumbing either to the certainties of 
'rationalism' or to the potentially corrosive nature of relativistic doubt. In arguing 
that such a conception can be found in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, I 
explore the possibilities it presents for moral education. Particular attention is paid 
to the role that the study of literature might play in deepening certain forms of 
ethical awareness in the classroom. 
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Chapter I 
Philosophical Rationalism and the Classroom 
(i) Starter in the Classroom 
It was late September; the class were beginning to study for their GCSE 
examinations in English Language. I mention this only because what I am about to 
describe could have taken place in any number of classrooms in the same school. 
But English it was. And in an English lesson taught by an experienced and highly-
regarded teacher, working in an innovative department, in a Good School with at 
least some Outstanding Features. That is not, of course, to say that it could not 
have taken place in a lesson delivered by a newly qualified teacher in that other 
school on the far side of the town. Nor is it to say that what I describe is typical, 
even common, merely that it could in fact have happened almost anywhere. 
"OK guys, let's recap on what we've just learned," said Ms Comberton, for whom 
regular plenary sessions had, quite imperceptibly, come to form part of her 
everyday practice. A trusty tool in her teacher's toolkit. She had often had cause to 
remind herself how OFSTED themselves had been much impressed by the fact that 
her lessons were guided, but not constrained, by the 'law of the three-part-lesson': 
a plenary does not, after all, have to be something that occupies only the final five 
or ten minutes of an effective lesson. Assessment and learning were, indeed, 
properly viewed as conjoined twins rather than as distant cousins. This plenary, 
however, was going to be different. She knew it. She had already confessed to 
herself that she was going to transgress. She was about to commit the sin of telling 
them what happened in the texts they had been studying; reminding them what 
they were supposed to know, not to mention understand, about how the language 
used by the writers of two different accounts of a mountaineering accident had 
varying effects on the reader. As she continued to talk, she thought she heard the 
Guardians of Educational Quality muttering as if present invisibly at the back of her 
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classroom: 'Far too teacher-led'; interrogating her still further with that familiar yet 
terrifying question, 'But how do you know they have all learnt what you wanted 
them to learn?' Of course, she ought really to have got one or more of them to 
remind the class about the key features of the two reports, but it was Monday 
morning, she was tired, they seemed tired...and this would just have to do. She 
would continue to speak. 
Plenary over, and it was time to get them active again; to get them to think for 
themselves, and to learn from each other. It was time for class discussion. With a 
click of a button, Ms Comberton's next slide was projected on the board, and with 
another, the discussion question marched in dutifully from left to right. (I should 
perhaps add that it wasn't strictly speaking her slide. It was the Department's slide. 
It was one of the thirteen that made up the lesson that every teacher followed for 
this part of the unit. It was, you see, part of the Scheme of Work.) And so, to what 
appeared to be a room crowded with bowed heads, the teacher proceeded to read 
from the slide: 
"Turn to face the person behind you and discuss with your partner the following 
question: Do you think it is acceptable to sacrifice the life of one person, to avoid 
two people dying?" 1. "I'll give you ten minutes to discuss," she added, secure at 
least in the knowledge that pace and timing were vital ingredients in a good lesson, 
"and then I want to hear back from some of you". With that she was finished. It was 
down to them. 
There was silence at first. There often was. 'It does usually take a little time for their 
brains to warm up', she reminded herself, consolingly. She also knew from her own 
experience how difficult it was to be the first voice to confront a room full of 
potentially critical quietness. With that thought in mind she proceeded to circulate 
the classroom, kneeling beside various desks to prompt and to probe, to get them 
This is in fact a 'real' question, quoted verbatim from Taylor, P, Addison, R, and Foster, D. (2011) 
Edexcel IGCSE English A and B. And here I must also confess to one minor inaccuracy: according to 
the Edexcel website, this particular English syllabus is not fitted for teaching in state schools in the 
UK; so strictly speaking, that particular question could not be asked anywhere. 
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to engage; perhaps even to care. Sure enough, the silence soon gave way to the 
familiar, comforting hum of classroom noise. Returning to her desk to remind 
herself of the homework task she was required to set, she became struck, albeit 
briefly, by the thought of what it would be like to have to sacrifice a human life. 
Beyond the example in the text of the mountain climber who considered leaving his 
injured friend to die in order to prevent both their deaths, she was surprised by 
how difficult it was to think of another instance where such a sacrifice might 
actually occur. She was no Odysseus forced to choose between Scylla and 
Charybdis. She was not even a mountain climber, or potholer, or anything of that 
sort. It was all somehow outside of her experience. At last, however, sanity 
returned. This sort of thinking simply wasn't helpful, and anyway, it wasn't the 
point of the exercise. She knew full well that the question demanded a much more 
abstract, higher-level sort of thoughtfulness. 
Ten minutes had passed. It was time to ask for volunteers or, perhaps, to single out 
the odd shy or surly reluctant. She spotted Emma in the third row with her head on 
the desk. 'If she's bored at least she could show some respect; some bloody 
manners,' she seethed to herself, with the sort of hurt that professionalism would 
now require her to keep firmly in check. "Emma," said Ms Comberton sharply, 
"Perhaps you would like to share your opinion with the class. That is if we are not 
keeping you from your beauty sleep". After the couple of slightly awkward giggles 
had subsided, the girl looked up, somewhat uneasily. She spoke with a slight 
stutter, all the time staring down at her desk: "Sorry Miss...but...I don't know what 
to think about it". Ms Comberton remained silent. Emma knew what was expected 
of her: "Well... I haven't been in a situation like that have I...I can't imagine what it 
would be like. I don't know what to think." 
The teacher's heart dutifully sunk. Yet another one who couldn't grasp the point of 
the exercise. There were always some Emmas in her classes. They always made it 
too personal. They always thought the question was concerned with 'What would 
you do?' rather than 'What should we think? They seemed to need 'the lives' in 
question to have names and histories - they simply couldn't think without the need 
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for irrelevant detail. In the mouths of some others, of course, 'the Emma reply' was 
merely a response borne of laziness. An excuse to stop thinking. On such occasions, 
'How can you know unless you're in the situation?' means simply, 'I am not in that 
situation, therefore, I can skip any further discussion and switch-off my brain until 
break-time.' 
However, perhaps Emma was different. She was a bright girl - well at least 
according to the baseline data passed to her at the start of the year by the head of 
department. Her scores on various cognitive ability tests put her in the top 10% of 
her year group; her projected grades were similarly intimidating. Ms Comberton 
hadn't yet had the time to get the measure of Emma personally, so perhaps the girl 
was simply trying to be difficult. Deliberatively subversive. Yet another case of the 
'smart-kid-that-thinks-everything-is-beneath-her-syndrome'. 
Ms Comberton would try again. "Yes, OK. But the important question is whether 
you think that in principle it would be acceptable. Could it ever be justified? Would 
it ever be right?" 
"I still don't know what I am supposed to say!" blurted Emma with increasing 
agitation. 
'She is being awkward', decided Ms Comberton, 'She is accusing me of not 
explaining the question properly: of being a bad teacher. She must surely 
understand what I am getting at. She's supposed to be bright isn't she?' 
"Well, let's put it more simply shall we?" the teacher continued, her hostility barely 
disguised beneath the slow, deliberate tone of her further questioning, "Do you 
think two lives count for more than one life? If so, might we not be doing the right 
thing if we sacrifice one life to save two lives?" 
"Miss, I am not being funny," said Emma, sensing the increasing tension in her 
teacher's voice, "I just don't know how I am supposed to weigh it all up. I mean 
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sitting here in a classroom and just, like, thinking about it. Of course, I know that 
two is more than one..." 
She was interrupted briefly by a loud, dismissive `Durr!' and some slow clapping 
from somewhere at the back of the class. 
"But...but I don't know about sacrificing...I don't know how I am supposed to work 
all of this out when it's about people's lives." 
"Oh, I see," said the teacher, "so what you are saying is that it's not a matter of 
number, and that to cause or allow the death of a human being is simply wrong. 
Full-stop." 
"No, that's not it...not really" replied Emma, "I guess I am just...just confused, that's 
all". 
It was time to put an end to this. She was getting nowhere with Emma, and besides, 
quite enough valuable class learning time had already been lost. 
Fortunately, Jeremy, a serious and studious pupil who somehow managed to avoid 
the nerdiness too often associated with such qualities, raised his hand with an air of 
control and self-confidence. 
"Yes, Jeremy", said Ms Comberton, hopefully. 
"I would say yes. I think it is acceptable. Sure, it could be a very tough decision to 
make, but the answer would still have to be yes". 
This was more promising. Much more promising. 
"I mean, two lives have got to be more important than one. Just as a thousand lives 
have got to be worth more than two. However much I would hate to make the 
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sacrifice myself, it would still, in principle, be acceptable for us to sacrifice the one 
for the two. It's just a matter of logic really." 
'Phew, I am saved...' Thank God', she thought, 'for Jeremy.' 
(ii) The Wrong Question? 
What, we may well ask, was Emma's problem with that question? One sympathetic 
response would be to recognise it was in fact a rather poor question. There is 
certainly little doubt that it required an immediate leap to a high level of 
abstraction. Unlike the situation with many of the hypothetical 'moral dilemmas' 
beloved of various philosophers, Emma was given little, if any, contextual 
information: she was missing the 'who am I?', 'where am I?', 'who will be 
sacrificed?', 'do I personally have to perform the sacrifice?', 'who or what requires 
me to do so?' etc. Perhaps, then, Emma's difficulties could simply have been 
resolved by better teaching. One might even be inclined to suggest that there is 
nothing wrong with the question per se, but simply with when or with how it was 
asked. It could be a good question to ask to different, perhaps older, students; it 
might even have been made suitable for the same class if the teacher had erected 
the appropriate intellectual scaffolding, perhaps by modelling some 'sample' 
responses with them. In short, the teacher needed to better support Emma to 
understand the point of the question; to access its demands more effectively. While 
it is certainly possible that there were more appropriate ways for the teacher to 
have responded to Emma's concerns, the problem here was not simply one of 
allowing her to better grasp the point of the question. This would assume that 
Emma, unlike her classmate Jeremy, simply did not understand the point. Once this 
assumption is challenged, then so too is the idea that insufficient teacher 
explanation (poor task 'modelling' etc.) was the single source of the her difficulties. 
Also, to be fair to Ms Comberton, it is likely that her class would begin to discuss the 
question in the light of the two unfortunate mountaineers whose accounts of a 
climbing accident they had just been studying. The question of whether one ought 
to leave his injured companion to meet his fate, or stay with him in an act of almost 
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certain self-sacrifice, would have provided at least some sort of background from 
which further discussion might have been imagined to arise. 
Emma's muddle, then, seemed not to be with understanding what the question 
required, but with the idea that it required her to respond in a certain way. Emma 
may have been troubled partly because she could not conjure at will the feelings 
experienced by someone, such as the mountaineer, who was forced to contemplate 
making an intolerably difficult decision. That said, I also doubt whether Emma must 
simply have suffered from a failure of imagination or empathy. There need not have 
been much wrong with Emma's imagination: she may well have imagined herself 
there on that mountain, not knowing what to do for the best, but knowing 
nevertheless that a decision would have to be made. She struggled, perhaps, with 
the idea of looking the mountaineer in the eyes and telling him whether leaving his 
injured friend would constitute acceptable behaviour. But I suspect that this was 
not all there was to it. Another side of Emma's difficulty might better be described 
as stemming from having, in spite of herself, to approach and answer questions of 
life and death in a peculiarly abstract sort of way. She may have struggled with the 
idea that she, or indeed anyone, could speak for everyone; that any one person 
could be in the possession of the means by which they could specify what we all 
'ought' to recognise as 'acceptable' or 'unacceptable' behaviour across any number 
of hypothetical situations. 
Emma of course may not have put it quite like this. Yet, she would perhaps have 
appreciated that Ms Comberton's question did not require her to begin and end her 
deliberations with specificity: with the lives, thoughts and actions of particular 
individuals. It did not ask whether it would have been acceptable for Joe to leave 
the injured Simon in order to prevent two deaths rather than one. The question 
concerned whether it is ever right to sacrifice one person to save the lives of two. 
The mountain context was in an important sense incidental. One is perhaps 
supposed to recognise that the dilemma faced by the two mountaineers represents 
a single instance of a more general sort of problematic. A broader issue thus hides 
behind the ethical struggles faced by that one man on that particular mountain 
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slope. It is the issue, then, that unites any number of hypothetical mountaineers, 
doctors, sailors, soldiers, teachers, and so on. It was something of this sort that, I 
surmise, Emma recognised, and it troubled her. It troubled her in ways that she 
would nevertheless find it difficult fully to understand or to articulate. Yet, for 
Emma there was something wrong, alien even, in this sort of approach, even if it 
was the approach that she knew she would have to adopt in order to satisfy her 
teacher. 
It would no doubt have been more acceptable if Emma had replied, 'Well, 
sometimes...it depends on the situation', and proceeded to provide and explain a 
couple of conflicting examples. Depending, of course, on how well she went on 
explained both the examples and their relationship to her initial 'point', she would 
at least have been credited with providing a balanced and justified response. Her 
teacher may still have dismissed her as yet another hapless teenage relativist, but 
she would at least have been operating, so to speak, within the spirit of the game. 
But then again, it was not as if Emma must merely have seen two competing 
responses to the question as equally compelling, and couldn't as such, decide 
between them. The problem, perhaps, was that she found it hard to think about the 
question in terms of competing sides, or of being compelled by competing, abstract 
arguments at all. 
I should probably add at this point that I have met Emma. More accurately, as a 
teacher, I have encountered a significant minority of students who seemed 
troubled by the sorts of questions (both by the content and the style) that moral 
philosophers have traditionally asked, and which have found their way, in various 
guises, into the syllabi of countless school curriculum subjects2. Emma is not, then, 
merely a philosopher's fiction, or indeed a fictional philosopher. She is, 
nevertheless, in part a vehicle for expressing my own concern at the concerns of 
these particular students, and with how their unease remains both under-examined 
2 One thinks not only of Philosophy, which at the time of writing is taught and examined only post-
16, but of other subjects too, such as Religious Education, Citizenship, History, Critical Thinking, 
English Language and Literature. 
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and untreated. It is too easy to put such difficulties down to a failure to understand 
the question, and of simply not being capable of the right sort of critical, abstract 
thinking. I have been as guilty as Emma's teacher of adopting this sort of response 
as an easy, general diagnosis. In my own case, a few years of philosophical study 
had meant that such questions no longer appeared strange to me, but had come to 
seem commonplace, even natural. In this sense, of course, Ms Comberton and I 
differed. She at least remained a little confused by the question she had set to the 
class. She also saw, or at least sensed, something problematic about it: something 
that mere re-phrasing or better teacher 'modelling' would not easily resolve. 
Nevertheless, she knew why that question, and a host of similar questions, are set 
in schools; she knew too what sorts of student responses were helpful and 
appropriate, particularly for a class studying for a public examination. The pressing 
immediate demands of the classroom, not to mention having to adhere strictly to a 
Scheme of Work, also prevented her from pursuing her own suspicions, and from 
attending more sympathetically to Emma's. 
Unlike Ms Comberton I can, however, put the immediate pressures of the 
classroom to one side and, in this thesis, take something akin to Emma's 
puzzlement seriously. In short, I believe that Emma was right to be troubled by the 
sort of question she was asked in class. Moreover, I suspect that the problems with 
this and similar 'ethical' questions run deep, and can help to reveal the influences 
of a particular, and still prevalent, approach to philosophical thinking about the 
aims and purposes of moral education. I describe this approach as Philosophical 
Rationalism. I want to be clear from the outset that I do not imagine this to be a 
school of thought with fully paid-up, card-carrying members. It is not intended to 
describe a distinctive movement in either moral philosophy or the philosophy of 
education. Nor is it intended as an easy way of identifying individuals; in fact, it is 
not a way of identifying ('outing') individuals at all. Rather, the writings of the two 
philosophers of education I go on to discuss are said to be 'rationalistic' insofar as 
they appear to share certain attitudes or tendencies towards the role, and the 
value, of ('critical', 'abstract') rationality in approaching ethical questions and 
concerns in the classroom. 
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The philosophical literature on controversial issues makes for a useful starting point 
because it allows one to grasp some major concerns of this rationalistic approach, 
and also to appreciate the nature and extent of its influence on recent trends in 
moral education. The teaching of controversial issues has a fairly recent origin as a 
distinct, or at least a distinctive, area of educational theory and practice (c.f. 
Stradling, 1984). That is not, of course, to suggest that those sorts of issues now 
commonly described as controversial are all somehow new, or have never before 
been the subject of classroom discussion. The point, rather, is that educational 
discussions about how best to understand and handle certain topics in schools, as if 
they required a particular sort of categorisation as controversial, as well as a 
distinctive form or style of teaching, are arguably much more modern. Through 
examining a selection of philosophical contributions to this recent educational 
debate, we can also gain some insight into Emma's question: why it might have 
been set, why it might have taken the form it did, and how it fits with certain views 
of educational aims, including how best to approach ethics, and to present ethical 
problems and concerns, with students. 
(iii) Development and Further Discussion 
The following chapter involves an exploration of Robert Dearden's work on 
understanding and teaching controversial issues in schools, with a particular 
emphasis on his seminal paper: 'Controversial Issues and The Curriculum' (1981). I 
will here take a closer look at Dearden's objections to the 'behavioural criterion' as 
a way of identifying controversial issues, along with why he supposed an epistemic 
approach to be more fruitful in this respect. I will, however, go on to argue: (a) that 
Dearden's attacks on the behavioural criterion fail to make the desired impact on 
their target, and (b) that his account of an alternative, 'epistemic criterion' of 
controversy seems both ambiguous and confused. In terms of how this chapter fits 
with my overall aims, I should make it clear that in critiquing Dearden, I do not seek 
to defend the behavioural criterion against his attacks on it. In fact, I do not aim to 
identify an alternative approach to understanding controversial issues at all. In both 
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describing Dearden's account, and in pointing out the problems I see with it, my 
larger purpose is better seen as preparatory in a different sense. The same can be 
said of my treatment of Michael Hand's updated approach to the epistemic 
criterion in the chapter that follows it. To be clear, the chapters on both Dearden 
(Chapter 2) and Hand (Chapter 3) are not intended simply as self-contained 
critiques, but also as ways of exemplifying (as I will draw out more explicitly in 
Chapter 4) a particular 'rationalistic' attitude shared by both philosophers toward 
ethics and moral education. My overarching aim for the next three chapters, then, 
is to move progressively beyond the assessment of particular sets of arguments 
about how best to approach 'controversial issues' with children, to reveal the 
deeper disquietudes about ethics and education that underpin the work of both 
Dearden and Hand in this area. This is, accordingly, a kind of 'investigation' in 
Wittgenstein's sense, and although its significance extends, I think, beyond the 
immediate discussion, this will not be explored in detail in the thesis. 
I will take up the notions of doubt and disquietude again in Chapter 5, and examine 
the challenges that moral relativism might pose for the foundational ambitions of 
the rationalistic picture I have been sketching. This will lead to consideration of a 
further challenge to the rationalist account in Chapter 6, where I introduce the 
work of Cora Diamond, and her uses of Stanley Cavell's notion of deflection. In 
particular, I explore the idea that an approach to ethics and ethical development 
which centres on the provision of abstract argument, may merely serve to bypass 
the encouragement of certain deeper forms of ethical awareness. Chapter 7 will 
then mark an attempt to move beyond a critique of the certain rationalistic 
tendencies I have identified, and to suggest how a Wittgensteinian approach to 
philosophy points to an alternative, non-deflective, approach to the ethical life. I 
develop this idea further in Chapter 8. Here the focus is on the question of what 
ethical learning and development might look like on the Wittgensteinian account 
described. Finally, in Chapter 9, I return to the school setting. Having by this stage 
outlined a picture of ethics and ethical learning which offers an alternative to the 
rationalistic understanding explored in the first part of the thesis, I examine how 
the use of literature in the classroom can help to encourage this sort of ethical 
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learning, or what I describe elsewhere as a progressive deepening of ethical 
awareness. 
(iv) Aims, Scope and Style 
To avoid as far as possible any misunderstandings of the aims of the thesis, I would 
like to make a couple of brief, preliminary remarks about its scope and style. Given 
my stated aims, the reader will rightly expect to discover here an extended critique 
of a particular 'rationalistic' approach to ethics and moral education, as well as the 
exploration of an alternative, 'non-deflective', account. If this is, indeed, the main 
purpose or direction of the thesis, some other features of its journey may strike one 
as puzzling; even ill-advised. For one thing, the reader will, en route, encounter 
discussion of various other philosophical problems and concerns, including some of 
those which surround understanding and teaching controversial issues, ethical 
doubt, moral relativism, the philosophy of Wittgenstein, the place of personal 
testimony in encouraging ethical development, and, finally, the role of literature in 
helping to promote non-deflective ethical awareness in the classroom. If this scope 
is, as I will argue, relevant both to my critique of 'rationalism' and my advocacy of 
an alternative picture of ethics and moral education, the reader may still reasonably 
be concerned by a question of depth: she may expect much more to be said about 
various problems; she may also desire the inclusion of a far greater range of 
participants in these discussions. 
The problem of selection, which necessarily involves one making certain omissions, 
is of perennial relevance to any writer. In discussing this very problem, although 
philosopher and historical theorist Beverley Southgate (2012; 4) is correct to 
suggest that one can "...invite to our parties only those to whom we have been 
introduced, or of whom we are at least aware...", it also seems that one may still 
invite the wrong people, or otherwise be thought unduly limited in one's range of 
acquaintances. Selection can, nevertheless, be a matter of aims; of strategy. To 
speak of inviting the wrong people, or too few people, to one's party — or indeed to 
one's philosophical discussions — relies, at least in part, on the question of what one 
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intended the proposed gathering to achieve. This thesis, then, is not intended to 
offer a deep and synoptic study of the potentially relevant scholarship in 
understanding Wittgenstein's philosophy, or of moral relativism, or indeed, of how 
to approach controversial issues in the classroom. Nor is it intended specifically to 
advance the scholarly knowledge in any, let alone all, of these fields of study. To be 
clear, what it is intended to do is the following: to engage in a strategic selection 
and deployment of philosophical sources - those which best allow me to marshal 
the arguments I need in order (a) to critique one ('rationalistic') approach to ethics 
and moral education, and (b) to outline and defend another, alternative, picture 
which is informed by Wittgenstein's later philosophical writings. 
I would, finally, like to say something about how terms such as 'ethics', 'morality' 
and 'moral education' will be approached in this thesis. Firstly, my main interest is 
with ethics rather than morality, certainly insofar as the latter can present a far 
narrower conception of what might constitute an ethical life; a particular 'species' 
of answer to the question: 'how should I live?' (c.f. Williams, 1985). To adapt 
Charles Taylor's threefold image of corral, field and forest, my main preoccupation, 
then, is less with the 'corral' of morality, and with the question of what we ought to 
do, and more with the 'field' of ethics, of what it is good to be. I also touch on what 
could be described as the relationship between field and forest: with the 
overlapping territory between the field of ethics and the forest of the 
'unconditional' (c.f. Taylor, 2011). 
This is especially evident in the later chapters devoted to Wittgenstein's philosophy, 
where I speak of deepening ethical awareness; of experiencing, living and 
discerning rather than merely 'grasping' - which often means reasoning or even 
calculating - aspects of the ethical life. It is, however, much less evident in the 
earlier chapters, where I am concerned to understand, and to critique, the 
approach I describe as rationalistic. Here, writers frequently speak of 'moral' and 
'morality' - sometimes in the same breath as 'ethics' or 'ethical'. Secondly, I have 
chosen to persist with the notion of 'moral' education' (rather than speaking of 
'ethical education') when describing, for example, the 'morally' educative role of 
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literature in the classroom. This decision was borne, in part, from convention: 
ethical education still - at least to me - sounds rather awkward compared with the 
more familiar moral education. Of course, talk of moral education carries its own 
risks, not least that I will be taken to be suggesting something narrowly systematic 
or prescriptive. Nevertheless, my use of the term — particularly in the final chapter —
ought to be read in terms of what I say in Chapters 7 and 8 about ethical learning 
and development in the context of Wittgenstein's philosophy. 
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Chapter 2 
Dearden, Reason, and Controversial Issues 
(i) 	 The Behavioural Criterion of Controversy 
It might, at first glance, seem rather surprising that there could be any meaningful 
debate about how best to identify a controversial issue. One would not have to look 
too long or hard to discover a wealth of books, films, artworks, and even songs that 
have been widely condemned, censored or even banned. These works are 
frequently described as controversial, largely because of the issues they examine 
and/or the manner in which those issues are examined and presented. In short, a 
controversial work is so described because it challenges, threatens, offends; it is 
both provocative and divisive, often deeply so. If one attends to everyday parlance, 
the meaning of the word controversial is, then, quite clear: controversy plainly 
implies division, disputation, and disagreement. Closer attention to the etymology 
of the word also supports this conclusion, where the English word controversial 
comes, originally, from the Latin controversus - literally, turned against. Thus, by 
extension, a controversial 'issue' would seem to be one on which people are 
manifestly 'turned against' one another: in short, they are involved in 
disagreement. 
Assuming of course that it is valuable for schools to teach students about 
controversial issues, or that it is at least unavoidable that they will encounter widely 
and deeply contested topics in school, then the question of which particular issues 
to teach as controversial might be considered a straightforwardly empirical one. As 
such, once the everyday meaning of the term controversial is discovered, one 
would need simply to discover which issues were particularly divisive at a given 
time and place, and then select the most appropriate pedagogical strategies to 
teach them. No doubt some rather large survey could assist in highlighting the 
issues where there exists the most profound lack of public consensus. One thinks, 
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perhaps, of something like Gallup's annual Values and Beliefs Survey (2010), 
conducted on a fairly large sample (n= 1,029) of adults living in the United States, 
selected using a random-digit dial telephone sampling technique. The survey 
indeed revealed that "...doctor-assisted suicide is the most controversial of the 
issues tested, with the public tied at 46% over its moral acceptability", while the 
morality of gay or lesbian relationships was also fairly divisive (52% acceptable; 43% 
unacceptable). On this approach, one might then credit Gallup with helping to 
identify two 'controversial issues' which could be included in a school curriculum. 
This manner of approaching the meaning of controversy, and deciding what issues 
might count as controversial, is in keeping with what is described in the educational 
literature as the behavioural criterion of controversy. To use the words of 
philosopher Charles Bailey (1975: 122), an issue is controversial if "...numbers of 
people are observed to disagree about statements and assertions made in 
connection with the issue". His understanding is termed 'behavioural' because it 
proposes that observed or observable 'behaviour' ought to be the decisive factor in 
determining whether an issue is controversial. As such, if public 'behaviour', or 
perhaps more accurately, public opinion, is widely divided on an issue — such as that 
of assisted suicide in the Gallup survey - then that issue is controversial. As Bailey 
(1975: 122) also rather notoriously puts it, whether or not an issue is controversial 
is "...a matter of social fact": it could simply be a 'fact' that an issue profoundly 
divides members of a given society, and hence, whether that issue counts as 
controversial. 
Despite the prima facie plausibility of such an approach, Dearden famously raised 
various concerns about its value as a way of approaching controversy for 
educational purposes. In his paper, 'Controversial Issues and the Classroom' (1981), 
he attacks this type of account on two main counts. His first objection is to argue 
that the mere existence of disagreement on an issue does not provide an adequate 
basis for thinking that an issue is controversial. In essence, this line of attack 
maintains that not all issues that are disputed should count as controversial, while 
not all issues that should count as controversial are much, if at all, disputed (c.f. 
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Hand, 2008: 214). As Dearden puts it, "...much disagreement which socially occurs" 
is likely to reflect either 'simple ignorance' or 'undisciplined assertiveness'. In other 
words, people may clash on an issue simply because some do not know the correct 
answers, even when those answers are readily discoverable (Dearden, 1981: 38). 
Others, such as members the Flat Earth Society, perhaps owing to mere 
stubbornness, or to other vested interests, may sustain disputes by sticking fast to 
what are demonstrably misguided views. Either way, the behavioural criterion, for 
Dearden, proves inadequate because it fails to operate with the requirement that a 
dispute be a reasonable dispute. 
Dearden's second objection is that the behavioural criterion, "could give 
undeserved encouragement to relativism", and thereby promote "...the thought 
that what is true should be collapsed into what some social group regards as true, 
with epidemic relativism and a sociological carnival as the result." (Dearden, 
1981:38). Although it is far from immediately obvious why Dearden thinks that the 
behavioural criterion will promote such socially damaging frivolity amongst the 
young, I suspect he has something like the following scenario in mind. If, as 
educators, 'we' choose to teach certain issues as unsettled (controversial) and 
settled (uncontroversial) simply based on levels of social consensus, then we will 
give the impression that consensus alone, to use Hand's (2008: 218) words, is "...the 
proper warrant for belief". If so, we run the risk of promoting complete disregard 
for the question of whether any competing view on an issue is, in fact, subject to 
"...ungroundedness, inconsistency, invalidity or mere expressiveness of vested 
interest" (Dearden, 1981: 38). 
In the face of such objections, Dearden would have schools and educational policy 
makers abandon the behavioural criterion as a means of establishing what ought to 
count as a controversial issue, and have them adopt an alternative, epistemic 
criterion. For Dearden, then, an issue should count as controversial if, and only if, 
"...contrary views can be held on it without those views being contrary to reason" 
He is quick to clarify what he means by reason, lest we take him to be referring, 
solely, to formal or logical consistency, whereby minimal standards such as the 
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principle of non-contradiction must be met. Reason does not, then, refer to 
something, 'timeless' or `ahistorical', but to the body of "...public knowledge, 
criteria of truth, critical standards...that have so far been developed" (Dearden, 
1981: 38). I leave, for the moment at least, the questions of how far this 
understanding of reason as presupposing 'agreed public standards' is either useful, 
or indeed, fully intelligible. The important point for now, however, is to recognise 
that for Dearden it is the 'reasonableness' of competing sides of a disagreement (in 
that each adheres to these standards) that makes the disputed issue controversial. 
In contrast, to pick out an issue as controversial according to the behavioural 
criterion is to say nothing about the reasonableness of any of the disputed positions 
on that issue. Whereas something akin to the justifiability of an issue is, according 
to Dearden's epistemic criterion, already written into the way that controversy is to 
be understood. On Dearden's approach, then, the existence of unjustifiable views 
on an issue, even if they were particularly widespread, would not be sufficient to 
render that issue controversial. On the other hand, the existence of a 'rationally 
preferable' view on any issue must, thereby, make that issue non-controversial —
that is settled; not controversial at all — quite irrespective of how few people 
actually endorsed such a position. 
(ii) 	 Assessing Dearden's Objections 
In its present form, Dearden's first objection to the behavioural criterion seems to 
beg the question, by confusing two seemingly different questions. One is whether 
or not the existence of widespread dispute is sufficient to render an issue 
controversial, which is actually what the behavioural criterion states; the other is 
centred on whether or not such disputes are either resolved or 'easily resolvable', 
and as such, constitute 'unreasonable disputes'. Without further argument, the fact 
that a widely disputed issue might turn out not to be worthy of dispute seems to 
have little to do with whether widespread dispute is itself an adequate criterion for 
identifying an issue as controversial. As such, the mere existence of unreasonable 
disputes, or disputes which are otherwise relatively simple to settle, does not give 
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us a good basis to think that a disputed issue should or should not be thought 
controversial. Nor, as Michael Hand (2008: 217) points out, does the existence of 
right or widely accepted answers count, "...against there being others who are 
ignorant of the answer and among whom the question remains controversial". 
Hence, on the basis of Dearden's objection alone, the most one can say against the 
behavioural criterion is that it could present us with many controversial issues that 
were, in fact, fairly easy to resolve. Whereas Dearden, seemingly illegitimately, 
wants us to say that the behavioural criterion presents us with many disputed 
issues which are not in fact controversial. 
It is by no means clear that the second objection offers much more than an 
extension of Dearden's first objection, which renders it vulnerable to the same sort 
of counter criticisms. In short, the 'bogey' of relativism is invoked by the fact that 
the behavioural criterion does not, strictly speaking, require a dispute over an issue 
to be a reasonable dispute. As such, young people may grow up with a dangerously 
limited, 'non-rational' understanding of what it means for an issue to be settled or 
unsettled; uncontroversial or controversial. The problem is that, once again, this 
idea seems to rests on confusion between how one should approach or define 
controversy on the one hand, and how one might go about resolving (and teaching) 
controversial issues on the other. Indeed, if one accepts the behavioural criterion, 
and the idea that rational dispute need not form the basis of a criterion by which to 
identify 'the controversial', it by no means implies that one must also accept that 
reason could have no role in allowing teachers to examine and teach controversial 
issues. Or to put it in slightly different terms, to understand controversy 
behaviourally does not imply that disputes could not be approached, or even 
'resolved', epistemically3. 
(iii) Assessing Dearden's Epistemic Criterion 
3 Although, to be clear, I am not actually recommending any such 'approach' to teaching 
controversial issues in this thesis. The point, rather, is to suggest that such an approach could, for 
the sake of argument, be adopted with behaviourally identified controversial issues. 
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In order to move on to assess Dearden's understanding of what might actually 
count as a genuine (epistemic) dispute, let us first remind ourselves how Dearden 
formulates his epistemic criterion. Thus, for Dearden, a matter is controversial if, 
and only if, "...contrary views can be held on it without those views being contrary 
to reason" (Dearden, 1981: 38). And for a viewpoint to fall within the scope of 
reason it should, as we have seen, not contravene the body of "...public knowledge, 
criteria of truth, critical standards...that have so far been developed" (Dearden, 
1981:38). This stance would initially appear to exclude many strange or exotic 
viewpoints which could otherwise be taken seriously if controversy were identified 
behaviourally. For example, a belief that the earth is flat, or that there are gods on 
Olympus, might be cause for some albeit limited disagreement within a given 
society. Such issues would not, however, count as epistemically controversial 
because the evidence and arguments presented in their favour would likely 
contravene publically attested standards of what counts as good evidence, or a 
good argument. 
However, the fact that its formulation is couched in negative terms could lead to 
the accusation that Dearden's account presents a rather 'thin' idea of epistemic 
controversy. As things stand, for a dispute to be rational, competing views need 
only meet the requirement that none are contrary to reason, rather than the 
seemingly more demanding condition that they must actually enjoy the support of 
compelling reasons or evidence. To adapt a familiar if well-worn example to 
illustrate the difference, the hypothesis that an evil demon is deceiving me about 
the grounds of my most cherished beliefs is, arguably, not contrary to reason, 
although there still might be no good, credible reasons to suggest it is in fact the 
case. Of course, it is likely that Dearden would want to claim that the difference 
between his formulation and the more demanding condition is more apparent than 
real. As such, the demonic deceiver 'hypothesis' could well prove contrary to 
reason because there are no good reasons or evidence to suggest that it is in fact 
the case. The point however remains that Dearden does not spell this out, and his 
negative formulation seems readily to invite the charge of permissiveness: that it 
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could allow an issue to count as controversial on the basis of some rather strange or 
obscure ideas that nevertheless do not straightforwardly contradict reason. 
Further problems for Dearden's account come from his attempts to identify the 
broad categories of disagreement which are supposed not to contravene standards 
of reason. The first of his four examples of what might constitute the grounds for 
genuine (epistemic) controversy, concerns those cases where people who broadly 
agree about the means of settling an issue, are nevertheless engaged in dispute 
because they, "...simply have insufficient evidence to settle the matter" (Dearden, 
1981: 38). The second case is where although the wider criteria for guiding rational 
choices are shared between disputants, the weight to be given to various 
'consideration-making criteria' is nevertheless disputed (Dearden, 1981: 39). 
Dearden's example of this type of rational dispute centres on the proposed building 
of a new coal mine where, 'all will agree' that 'environmental and economic criteria 
are relevant'; and yet, the respective weightings given by local residents and the 
'National Coal Board' might be rather different. Dearden's third case is where 
although there "...is no agreement even on the criteria..." to be used to resolve an 
issue, shared commitment to underlying rational standards is clearly in evidence 
(Dearden, 1981: 39). To take Dearden's own example again, although there may be 
no clear rational grounds to prefer consequentialist to deontological approaches on 
the morality of torture, a broad concern for, say, 'consistency and clarity' will be 
equally apparent on both sides of the debate (Peters 1972: 226). Finally, Dearden's 
fourth case is where, "...not just individual criteria..." but "...whole frameworks of 
understanding are different." It is interesting that Dearden uses the controversy 
between the religious believer and non-believer over the "...correct description of a 
great many things in the world", as a good example of where different views may 
be held without either side contravening reason (Dearden, 1981: 39-40). 
Although each of these examples is worthy of further comment, I will focus on the 
second and the fourth. In the second case, and the example of the proposed coal 
mine, Dearden asserts that perfectly 'reasonable' people may agree on broad 
rational 'decision making criteria,' but nevertheless disagree about 'the weight to 
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be given to them.' We might, however, ask what agreement on rational criteria 
could amount to in the example he offers. Here, agreement that criteria are 
'relevant' seems only to require that two parties admit that environmental and 
economic criteria are among the range of considerations that people could bring to 
bear on the issue. Nevertheless, one crucial concern for those who disagree about 
the building of the coal mine could be that their opponents in fact favour the wrong 
criterion. One might even expect them say that it is quite unreasonable, even 
irrational, for the other side to weigh the issue as they do: for them to put, for 
instance, immediate financial gain before long-term environmental damage. To 
agree that certain criteria can be relevant in certain cases may say very little about 
whether people would agree that it is not 'contrary to reason' to apply or to favour 
them in any particular instance4. It is not as though disagreement must simply be 
about the extent to which a criterion applies; it could instead be about whether it is 
right to apply it at all. 
It might be considered unfair of me to criticise Dearden's understanding of this 
class of rational disagreement simply by probing the example he uses to illustrate it. 
Moreover, Dearden could also seek to address my broader concern by suggesting 
that it is, in and of itself, irrelevant if one of the competing sides in a dispute were 
to view the decision making criteria used by the other as contrary to reason. The 
point is that the objective grounds provided by publically attestable standards of 
reason will allow a hypothetical third-party to decide whether they are in fact 
rationally applied. Of course, none of this could be supposed to rule out the 
existence of the class of disagreement Dearden seeks to establish here: cases 
where people do, in fact, agree that decision making criteria are relevant but, unlike 
their opponents, choose not to favour them in a given situation. It could even be 
suggested that my disagreement with Dearden here could be resolved by the 
provision of further examples. (It might even be said that the type of [academic] 
4 If one says that it was rational for an 'opponent' to apply a given criterion (e.g. the economic 
benefits), what one could have in mind is little more than the idea that it was predictable, 
understandable, or consistent, given what is known about the other's motivations and priorities 
('That would be typical of him!', 'Well of course he would say that wouldn't he!', 'It comes as no 
surprise to hear her say that' etc.) 
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disagreement we have on this very issue provides a better example with which to 
illustrate Dearden's point.) 
Perhaps it could be said that Dearden simply finds it easier than I do to imagine 
those engaged in a genuine dispute, such as the proposed building of a coal mine, 
as being willing and able to credit their opponents with applying decision making 
criteria 'rationally'. Moreover, it might also be pointed out that the fact that any 
number of actual disputes might become similarly heated, and thus prevent both 
sides from acknowledging the others' criteria as applied rationally, does not in itself 
damage Dearden's general point that this class of rational disputes can and do 
occur. Nevertheless, I want to suggest that my disagreement with Dearden over his 
example of 'rational dispute' reveals an important difference between us, one that 
is also relevant in emphasising what I see as the rationalistic tendencies in his 
account. 
The question I want briefly to consider at this point, and then pursue in more detail 
later is the following: what are the people in Dearden's example like? In other 
words, what can we say about them as people? This is clearly different from 
inquiring into the purpose of Dearden's example: the answer to this seems simply 
to be that evoking a recognisable, 'real-life' dispute will help to clarify his general 
point. What I will add here is that Dearden's coal mine dispute presents us not only 
with an instance of a disagreement over the use of certain rational criteria, but also 
with an example of 'people' behaving reasonably while in dispute. Insofar as they 
are recognisable as human beings engaged in an actual dispute, the people in 
Dearden's example are those who are willing and able to apply the term 'rational' 
dispassionately to their opponents, even in the midst of a disagreement with them. 
The competing sides are comprised of those who are able to acknowledge that 
their opponents apply criteria that they themselves understand to be relevant, 
although not compelling in this particular context. They are engaged in dispute, but 
are also clear-thinking, reflective, and self-controlled in the midst of disputation. 
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Moving away from Dearden's second example of what might constitute a genuine 
controversy, to his fourth and final example, it appears that his epistemic account 
has all but crumbled into the behavioural one it sought to replace. The trouble 
arises in part because Dearden allows religious worldviews to count as competing 
'frameworks of understanding' which still operate within a wider 'space' or 'sphere' 
of public reason. Although I have a great deal of sympathy with Dearden's desire to 
broaden what might count as a 'rational account', and with the related concern that 
religious outlooks are not automatically regarded as 'non-rational', the examples he 
offers seem nevertheless to open the intellectual floodgates wider that he himself 
would have desired or anticipated. If I understand him correctly, it would seem that 
it is not simply the existence of a particular deity that can be rationally disputed 
between different religious viewpoints, and between the theist and atheist, but the 
'correct description' of the nature and purpose of human life, including perhaps, 
the moral status of numerous activities. Quite aside from the issue of whether we 
ought to include, say, followers of the Jedi, or some other sect, among the class of 
religious believers whose views do not contravene reason, we are seemingly 
committed to accept that the condemnations from world religions of heterosexual 
cohabitation, homosexual sex, Sunday trading, the teaching of evolution in schools 
etc., are based on a 'framework' of understanding that remains rational. Of course, 
if that is so, then according to the epistemic criterion all must count as genuinely 
controversial issues. 
Innumerable other viewpoints might also be seen to offer distinctive, yet 
competing ways of understanding the world, and be situated within long-standing 
traditions of thought and practice. As such, our old friends in the Flat Earth Society 
can boast a long history, along with a distinctive, if 'anarchic' idea of what is to 
count as certainty on empirical matters. Yet, does this mean that we are entitled, 
on Dearden's account, to see their views as rational? Given Dearden's own use of 
flat-earth ideas to attack the permissiveness of the behavioural criterion, this is 
something he would almost certainly deny. However, as things stand, it looks 
doubtful that Dearden's own account ends up being much less permissive: to assert 
the importance of reason in establishing which views are controversial is of little 
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help if almost any view could count as rational according to a different framework 
of understanding. 
(iv) Conclusions 
It is interesting to note something that Dearden says at the end of his article which 
appears further to undermine the supposed advantages of his epistemic criterion. 
Hence: 
The point here is that serious and mature people can be in disagreement 
precisely over what is controversial, in the epistemic sense. One party 
regards the matter as definitely known while the other regards it as 
controversial (Dearden, 1981: 43). 
Dearden then asks, rhetorically, "Can there be a rational solution in such cases?", 
only to raise yet another question: "Does it just depend on who is finally in a 
position to enforce his view?" (Dearden, 1981: 43). Although Dearden is no doubt 
correct to note that people may indeed disagree about what would constitute an 
epistemically controversial issue, and also to attend to the notion of power 
relationships in establishing what might come to count as a rational solution to a 
problem, it is nevertheless striking that such ideas are raised at all. It ought to be 
remembered that they are raised in the concluding paragraph in an article devoted, 
at least in part, to making a case for the superiority of the epistemic criterion for 
deciding what ought to count as a controversial issue for educational purposes. 
One might well ask why, if Dearden's apparent confidence in the objective nature 
of public standards of rationality were well placed, would 'serious and mature' 
people disagree in this manner? Perhaps they should not so diverge if there were 
indeed a rational consensus on what constitutes the grounds for sound argument 
or credible evidence. If Dearden's serious and mature people disagree about what 
counts as an epistemically controversial issue, then it is because (according to the 
terms of Dearden's account at least) they disagree about whether a give position 
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has contravened reason. If one side views an issue as settled, then it is because 
they maintain that only the arguments or evidence offered for one position do not 
contravene certain rational standards. If the other side views the issue as 
controversial, then it is because they hold that more than one position is supported 
by arguments or evidence that are not contrary to reason. Because they disagree 
about whether a given case is rationally disputed they also disagree, in this sense at 
least, about what a rational dispute looks like. If this were the case, then one might 
say that there is little benefit in adopting Dearden's view that a dispute must 
adhere to certain 'shared' rational standards when people do not actually agree on 
what adherence to such standards would require. One might also suggest that 
Dearden has started to undermine the grounds he provided for the superiority of 
his epistemic criterion over its behavioural predecessor: one could hardly use the 
notion of a rational dispute as a reliable means of identifying controversial issues, if 
the nature of rational dispute is, in fact, rationally disputed. 
One possible reply here is to suggest that while such broad convergences on the 
nature of rational standards do in fact exist, there may always be a few borderline 
cases where there are disagreements about whether those standards are in fact 
satisfied. Hence, the existence of such issues ought hardly to weaken our 
confidence in public standards of rationality in toto; nor should they prevent 
Dearden from identifying controversial issues on the basis of competing views 
which do not contravene such standards. A deeper problem, however, appears still 
to remain. It is centred not so much on the extent to which 'serious' people agree 
on what counts as a rational dispute (and thus on what counts as an epistemically 
controversial issue), but on Dearden's continued reliance on the notions of 
convergence or consensus. 
We are reminded how, for Dearden, the behavioural criterion is likely to cause 
educational damage because it relies on social consensus (and the lack of such 
consensus) in order to identify controversial issues. Dearden thus sought to avoid 
this situation by replacing social consensus with rational consensus, whereby an 
issue is to count as controversial if the support offered for it does not contravene 
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'standards of reason' on which there is public agreement and consensus. These 
standards, of course, can only count as standards because people have agreed to 
treat them as such. The difference between this agreement of rational standards, 
and the sort of agreement presupposed by the behavioural criterion, is that the 
former consensus is reached by the right sort of people. Although one might want 
to use the term 'rational agreement' in this case, as opposed to mere 'social 
agreement', the distinction is somewhat disingenuous given that the reasoning that 
underpins it seems to be circular. What would make a case one of 'rational 
agreement' would, I take it, be that the people who agree with one another are 
those rationally disposed, 'mature and serious' people, that Dearden speaks about 
in his paper. And yet, what allows us to call them 'rational' people other than they 
have in fact agreed to the adoption of certain rational standards? It would then 
seem that they have agreed to such standards because they are, in fact, 'rational' 
people, and they are 'rational' and serious-minded people because they have 
agreed to the standards. Hence, we seem to be presented with the situation where 
there are no mature and serious-minded people who do not also agree with the 
standards of reason; and no standard of reason which is not also agreed on by 
mature and serious minded people. 
What is more, when Dearden speculates whether a rational solution to 
disagreement between serious people about what might count as a genuinely 
controversial issue might "...just depend on who is finally in a position to enforce his 
view?" his epistemic criterion seems further to collapse into some version of the 
behavioural criterion (Dearden, 1981: 43). For here the crucial factor in determining 
whether an issue counts as epistemically controversial is simply whether or not one 
has the power to make one's view stick. So, whether or not a dispute is considered 
'rationally' resolved might actually be determined by the decisions of an influential 
group, or groups, of people: those in the position to enforce their preferred 
standards of rationality as the only acceptable standards in this case; the only 
genuinely rational considerations. Hence, in all, it is possible that Dearden's 
confidence in the agreed nature of rational standards may reveal more about the 
kinds of power relationships that exist where decisions are made about what could 
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count as a rational dispute, than it does about any intrinsic, or epistemic nature of 
the disputed issues themselves. 
In spite of the problems I have highlighted with Dearden's account, I still view his 
paper as a deep and serious attempt at mitigation: as affecting important 
educational damage limitation. Dearden writes with an awareness of the growing 
influence of various trends which seemed to threaten to sweep away much of what 
he viewed as valuable in education. As I will make clear in Chapter 4, we find 
Dearden attempting a balancing act through his work on controversial issues; one 
which represents, I think, an attempt to square the aims of a liberal curriculum 
(which includes a range of subjects in which debate and disagreement form a 
prominent part), with the swelling tide of positivistic thinking about education, and 
the increasingly politicised nature of public debate surrounding the school 
curriculum. In fact, I will go on to point out that many of the problems I have 
highlighted with what Dearden has to say about the epistemic criterion, for 
example his reliance on the notion of rational consensus, stem from the fact that he 
ends up conceding too much to positivism. While it is true that Dearden's work 
does reveal something of the rationalist attitude I also seek to draw out in Chapter 
4, it also offers much more than mere exemplification. In an important sense, then, 
we might also read it as a piece of intellectual history: one that helps to throw light 
on the origins of more recent philosophical discussions of controversial issues, and 
also on the growing ubiquity of 'Emma's question' - and others that resemble it -
across various subject areas in schools. 
For the present, however, I will move to examine the work of Michael Hand on 
understanding controversial issues. This proves valuable both by way of a 
comparison with Dearden's work on controversial issues — which Hand seeks to 
both adopt and refine — and also because Hand's thought will help me to reveal 
some further facets of what I see as a rationalistic approach to thinking about ethics 
and moral education. 
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Chapter 3 
Hand and Rational Controversy 
(i) 	 Mending Dearden's Epistemic Criterion 
Although Michael Hand (2007; 2008) considers the epistemic criterion as the most 
promising way for schools to approach controversial issues, he nevertheless seeks 
to adapt and improve on Dearden's version. The main thrust of Hand's modification 
of Dearden's formulation is centred on developing what he calls an 'expanded 
argument', which attempts to reveal the core aims of education that an application 
of the behavioural criterion "...might reasonably be thought to frustrate." This 
argument rests on the 'normative premise' that "the central aim of education is to 
equip students with a capacity for, and an inclination to, rational thought and 
action." Of course, if 'we', as educators, are truly serious about promoting 
rationality, then for Hand, we must be equally serious about "...teaching students to 
judge candidates for belief against the evidence or arguments in their support" 
(Hand, 2008: 218). In short, teachers must encourage students to accept a claim 
only if "...the evidence is epistemically adequate". Against these supposedly core 
educational commitments, Dearden's concerns about the inadequacy of the 
behavioural criterion, and its promotion of relativism, are also seen to become 
'readily intelligible'. For, as Hand supposes, the behavioural criterion, "...requires 
teachers to refrain from endorsing a view on any issue about which there is 
controversy", even, of course, "...when only one view is epistemically justifiable" 
(Hand, 2008: 218). 
For Hand, it would seem that this requirement "...cannot do other than convey to 
students the message that epistemic considerations are not decisive". If epistemic 
considerations are not thought decisive in determining whether an issue ought to 
be thought settled, then teachers once again run the risk of promoting "...the sort 
of relativist thinking that Dearden is anxious to avoid" (Hand, 2008: 218). One must 
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read slightly between the lines to discover why Hand thinks his vindication of 
Dearden's concerns about the educational use of the behavioural criterion actually 
provides a positive reason to favour the epistemic criterion. As things stand, Hand 
has not seemingly shown why it is superior to its behavioural competitor in meeting 
this 'core' aim of education, or, indeed, that there is not a different formulation 
that is superior to both. Here, one must suppose that, for Hand, only when 
controversial issues are defined and selected on the basis of rational dispute can 
the young truly be immersed in, and grow to use and respect, the power of rational 
argument. The epistemic criterion is to be favoured because it is the only method of 
approaching controversial issues that gives priority to the notion of epistemic 
adequacy; ergo, it is the only criterion that is fully compatible with the core 
educational aim of developing pupils' rationality. 
Hand's modification of the epistemic criterion also includes clarification of the 
wording of Dearden's formulation. Dearden's own apparent lack of clarity on what 
it might mean for opposing viewpoints not to contravene reason arguably led to the 
following objection lodged against his epistemic criterion by Peter Gardner (1984). 
Here, Gardner takes Dearden's requirement that competing views on a 
controversial issue should not be contrary to reason to entail that the issue would 
be one on which, 'reason favours neither side'; and where contrary views must 
appear, 'equally sound and reasonable' (Gardner, 1984: 381). He then asks how a 
person genuinely confronted with two equally rational viewpoints could prefer one 
to the other; on what basis is such a person entitled to take a view at all? For 
Gardner, the only truly rational approach in this situation would be for them to 
suspend judgement on the matter. 
This certainly appears to present the epistemic criterion with a problem. To 
understand an issue as controversial according to the epistemic criterion would be 
to understand it as an issue on which one could not rationally adopt a position. If 
one were to adopt a certain stance, the issue could no longer count as 
controversial: reason would, so to speak, have favoured one side of the dispute 
over the other. If the only rational response to a controversial issue is agnosticism, 
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one could indeed ask whether Dearden is not, somewhat ironically, left to cope 
with his own second objection to the behavioural criterion: that it too may give 
undue encouragement to some variety of relativism because it would present 
controversial issues as, to adapt Hand's words, ones on which reason alone "...can 
get no purchase" (Hand, 2008: 220). For Hand, however, Gardner's objection fails to 
deliver a knock-out blow to the epistemic criterion once it is appropriately adapted. 
It appears instead to be based on a misunderstanding of what is required for 
contrary viewpoints not to contravene reason. 
If Dearden's version of the epistemic criterion does little to prohibit the idea that 
'rational dispute' implies the epistemic equivalence of competing positions, Hand's 
account does seem to go some way in addressing Dearden's seeming ambivalence, 
and providing a way of side-stepping Gardner's attack. Nevertheless, the safe-house 
he erects is both temporary and unstable. To reveal how Hand's position itself 
becomes entangled in similar difficulties will require a clear account of his epistemic 
criterion, and how exactly it is supposed to meet Gardner's objection. Before I 
pursue this, however, I want to make clear that Gardner's objection remains a 
problem for Hand only insofar as he is wedded to a particular approach to the 
nature of reason and reasoning. And as I will also make clear in Chapter 4, when 
bringing together certain strands in the accounts of Dearden and Hand, this 
approach bears many of the hallmarks of what I call philosophical rationalism. As 
such, Gardner's attack should not be treated as a final, all-out assault on the 
efficacy of 'reason' when approaching, say, ethical controversy, but instead, as a 
cause for concern only insofar as a particular (rationalistic) approach to thinking 
about such issues is being endorsed. 
(ii) Answering Gardner's Objection? 
There are times when Hand quotes Dearden's 'negative' formulation of the 
epistemic criterion with apparent approval, as the following passage makes clear: 
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The answer I propose to defend is that a matter should be taught as 
controversial when "contrary views can be held on it without those views 
being contrary to reason" (Hand, 2008: 217). 
While elsewhere he offers what looks to be a different, more demanding account: 
where an issue is controversial if, and only if "...two or more conflicting views on a 
matter enjoy the support of corroborating evidence or credible arguments." (Hand, 
2008: 217). If we can safely assume that Hand does not wish to endorse two 
different versions of the epistemic criterion, it would appear that he understands a 
viewpoint not to contravene reason if, and only if, it enjoys the support of evidence 
or arguments that are at least credible. 
That competing views on an epistemically controversial issue need only enjoy the 
support of credible reasons provides the basis for a reply to Gardner. As I have 
suggested, Gardner's objection seems to be directed at something like the notion of 
epistemic equivalence, where competing viewpoints are understood to enjoy the 
support of equally good reasons or evidence insofar that none contravene reason. 
Hand insists that such equivalence is not implied by the epistemic criterion. Instead, 
he argues that it is quite reasonable to find the grounds for one credible position 
'less persuasive' than another, while acknowledging that the arguments or evidence 
for the rejected position also remain credible. For Hand, then, I can be 
"...simultaneously confident in my own reading of the evidence..." on a 
controversial topic, and still be "...willing to recognise that other readings are both 
possible and rationally credible." (Hand, 2008: 220). So, even though I might come 
to reject one set of credible supporting reasons as less plausible than another, the 
issue, contra Gardner, remains controversial because more than one competing 
viewpoint is supported by credible arguments or evidence. 
It might also be said that Gardner mistakenly ties the notion of rational credibility 
to that of compellingness. He assumes that the epistemic criterion requires us to 
understand any view which does not contravene reason as rationally compelling. 
For Hand, a controversial issue should instead be understood as one on which there 
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are no rationally compelling positions. Credibility itself does not imply 
compellingness. Of course, as long as rational credibility were supposed to 
guarantee compellingness, then each competing view on an issue supported by 
credible reasons should be thought rationally compelling. One would, then, have 
simultaneously to endorse every competing view, which would be patently absurd, 
or otherwise suspend judgement on the issue and remain agnostic. To avoid this 
dilemma, Hand insists that only viewpoints supported by what are called 
'epistemically adequate' reasons should be found rationally compelling. If a 
viewpoint on any issue were supported by epistemically adequate reasons it would 
count as a 'settled' rather than a controversial issue; as definitely 'known' rather 
than merely rationally contested. For example, it is on this basis that Hand 
understands the moral permissibility of homosexual sex as a non-controversial 
issue. For, "...the view that homosexual acts are morally legitimate" is the only 
option that enjoys 'rational support'; in the absence of any credible arguments 
against it, the reasons in favour reach beyond credibility to the level of epistemic 
adequacy required to settle the issue (Hand, 2007: 84). 
If Hand manages to side-step Gardner's objection, he does not I think defeat it. His 
account still fails to deal effectively with the suspicion that epistemic controversy 
implies the epistemic equivalence of competing views on an issue. While he denies 
that any credible position could be considered rationally compelling, he still wants 
to claim that competing viewpoints supported by credible evidence and arguments 
could be more or less persuasive. If he did not accept this, Gardner's point that 
agnosticism is the only properly rational response to an epistemically controversial 
issue would stand unscathed. Hence, in the following passage Hand discusses the 
range of rational possible responses for someone confronted with a controversial 
issue, and on what basis they may adopt a position: 
In some cases they may opt to remain agnostic, on the grounds that they 
consider the evidence to be inconclusive and see no pressing need to 
commit themselves one way or the other. But in other cases they will judge 
one view to be significantly more plausible than its rivals, or will commit 
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themselves to a view they find only marginally more plausible because of 
some practical imperative to take a position. None of these options is 
incompatible with recognizing that the matter at hand is such that other, 
equally rational people will judge the available evidence and arguments 
differently and thus come to different conclusions (Hand 2008: 220). 
It is clear that plausibility admits of degrees here: credible positions can indeed 
appear more or less plausible. It is also clear that in some borderline cases, one 
could be prompted to adopt a stance on a controversial issue by so-called extra-
rational considerations: a 'pressing need,' or a 'practical imperative'. The existence 
of such practical considerations would not, however, appear to increase the 
plausibility of any one position on an issue; nor would it prevent someone from 
simply endorsing a significantly more plausible position on the basis of credible 
evidence alone. This is to say that practical considerations are understood by Hand 
to provide little more than an additional push to abandon agnosticism, and to adopt 
on epistemic grounds alone, the marginally more plausible view. 
The point, however, is that if one credible position is considered more plausible 
than another solely on the basis of its supporting evidence or arguments, the 
credibility of supporting reasons is thereby sufficient to guarantee the level of 
plausibility required for one to endorse it. Even if one assented to a view that 
appeared only marginally more plausible than another, it would be on the basis 
that its credible supporting evidence is more plausible, more persuasive, than that 
of its competitors. In supplying no additional grounds for accepting a viewpoint on a 
controversial issue beyond the credibility of a set of supporting reasons, we can 
now see why Hand again faces Gardner's objection that to understand a 
controversial issue epistemically is to understand it as one on which reason alone 
can get no purchase. The problem re-emerges with the decision about which of the 
competing viewpoints on a controversial issue one ought rationally to accept. 
Hand clearly wants to understand a controversial issue as one where there is an 
absence of epistemically adequate, compelling reasons for belief, and also as one 
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where it is possible to rationally adopt any of the credible competing positions. But 
in what sense could one position be said to be preferable, rationally speaking? 
Either the supporting evidence or arguments for one credible viewpoint are 
stronger in a sense that any rational person ought to prefer them, or else they 
appear more plausible for me, because I am the person that I am. In which case, I 
could also readily admit that they might not seem so persuasive to another person 
with a quite different character and history. To adopt the former position would 
make it hard for Hand to maintain that the issue could remain controversial: if there 
are independent, rational considerations that call for the assent of any rational 
person, they ought surely to settle the issue. 
To admit instead that beyond credibility there are no impersonal criteria for 
rational preferability, no basis that should force the hand of any rational person, 
could be seen as conceding Gardner's point that a controversial issue is one on 
which 'reason' can get little grip. It is as if the appeal to reason can lead us into the 
arena of the controversial only to abandon us once we get inside. This is also 
another way of saying that Gardner's problem of epistemic equivalence has not 
gone away. If Hand understands a controversial issue as one on which more than 
one viewpoint is supported by credible evidence or arguments, and there is no 
single, independent rational basis to prefer one credible position to another, then 
the positions do appear to be epistemically equivalent. And if two or more views on 
an issue are epistemically credible, and it is no less contrary to publicly agreed 
standards of rationality to adopt any one credible view, it seems that one must 
indeed remain agnostic on the issue as Gardner suspected, or else appeal to 
another, less impersonal basis to end the impasse. 
If an alternative route is for Hand to adopt a more perspectival account of rational 
preferability, there are grounds for thinking that he would not want to follow it. 
Here, whether or not someone came to endorse any particular viewpoint on an 
epistemically controversial issue is more a matter of their personal history: a history 
that opens one up to certain types of consideration while restricting and closing 
down other possibilities. Other 'equally rationally people', to adopt Hand's phrase, 
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with different experiences and preoccupations would no doubt see things 
differently. They might of course agree that each other's views are rationally 
credible, in that none are flatly 'contrary to reason', but would still see the other as 
holding a position that they could not themselves accept. One reason Hand would 
be disinclined to adopt this sort of perspectivism is, I suspect, that it could be 
thought to encourage the 'slide into subjectivism' that concerned Gardner about 
adopting the epistemic criterion. It might well give the impression that once we 
enter the realm of the epistemically controversial, we must indeed, "...trust to 
subjective preference and cannot trust to reason" (Gardner, 1984: 381). 
It is certainly difficult to see how it would fit with what Hand has to say about the 
aims of education. Here, the "...core educational aim is to equip students with a 
capacity for, and an inclination to, rational thought and action"; where students 
should be encouraged to accept a claim, "...if, and only if, the evidence is 
epistemically adequate." (Hand, 2008: 214; 218). Of course, given Hand's 
terminology, issues on which there is an epistemically adequate claim count as 
'settled' rather than controversial. The point, nevertheless, is that the grounds for 
endorsing such claims seem to lie beyond the 'personal', beyond what may merely 
strike me as compelling, and in the epistemic adequacy of the reasons themselves. 
The force of the reasons demand our assent as rational thinkers. And if there is no 
perspectival account of compellingness, it would be strange for Hand to introduce a 
perspectival account of persuasiveness in his account of controversial issues. There 
is certainly little indication that when a 'rational person' encounters a controversial 
issue, and aims to make their decision rationally, according to "the best available 
evidence and arguments", they should for Hand allow perspectival concerns to 
interfere unduly with their assessment of the reasons (Hand, 2008: 220). Yet, 
without such an account, it is hard to see how any move from credibility to 
persuasiveness could be made on the basis of reason alone, at least as Hand seems 
to understand it. In short, on Hand's account it seems that the rational person is 
forced again into the clutches of agnosticism. 
(iii) The Educational Implications of the Epistemic Criterion 
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In discussing the implications of Gardner's concern about how one could rationally 
endorse any view on a controversial topic, what Hand does is to shift the focus of 
the debate back to education. Here, Gardner's worries about the epistemic 
criterion are seen to result, at least in part, from his failure to acknowledge the 
'important distinction' between "...believing that one knows the answer to an 
epistemically controversial question and believing that one has the right to impart 
that answer to students." Hence, the basis I have for endorsing a particular view on 
a controversial issue should not entitle me, as an educator, "to ensure that my 
students come to the same conclusion". Whether or not my preferences derive 
from something peculiar to my nature and history, the important educational point 
is that as a teacher I ought merely to encourage my students to come to their own 
decisions on the basis of 'the best available evidence and arguments'. For Hand, a 
teacher's "...awareness of the fact that different answers to a question can 
reasonably be inferred from the same evidence..." ought rightly to 'trump' their 
confidence in the correctness of their own preferred solution. The teacher's job 
when teaching about a controversial issue is to present as neutrally as possible the 
arguments and evidence given in support of the range of epistemically credible 
views (Hand, 2008: 220). 
It is not, however, as if the question of what entitles someone to prefer a certain 
viewpoint on a controversial topic could so easily be side-lined; superseded by the 
question of how such topics should be taught in schools. This is particularly relevant 
given what Hand himself has to say about the centrality of rational development as 
an educational aim. For what message could the teacher now give about the role of 
reason in deciding which viewpoint to prefer on an epistemically controversial 
topic? Consider, for example, the case of abortion: an 'issue' that would I assume 
count as controversial according to Hand's epistemic criterion. On Hand's account, 
although there may be no compelling reasons to adopt, say, a 'pro-choice' over a 
'pro-life' stance, we could nevertheless acknowledge that both types of position 
were supported by credible reasons. This would not for Hand prevent us from 
reaching a rational position on the 'issue': it would not stop us from finding one 
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viewpoint either marginally, or even significantly, more plausible. Yet, even if one 
found the arguments in favour of the pro-choice stance significantly more plausible, 
one must nevertheless acknowledge that it is no less rational for someone else to 
adopt a 'pro-life' position. 
The risk is that according to this position, the message a teacher would deliver to 
students is that, rationally speaking, it makes not a jot of difference which position 
they choose, if in fact they choose at all. Not only could this send the message that 
epistemic considerations are not decisive in allowing students to make up their 
minds about an issue like abortion, it runs the risk of promoting the idea (one that 
Hand wants to counter) that we ought to abandon reason altogether in such cases. 
For what, one might ask, is the point of thinking long and hard about such issues 
when one may as well go along with, say, the pro-choice views of one's peers, or 
trust instead to one's pro-life gut instinct? (C.f. Hand, 2008: 218). This again appears 
tantamount to admitting that having helped the teacher identify certain 
epistemically controversial issues with students, reason (certainly as Hand seems to 
understand it) must now raise both hands in resignation, and admit, 'I've gone as 
far as I can. Now it's over to you...' 
(iv) Conclusions 
To make things worse, Hand's epistemic criterion also helps to mask at least one 
reason why certain 'issues' are commonly thought to be controversial: they involve 
problems that continue to matter to people, often quite profoundly. This links to 
Gardner's concern that "...a purely epistemic account will not guarantee the 
satisfaction of the social condition of an issue being regarded as important" 
(Gardner, 1984: 381). So, while Dearden is rightly concerned that not teaching 
controversial issues would 'misrepresent' the true nature of curriculum subjects, 
Gardner is also right to say that we also, "...misrepresent the frontiers of subjects 
and the nature of heated disputes..." if we simply present them as areas "...where 
disputants must acknowledge..." that reason favours neither side (Gardner, 
1984:383). The misrepresentation, however, goes deeper still; beyond the question 
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of how best to understand and represent various subjects on a school syllabus, and 
so to knotty and seemingly intractable ethical problems, and why they continue to 
be socially disputed. 
If the epistemic criterion might be said to gloss over the deep cracks of various 
ethical disputes with the thinnest coat of reason, the behavioural criterion itself 
attends only to the range of surface fissures. Hence, what appears to make an 
'issue' like abortion controversial is not simply that disagreement over the issue is 
widespread, as Charles Bailey would seem to suggest. An ethical dispute is not the 
same as a squabble, however many people may be involved in the latter. The ethics 
of abortion are disputed, intractably so, in part because the 'issue' continues to 
touch at various points on what matters most to people; the level of fundamental 
values, or to quote from a poem by Philip Larkin, on "...what we think truest, or 
most want to do."5 The disagreements generated are often characterised by raised 
temperatures and bitter exchange; where there is precious little agreement about 
what criteria should be appealed to in discussing and 'resolving' the issue (c.f. 
Dearden, 1981: 86-7). Indeed, without reference to the quality or depth of the 
disagreements generated by such problems, it seems that Hand fails fully to 
appreciate the need to understand 'controversial issues' for the purpose of 
teaching as deeply sensitive issues: those which might demand not just that a 'non-
directive' teacher examine the strength of competing sets of evidence and 
arguments with pupils, but that she proceeds in her teaching with great delicacy 
and care. 
5 From Larkin, P (1988) 'Dockery and Son' in Collected Poems, London: Faber. 
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Chapter 4 
Controversial Issues and 'Philosophical 
Rationalism' 
(i) Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to bring together various strands in the work of Dearden 
and Hand on understanding and teaching controversial issues, and show how they 
reveal an approach to ethics and moral education which can be described as 
rationalistic. I do not aim in this chapter to provide arguments against the 
rationalistic features in their respective accounts, but merely to identify them as 
present in these accounts. This will, however, form part of a larger concern to begin 
to widen the discussion from understanding and teaching controversial issues in 
schools, to how ethical problems and concerns are to approached and addressed 
educationally. What I will begin to reveal, then, is what a rationalistic approach to 
such questions looks like, and why it might also take this sort of form. This will 
enable me, in Chapter 5, to go on to identify the deeper anxieties that seem both to 
inspire and underpin the various features of the rationalistic approach to ethics and 
moral education revealed in this chapter. 
(ii) 'Rationalism' and Objective Standards 
Let us begin our discussion of philosophical rationalism by reminding ourselves how 
Deaden makes clear that in speaking of the 'standards of reason', he does not refer 
to something 'timeless or unhistorical,' but to the body of "...public knowledge, 
criteria of truth, critical standards...that have so far been developed" (Dearden, 
1981: 38). It seems clear enough that Dearden seems to have in mind here 
something akin to the publicly attested forms of human endeavour epitomised by 
the physical sciences: while new scientific discoveries are made, and old theories 
revoked, the informing standards that underpin each of these discoveries or 
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theories are supposed to be broadly constant. Nevertheless, it is also clear from 
Dearden's paper on controversial issues, that other 'subject' areas beyond the 
physical sciences are marked by a similar constancy of rational standards. It is this, 
perhaps, that allows Dearden to suggest that it is 'uncontroversial' that Turner was 
a 'better' painter than himself, and that theological disagreements about the true 
description of the world, can be viewed in the light of something akin to R.S. Peter's 
talk of 'traditions of inquiry', each underpinned by differing 'frameworks' of 
rationality. What makes each of these areas of human knowledge and enquiry 
worthy of the epithet of 'rational' is, for Dearden, that one can seemingly detect in 
each 'domain' a certain stability of values: a general modus operandi; a constancy 
of shared standards. 
This is not to say that reason for Dearden is wholly domain specific, or that there 
were not any rational standards shared between the diverse domains of human 
knowledge. One would again do well to acknowledge his sympathy with something 
akin to Peters' view of the basic educational endeavour, whereby one's life 
becomes transformed through internalising the very principles "...which give 
structure and point to theoretical enquiries". The educated person, then, is to be 
filled with a sense of wonder before the facts, a sense of humility in the face of 
human endeavours in the arts and sciences, a broad concern for 'consistency and 
clarity' and a generalised 'hatred' for "...irrelevance and other forms of 
arbitrariness" (Peters 1972: 226). It is these basic standards that underpin both the 
arts and the sciences, and unite the various frameworks of reason offered in each 
and every legitimate domain of enquiry. It is adherence to these basic standards 
that in part makes any field of human endeavour worthy of inclusion as a 'subject' 
in the school curriculum. One is reminded, perhaps, of a passage from Louis 
MacNeice's Autumn Journal, and the idea that the ancient Greeks provided, at least 
for the humanist in "...his room with Jacobean panels", various ways of training the 
modern mind through a university syllabus based on "...models of logic and lucidity, 
dignity sanity..." (MacNeice, 1990: 58). For Dearden too, while each area of human 
endeavor and enquiry can be clearly separated into different 'subjects' with varying 
aims and methods, and while the clarity revealed in, say, a history essay differs 
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from that expressed in a mathematical equation, it is crucial that the value of clarity 
is present in both insofar as they are domains of human knowledge (and know-
how) at all. 
The key question in this respect concerns why Dearden placed so much weight on 
the question of how best to understand controversial issues, rather than on simply 
how best to teach students about such issues. Given that it is at least plausible that 
schools could adopt the same clear and balanced approaches to teaching regardless 
of how they chose to select an issue as controversial, the reasons for Dearden's 
insistence that they ought to adopt an alternative, epistemic criterion, do indeed 
require exploration and clarification. Schools could, for example, still have 
encouraged students to examine the respective force of reasons given by 
competing positions on controversial issues, even if such issues were identified 
behaviourally. One might well argue, then, that the epistemic criterion is surplus to 
requirements: even if certain views on various controversial issues (identified 
behaviourally) were clearly unjustifiable, then it would presumably not take too 
long for students to discover this for themselves, if they were encouraged to 
identify and critically weigh-up the reasons proponents commonly give for holding 
such views. 
There are, I think, at least two strands to a satisfactory answer as to why Dearden 
sought to encourage the use of an epistemic criterion. The first requires us to 
attend to the perceived aims of education, and to what aim or aims the use of the 
behavioural criterion would, for Dearden, be supposed to contravene. The second, 
involves further examination of the social, political and intellectual climate of the 
1970's and 80's, insofar as public debate about the nature and purposes of 
education had a bearing on Dearden's views about teaching controversial issues. 
Both strands are related; both also coincide insofar as they help to reveal 
something of the influence of philosophical rationalism in shaping the background 
concerns and preoccupations which informed Dearden's discussion of teaching 
controversial issues. 
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(iii) Rational Development and Educational Aims 
One way to better understand the first of the two strands of influence on Dearden's 
account of controversial issues, is to consider the supposed gaps in that account 
identified by Michael Hand (Hand, 2007; 2008). For Hand, then, Dearden not only 
fails adequately to explain, "...how or why application of the behavioural criterion is 
liable to result in epidemic relativism.", he also neglects to supply an account of the 
educational aims, "...that the encouragement of relativism might reasonably be 
thought to frustrate" (Hand, 2008:218). As we have seen in Hand's own reworking 
of the epistemic criterion, he proceeds to make explicit what Dearden is accused of 
omitting. To be fair to Dearden, however, he seems far clearer about why 
'relativism' might actually be encouraged by the behavioural criterion than Hand 
appears to suppose. Hence, he argues: 
If all that is needed is for a number of people to assert a counter-opinion for 
the matter to become controversial, regardless of that counter-assertion's 
ungroundedness, inconsistency, invalidity or mere expressiveness of a 
vested interest, then even the shape of the earth becomes at once 
controversial (Dearden, 1981: 86). 
Recalling Charles Bailey's use of the phrase, Dearden proceeds to point out that it is 
'a matter of social fact' that some still believe the earth to be flat. Yet, he goes on to 
ask, somewhat dismissively, "...what have such social facts to do with the shape of 
the earth?". It would not only be foolish to treat this issue as controversial simply 
because of the wilful persistence of some individuals, it could also be dangerous: 
encouraging the thought that, "...what is true should be collapsed into what some 
social group regards as true" (Dearden, 1981: 86). The idea that we are left with no 
other standard beyond social consensus by which to judge the settledness of an 
issue is at least reminiscent of some form of relativism. For to recall and adapt 
Protagoras's injunction, 'Man', or at least the society of 'men', becomes the sole 
measure of all things controversial. Moreover, if the behavioural criterion allows 
the shape of the earth to count as controversial simply because it is disputed, then 
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there is little to prevent any issue counting as controversial if some prominent 
groups in society disagree on how to resolve it. So, for Dearden, it seems clear that 
without the provision of some other criterion beyond the mere social fact of 
disagreement, we may well end up in our schools with a situation where 'anything 
goes': where the quality of the evidence or arguments presented for a viewpoint 
are not considered conclusive in such matters, if they are even considered at all. 
Although none of this does much to advance his objections against the behavioural 
criterion, the nature of the supposed educational damage caused by use of the 
behavioural criterion is at least a little more clear. And while it is fair to say that 
unlike Hand, Dearden never spells-out that, "The central aim of education" is to 
"equip students with a capacity for rational thought and action", the substance of 
his concerns about the potential damage caused by epidemic relativism point us 
very much in that direction (Hand, 2008: 218). In this respect, Dearden's fear that 
adopting the behavioural criterion might allow 'ungrounded', 'inconsistent' and, 
'invalid' views to play a central role in forming our understanding of controversy, is 
telling. Relativism, as Dearden seems to have understood it, would pose a clear 
threat to public standards of rationality: those "...criteria of truth, critical standards, 
and verification procedures..." that underpin his development of an alternative, 
epistemic criterion of what is to count as controversial (Dearden, 1981: 38). 
Moreover, his concerns about the 'endemic relativism' encouraged by the 
behavioural criterion will not make much sense unless we view this perceived 
danger as contravening what else he held to be educationally valuable. 
For Dearden, as for Hand, it seems that it is nothing short of pupils' rational 
development that will be 'frustrated' if we allow them to think that reaching a 
judgement on a complex issue involves little more than personal preference, or an 
otherwise whimsical selection from a range of different standpoints. This is a clearly 
undesirable outcome, particularly given Dearden's wider sympathy with the idea 
that to remain insufficiently grounded in rational 'forms of knowledge' is to fail to 
become a fully developed human being (Dearden, 1972; Peters, 1972). Indeed, it is 
equally apparent from what Dearden says about the educational benefits of 
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teaching controversial issues that the development of 'rational faculties' is held in 
high regard. Hence, given the correct exposure to such issues, pupils will likely 
become 'better informed' and 'more discriminating' (Dearden, 1981: 41). And yet, 
we would also do well to remember that for Dearden, the teaching of controversial 
issues could be truly beneficial only if our understanding of controversial falls firmly 
under the jurisdiction of reason. If not, pupils could well develop a kind of misology: 
a distrust or disregard for the roles of reason and evidence in forming and settling 
disputes, along, perhaps, with the attendant belief that the existence of widespread 
and persistent dispute means that there is no real truth to be had. 
(iv) Controversy and the need for Objective Standards 
...it often happens that a philosophical position is a critical elaboration of an 
attitude or outlook which is abundantly present in a less examined way at the 
level of common sense, or for that matter in non-philosophical educational 
theorizing. For example, much that is of a positivist spirit is to be found in 
behaviourism and its offspring, such as the behavioural objectives movement 
and certain calls for more objective styles of assessment, and more generally in 
strong attachment to the observable and quantifiable as our sole guiding light 
(Dearden, 1981: 37). 
If, as Dearden suggests at the beginning of his paper, the grip of Logical Positivism 
over analytic philosophy was well and truly loosened by the 1980's, the ways in 
which he supposed the 'spirit of positivism' still to haunt the educational landscape 
are nevertheless worthy of discussion here. For Dearden, the positivistic insistence 
on procedural clarity and empirical verifiability continued to echo with the so-called 
'behavioural objectives movement', and with the supposed requirement for 
teachers to formulate clear and specific lesson objectives, and beget wholly 
measurable learning outcomes. In such a climate, there existed for Dearden a very 
real risk that, "...moral or social education, political education, religious education 
and literature and the arts" could simply disappear from the school curriculum: 
excluded on the basis of their epistemological vagueness, as being concerned with 
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mere feelings and self-expression rather than with 'hard' knowledge6. How he 
supposed the notion of the controversial to sit with this quasi-positivistic insistence 
on the observable and quantifiable is also instructive. For if a controversial issue is 
to be understood as that which is simply contested or contestable, then such issues 
too risk simply being excluded from a knowledge or fact centred school curriculum. 
Indeed, it is partly in the context of this fear of depredation and disappearance that 
one can view Dearden's discussion, and indeed, rethinking, of the place of 
controversial issues in the school curriculum. 
Dearden's concern with how best to define controversial issues for educational 
purposes, and his subsequent proposal of an epistemic criterion by which one 
ought to distinguish the controversial from the settled, ought to be seen in the light 
of his belief that teaching controversial issues, "...is not simply an epistemological 
disaster area into which the responsible curriculum constructor should not care to 
go" (Dearden, 1981: 37). It is possible, at least partly, to view Dearden's emphasis 
on the epistemological rather than the merely behavioural in the light of a pressure 
to appease certain positivistic tendencies of his time, and the threat they presented 
to the ideal of the liberal curriculum. In this light, one can better understand 
Dearden's desire for schools to identify controversial issues not as widespread and 
sentiment-driven disputes, but as debates between opposing parties who have 
good reasons for holding their positions'. On this basis schools can thus avoid 
6 Time, one might say, has proved Dearden wrong in certain matters of detail. He may nevertheless 
be credited with being most perceptive in identifying the growth of an educational trend which has 
profoundly changed the face of teaching in schools in recent years. On the matters of detail, the 
growth of interest in teaching controversial issues in schools has, contra Dearden's fears, increased 
in spite of the ascendency of what he described as that offspring of positivism: the behavioural 
objectives 'movement'. This ascendency has not involved replacement so much as assimilation. 
Curriculum subjects have survived insofar as they adhered to the 'evidence-based' demands of the 
movement. We have not, for example, seen the removal of arts and humanities subjects from the 
curriculum, but instead have witnessed their gradual compartmentalisation into lists of key 
elements, key skills, and competences. Their survival, one might say, was guaranteed only insofar as 
the content of such subjects, and the approaches to teaching them, could be rendered into the 
quantifiable, the measurable, and the replicable. There may, of course, be some room left for 
debate in, say, English Language as to whether there are in fact five, six or seven different 'types' or 
'categories' of writing; whether a given text may be both 'persuasive' and 'informative', or must be 
exclusively one or the other. 
Or more accurately (according to the letter but not, perhaps, the spirit of Dearden's wording of the 
epistemic criterion) this ought perhaps to read: understood as debates between opposing parties 
whose respective positions were not contrary to reason. This matters only insofar as Dearden's 
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teaching about disputes, however widespread and heated, which are not also 
marked by the existence of two or more sets of rationally `proper' positions. 
Equally importantly, however, they would not have to avoid teaching controversial 
issues on the basis that these disputes were, as the positivistically inclined might 
suspect, driven merely by mere 'subjective' preferences. Dearden's recourse to 
reason, and to epistemology, constitutes an appeal to the existence of what is 
known and knowable. It implies shared methods, shared standards, shared 
knowledge: something that ought to satisfy positivistic demands that properly 
educational subject matter ought to be clearly articulable, examinable, testable and 
measurable. Dearden's idea that various value judgements may be treated as 
'positions' on epistemically controversial 'issues', not only brings such judgements 
under the aegis of 'objective' standards of reason, it also provides a basis for 
suggesting that not all judgements of value are indeed controversial. We can also 
discover that at least some such judgements cannot be rationally disputed, but 
must instead count as settled; as definitely known. This, I think, helps to explain 
Dearden's use of the "...moral value-judgement that it is not only wrong but 
viciously so when someone amuses himself by stubbing out burning cigarettes on a 
baby entrusted to his care..."(Dearden, 1981: 40). We are supposed then to know 
the action described here is simply and absolutely wrong: there can, for Dearden, 
be no rational debate about this, despite the fact that it has to do with moral 
values. 
To better understand what else might have helped inform Dearden's epistemic 
approach to teaching controversial issues, it is helpful to hold in mind the existence 
of certain social and political changes Dearden does not refer to explicitly in his 
paper. Research carried out by Robert Stradling (1984), however, helpfully points 
out how the teaching of certain topics had become increasingly 'politically sensitive' 
by the beginning of the 1980's, hence: 
wording does not strictly require both sides to have positions which are supported by 'good 
reasons'. 
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If there ever was any measure of public consensus about whether or not such 
issues should be taught or how they should be taught then there are clear signs 
that this consensus is breaking down in the 1980s (Stranding, 1984: 122). 
Stradling goes on to explain how this was due, in part, "...to growing polarisation 
between the political parties, particularly on economic and social issues and on 
defence issues", which intensified during the 1970's; and was coupled with 
increased "...public debate about what schools should be doing and which values 
they should be promoting". One concrete example of this can be seen in the 
example of teaching about nuclear disarmament. Here, Stradling emphases how 
teachers who had been committed members of CND since the early 1960s, and had 
"...been teaching about nuclear disarmament for nearly 20 years", found 
themselves subject to increasing suspicion and hostility. Stradling explains that 
recent "...public debate about the siting of Cruise and Pershing missiles" had a 
knock-on effect for schools, whereby many people increasingly came to question 
the inclusion of this topic in schools, along with the ways in which it was frequently 
taught (c.f. Stradling, 1984: 121-2). 
What we begin to get a sense of here is the growth of public anxiety about 
politically motivated teaching, along with schools and teachers coming under 
increasing public scrutiny. If we link a growing concern with the political 
committedness of the curriculum with the presence of positivism in what Dearden 
terms, 'common sense', and 'non-philosophical educational theorizing', then the 
threat to the very idea of teaching controversial issues in schools is clearly 
exacerbated. One may then be permitted to view Dearden's epistemic approach as 
inspired by the need to effect a defence of the teaching of controversial issues: a 
defence that needed to appease certain positivistic tendencies in educational 
thought, and allow schools to avoid charges of political bias and student 
indoctrination. 
Against this background, Dearden's epistemic criterion certainly looks promising. 
The charge of political bias might, indeed, be averted if educators were to make 
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curriculum choices based solely on the demands of reason. If concerns over nuclear 
disarmament were taught at all in schools, they could be taught as epistemically 
controversial 'issues's: as rationally divisive issues where competing sets of reasons 
could be identified and critically examined with students. To adopt Dearden's 
epistemic criterion is, one might say, to allow reason to decide which issues are to 
count as controversial, rather than leaving the decision to the whims of individual 
policy makers, schools or teachers. While, of course, some person or other must in 
fact make the decision about which subjects to include, their decision could be 
demonstrably guided by criteria that we would all endorse insofar as we were 
thinking in accordance with reason, and not mere subjective biases. 
(v) Controversy, Epistemology and Compelling Arguments 
Dearden's 'recourse to reason' allowed for controversial issues to be both identified 
and approached according to objective, publicly attestable standards. This, I have 
argued, can be seen at least in part as a response to the positivistic trends he saw 
infecting the educational discourse of his day. Contrary, then, to the extremes of 
logical positivism, aesthetic or ethical claims should not for Dearden simply be 
dismissed as meaningless, as merely 'subjective', on the basis that they could not 
be verified according to the standards of the empirical sciences. We might well say 
that although rational standards were, for Dearden, as important to human enquiry 
as they were to the logical positivists, the positivists had yet failed to recognise how 
they are more broadly manifested. Although we have also seen, in Chapter 2, how 
Dearden's permissive notion of rationality seems to present various problems for 
his epistemic criterion (i.e. that it seems to allow too much to count as a rational 
dispute), we can at least understand why he might have wanted 'rationality' to 
constitute an appropriately 'broad church': it would at least allow for a range of 
arts and science subjects to count as rational, and thus publically attestable, 
pursuits, which could thereby continue to be included in the school curriculum. 
8 Assuming, of course, that opposing views on the 'issue' could be discovered which did not 
contravene the standards of reason. 
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With Michael Hand, however, the requirement that reason provide objective 
standards arguably takes on an increasingly abstract and impersonal dimension. If 
Hand shares with Dearden a belief in the importance of rational development as an 
educational aim, and the need to identify controversial issues as those which are 
rationally disputed, the sorts of disputes that would count as rational appear to be 
of a far narrower class than Dearden would have desired. Gone, then, is the talk of 
various areas of human enquiry being underpinned by different 'frameworks of 
rationality', and in its place is posited something far more general: that an idea, 
whatever its source, constitutes a 'claim' or 'position' which is supported by various 
'arguments'; arguments that are themselves wholly amenable to a critical, 
recognisably philosophical, style of assessment. 
Hand's desire that schools identify controversial issues correctly is, also, inextricably 
tied to the perceived need for educators to identify non-controversial, or settled, 
issues, and to teach them directively to students. There appears to be a particular 
concern in Hand for educators to provide substantive moral guidance to their 
pupils, and for the pupils to emerge from schools as, what we may well term, 
'ethically confident' individuals. Their confidence is to be promoted through, (a) the 
idea that some moral issues can be settled by reasoning and that these moral truths 
can be transmitted to children; and, as we have seen in the previous chapter, (b) 
the idea that any moral issue, even those which are more stubbornly intractable 
and 'controversial', can in a sense be 'tamed', made intelligible, by critical 
philosophical reasoning. Furthermore, what we might describe as ethical 
confidence (a confidence which is tied to one's ability to select rationally defensible 
ethical positions) is to be progressively bolstered by the discovery of more 
epistemologically uncontroversial or settled moral issues. Roughly speaking, then, 
the more moral issues one can determine as settled, the more ethically confident, 
in this sense at least, one becomes. As far as education is concerned, the more 
issues are determined as settled, the more the epistemic solutions to ethical issues 
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can be taught to students, and the stronger the guidance one can give them about 
their moral roles and responsibilities9. 
For Hand, to come to possess (and to promote) the right sort of ethical assurance 
one must, in a sense, have confidence in philosophy: certainly in the sort of 
reasoning which aims, via the critical examination of various arguments, at 
establishing the epistemological foundations for certain positions on ethical issues. 
If one is, so to speak, 'confident' without first submitting one's ethical beliefs to the 
acid test of critical reflection, then it would seem that one's confidence is, at the 
very least, premature, if not misplaced. One has confidence in one's 'ethics' but 
such confidence is not as yet properly credible or desirable. Of course, to say that 
one has not submitted one's belief to the right sorts of 'critical reflection' does not 
mean that one has not previously thought long and hard about the 'issue' in 
question. But this would not in itself be enough on Hand's view: one has to think in 
the right way; have the right sort of critical thoughtfulness. What is also implied in 
such an approach is that one should not have more than a tentative 'position' on 
any matter of ethics until one has thought in the correct manner: critically, and with 
a sort of ideal detachment. The 'ideal', one might well say, is that the educated 
person has no ethical beliefs that are not first chosen, or at least parsed, 
'rationally' °. As Hand himself puts it: 
9 Where issues cannot be settled through the discovery of epistemically adequate grounds, i.e. 
controversial issues, it is hoped that students will at least come to see critical reasoning as the most 
fruitful approach, in spite of the fact that their own 'rational' position on such issues will never be 
uniquely defensible. 
10 There is at least something recognisably Kantian in such an approach. For Kant, one might say that 
reason is our way of acting autonomously; although other factors might act upon us — external and 
internal - we have a capacity to act freely precisely because we can formulate and follow certain 
'rules' or maxims that any rational being can rationally approve. Hence, fully moral principles are 
those that can be universalised, and understood as binding upon any rational agent: indeed, if we 
could not universalise them, then they would not be rational; and, therefore, they could hardly 
count as moral either. Being autonomous does not imply that we must reject externally imposed 
rules: rules that are laid-down externally can be subjected to rational scrutiny, universalised and 
found acceptable to a rationally autonomous being. Good reasons, then, may be found for accepting 
at least some rules not originating from the self. The locus of control in the Kantian project does shift 
from obedience to an external authority for its own sake, to obedience only once we test a rule for 
rational coherence, and find it morally binding in that respect. 
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To give a child a moral education is precisely not to bully or charm her into a 
non-rational acceptance of moral beliefs. It is to enable her to think 
rationally about moral questions and to commend to her such values, 
virtues and principles as enjoy the support of rationally compelling 
arguments. (Hand, 2007: 6). 
While Hand does not say here that all moral education reduces into the directive 
teaching of settled moral questions (directing students to the correct answers on 
various issues), it is clear that it must involve getting students to think rationally 
about moral beliefs, which means, at least in part, commending to them the values, 
virtues and principles which enjoy the support of rationally compelling arguments. 
When a teacher cannot commend a given moral belief it will be because there are 
no rationally compelling arguments, which for Hand, is the case precisely when an 
issue is epistemically controversial rather than settled. In such cases, as we have 
seen in the previous chapter, the proper response is to encourage a pupil to think 
rationally about the issue, which means weighing-up the arguments offered by 
competing sides of the debate, and reaching a defensible position of one's own. It 
seems clear that on this picture the moral thinker is, in an important sense, the 
critical assessor of arguments; while whatever else the moral agent is, she will 
nevertheless be one who acts or desists from acting, on the basis of reasons that 
she has first submitted to rational scrutiny. 
If follows that, to decide whether a particular issue, e.g. the morality of homosexual 
sex, should be taught as a controversial issue, one must, for Hand, examine the 
strength of the arguments for and against the moral legitimacy of 'homosexual 
acts'. This he does in his 2007 paper, 'Should we teach homosexuality as a 
controversial issue?' In support of the moral legitimacy of 'homosexual acts', Hand 
provides an argument which I cite at length below: 
An argument in support of the moral legitimacy of homosexual acts is as 
follows. Reproduction is only one of a number of goods that can be served 
by engaging in sexual acts. Other such goods include 'pleasure, romantic 
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feelings, companionship, mutual support, sexual outlet, ecstasy, intimacy, 
and interpersonal communication' (Vacek, 1980: 133). These latter goods 
(or at least some of them) constitute morally sound reasons for engaging in 
sexual acts even when the possibility of reproduction is naturally or 
artificially precluded. Since reproduction is the only sexual good that is 
unavailable to homosexuals, it follows that homosexual acts are morally 
legitimate. This is not to deny that homosexuals sometimes have sex for bad 
reasons, just as heterosexuals sometimes have sex for bad reasons. It is 
simply to observe that all but one of the good reasons for engaging in sexual 
acts are available to homosexuals as well as heterosexuals. (Hand, 2007: 7). 
He continues by stating that "Whether or not one regards this argument as 
decisive, it has undeniable rational force"; which, he supposes, is equivalent to 
demonstrating that "... those who regard homosexual acts as morally legitimate do 
not hold a view that is contrary to reason". I am not at this juncture interested in 
assessing this argument, merely in understanding what offering it suggests to us 
about Hand's approach to reasoning about ethical questions. 
Let us look, firstly, at what the human beings in Hand's argument in support of the 
'legitimacy' of homosexual sex are like. Or rather, at how their lives are treated by 
Hand. Here we find that people 'engage' in sexual 'acts' for good and bad 'reasons'; 
that such acts can be 'morally legitimate'; that they can serve various 'sexual goods' 
which themselves 'constitute' morally 'sound reasons' to engage in an 'act'. Human 
lives are approached here largely in the abstract; insofar as we recognise those 
engaging in various acts as individual and individuated human beings at all, they 
appear to us as self-consciously deliberative, even calculative. They act, in this case 
sexually, on the basis of reasons that can be good or bad. Their actions, and their 
lives as such, are motivated by such reasons. This links to another important feature 
of Hand's approach here. Hand's provision of the argument in favour of the moral 
legitimacy of homosexual acts helps to reveal that reasons, in the shape of 
philosophical arguments, are supposed to have a certain force: they ought to move 
one to accept or reject a moral claim depending, of course, on something like the 
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compellingness of the arguments provided. To be compelled by the weight of 
reason means that one is moved to assent by the strength of the arguments alone. 
A proper assessment of arguments requires maximal disengagement from one's 
own commitments or personal history, except of course where that such things 
might themselves provide good general reasons to move any rational agent to 
assent to a particular belief. One is compelled to accept a belief not so much as an 
individual, or individualised, human being, but impersonally, insofar as one attends 
simply to the strength of the reasons themselves. 
What one might say, of course, is that in order for one to adopt so-called moral 
beliefs in this manner, one must see, and be open to, the value of such reasoning. 
One must be able to accept argument as a force in one's own life. A question such 
as: 'Why ought I to assent to a moral belief if it is supported by compelling 
arguments?' would no doubt be treated as a complete non-starter: the questioner 
would likely be admonished for asking for a compelling reason to accept beliefs on 
the basis of compelling reasons. Although the question above could be answered in 
the manner I have just described, I do not think that this necessarily does justice to 
the sorts of scepticism that might have driven the questioner. I will deal with this 
issue further in the next chapter, where I deal in more depth with the 'threat' of 
relativism. Nevertheless, before continuing with the task of making explicit what 
Hand's particular arguments about the morality of homosexuality reveal about his 
approach to reasoning about ethical questions, I do want to make the following 
observation. The quick dismissal of the question about why one ought to assent to 
moral beliefs which are supposed to enjoy the support of compelling arguments, 
actually helps to reveal what can be viewed as the circularity inherent in the sort of 
approach Hand appears to recommend. 
Here it appears that one will assent to a given moral belief on the basis of argument 
alone if one is being rational, while one is only being rational insofar as one's moral 
assent is based on the assessment of arguments alone. Furthermore, it would seem 
that if someone were to ask why they ought to do something, they would be 
supposed to be asking for compelling arguments in favour of doing that thing, 
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which they could ask for only insofar as they are already a rational agent and thus 
moved by the power of reason. I do not intend any of this to function as a criticism 
in the traditional sense that it must thereby 'weaken the argument', and provide a 
'reason' for us to reject it. In defending rationality as it is understood here, what 
else, one might say, is the defender supposed to do other than simply to reassert its 
absolute indispensability? To re-position it, so to speak, at the centre of the moral 
universe. To ask why one ought to accept moral beliefs only on the basis of reasons 
must seemingly be to ask what reason or reasons one has for believing in the power 
of reasoning. It seems that the questioner has thus presupposed the very thing she 
is questioning. If her question were, in fact, asking something of this sort: 'Why is 
the right ethical response given only by the correct assessment of reasons or 
arguments?', one again hits again upon the idea that rational correctness and 
ethical rightness are supposed coincide: that the correct assessment of reasons 
simply leads to the correct ethical beliefs; that reasoning in this sense gives us the 
ethical. On the flip side, to refuse to assent to an moral belief which enjoys the 
support of rationally compelling arguments would, on this position, be to choose 
the wrong ethical belief. It is, in this sense at least, also to go wrong ethically: it 
constitutes an ethical failure. 
Of course, our questioner could simply have meant something similar to the 
following: 'How would it benefit me to assent to moral beliefs on the basis of good 
reasons?', to which the reply must, it would seem, be that it would be of benefit 
insofar as you wish to be right in your thinking, which in this case means thinking 
correctly ethically, as well as simply coming to the 'correct answer'. If she replies 
that she is not interested in being right in that sense, only in advancing certain 
aspects of her life (e.g. financially), then she might well be seen to be asking us to 
give her extra-rational considerations to adhere to a moral belief that she should, 
one might think, have adopted on the basis of good reasons alone. She may thereby 
show herself to be amenable to reasoning but only insofar as it could be supposed 
to benefit her in certain other ways. Would one, in such a case, also want to say 
that she was being irrational if she rejected a moral belief that we supposed to 
enjoy the support of compelling arguments, in favour of a belief that would simply 
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benefit her, say, financially? One might want to say that her starting point was in 
some sense wrong. But what would it mean for it to be wrong? We may want to say 
that she makes a mistake ethically, but given that she merely wishes to advance 
herself financially, on what basis could we also say that she selects a belief in a way 
that is, to use Dearden's phrase, contrary to reason? If she believes in a way that is 
consistent with her other stated beliefs and aims then it might indeed appear 
rational for her to believe that this course of action constitutes the right (i.e. the 
most suitable; the most prudent) course of action. If, of course, we say that she is 
wrong ethically, but not rationally, we seem then to be suggesting that rational 
does not always give us the ethical; that the two do not always coincide in the way 
that Hand, for example, seems to suppose. 
Of course, for Hand, the point is that if there were rationally compelling arguments 
in favour of a particular moral view which she chose to ignore, in favour of a 
position that would merely bring her various social or financial benefits (perhaps 
espousing it would bring her social acceptance, popularity, fame etc.), then she 
would, of course, be acting irrationally as well as unethically. The broader question, 
however, is what rational compelling arguments for an ethical position are 
supposed, in general, to look like. One point that Hand's account seems to 
overlook, or at least avoid, is the following: that compelling reasons offered in 
support of an ethical belief must already be ethically compelling reasons. They will 
already be ethical considerations which one is amenable to treating as being the 
sorts of reasons that could count as compelling. Ethical considerations do not 
simply seem to be revealed or grounded by our reasoning. The ethical seems, 
rather, to be tied-up with reasoning about ethics: connecting with, and even 
inspiring, what counts as compelling reasoning in certain cases. It is not as if 
something like a 'process of reasoning', uninfected by the ethical, could somehow 
be used to ground or justify the ethical or, ex nihilo, lead to the conclusion that this 
or that consideration has ethical weight or value. To suppose that reason and ethics 
coincide in the way that Hand suggests cannot be shown independently by another 
'independent' standard of reason, it has rather to be assumed; taken for granted. I 
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will revisit this point in the later chapters when dealing with attacks made by those 
who are equally suspicious of the rationalistic approach to ethics. 
Following on from this discussion, let us now look at the following passage where 
Hand deals with the existence of scriptural condemnations of homosexuality. He is 
clear that although the condemnation of homosexual acts in these biblical passages 
is 'fairly unambiguous': 
...the existence of such passages is only pertinent to the moral assessment 
of homosexual acts if one has good reason to accept the major premise that 
all biblical injunctions are morally sound. And this premise is rationally 
indefensible (Hand, 2007: 12). 
One way to show this is for Hand to draw attention to biblical injunctions that are 
'self-evidently not morally sound'. We are then presented, Hand thinks, with a 
reductio ad absurdum of condemnations of homosexual sex based on scriptural 
authority. To this end, he goes on to cite the following examples: 
The Bible sanctions purchasing slaves from neighbouring countries (Leviticus 
25: 44), selling one's female children into slavery (Exodus 21: 7), animal 
sacrifice (Leviticus 1: 5) and the subordination of women (Ephesians 5: 22-
24). It prohibits, frequently on pain of death or exile, eating shellfish 
(Leviticus 11: 10), working on the sabbath (Exodus 35: 2), sexual intercourse 
during menstruation (Leviticus 20: 18) and wearing garments made of two 
kinds of cloth (Leviticus 19: 19) (Hand, 2007: 12). 
The point here is that these examples are selected precisely because they will be 
taken by the reader to be either straightforwardly wrong, or downright morally 
superfluous. Presumably, for Hand, this is precisely because any attempt to defend 
them simply would not be rationally compelling. But, of course, one could still 
attempt to justify them on the basis that the scriptures permit them: they are 
morally right as long as the bible says they are. The idea that there are no good 
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reasons to suppose such actions to be morally acceptable already precludes the 
very thing Hand was supposed to be attacking: the idea that scriptural injunctions 
do in fact constitute good reasons. 
I am not so much defending the inerrancy of scriptural authority here, but wanting 
instead to use this point as a way of showing how reason operates for Hand, and 
also for raising the following related question: for whom, then, does Hand's 
supposed reductio have a force? It is, after all, only a reductio if we agree that it is 
wrong or superfluous, morally speaking, to do these other things supposedly 
advised by the scriptures. Hand does not offer any reasons against these activities 
precisely because it is supposed to be self-evident that such things are wrong or 
otherwise absurd. The reasons, in a sense, make themselves and their force evident. 
What this might amount to is interesting: Hand does not have to make the reasons 
evident to us because we already, in some sense, know them. We do not, one 
assumes, know of this by intuition, in the sense that they simply feel wrong to us, or 
otherwise merely on the basis of consensus, in that my society or your society 
happens to view them as morally unacceptable. Nor do we take them as wrong 
simply because we as individuals cannot, at present, think of any good reasons to 
offer in their support, or because we have thus far been unable to discover any in 
the relevant philosophical or theological literature. It is not enough that we, 
personally speaking, find the moral rightness or relevance of any of these actions 
unthinkable. Hand, and those of us who would credit him with having performed a 
reductio of the scriptural basis of condemnations of homosexuality, would seem to 
suppose something far stronger. This would be something akin to the following: 
that there are not, have never been, and never could be, any good reasons to 
suppose that such actions are morally acceptable (or, in other cases, morally 
relevant). 
In spite of what the scriptures, or, say, various members of past societies might 
have imagined, the moral wrongness (or the sheer moral irrelevance) of such 
actions is, now, both known and seemingly irrevocable. This is not supposedly 
because of Hand's - or of our own - place in human history, but a matter of 
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epistemology alone. To argue for them would be not simply be to assume one set 
of historical values over another, but to contravene that which provides the proper 
foundation for any set of values whatsoever: reason itself. One might say, however 
odd it sounds, that it is reason that finds them unthinkable. Hence, in arguing 
against various, usually religious, 'arguments' about the wrongness of homosexual 
sex, Hand concludes that no such argument was found to be compelling. It is on this 
basis, of course, that he wants to teach the 'issue' as settled: reason quite simply 
favours those who argue that homosexual sex is morally legitimate. In fact, not only 
does he see himself to have discovered no compelling argument against its 
permissibility, but no argument that does not also contravene reason. There is 
simply nothing in such a case that could even have constituted a rationally 
defensible argument. For if there were, then the legitimacy of homosexual sex 
would have to be, on Hand's position, understood (and taught) as a controversial 
moral issue: a matter of legitimate, rational debate and disagreement. 
What interests me is what a compelling, or even a rationally defensible, argument 
could have looked like here? This might seem a rather odd question, precisely 
because to even talk of such a thing would seem already to contradict, and thus beg 
the question, with Hand. What I am suggesting, however, is that it is not simply 'a 
moral discovery' by Hand that there are no rational arguments against the moral 
legitimacy of homosexual sex, but something that constitutes a (structural or 
foundational) precondition of his very understanding of reasoning about morality —
a reasoning that is, in essence, value free. There was never going to be an argument 
against homosexuality that was not criticisable according to this approach to 
reason, at least in part because the sorts of views that attacked its legitimacy do not 
begin by placing Hand's notion of rationality at the centre of their moral universe. 
The sorts of reasoning he attacks begin, one might say, with the authority of the 
scriptures, with the idea of a universe purposefully created by a God, or whatever 
else. It is these just ideas, rather than a particular notion of abstract, critical 
reasoning, that provide the ethical starting point for such 'theories'. It is they which 
are absolutely or ultimately valuable; it is they which guide any subsequent thought 
on such 'issues'. For Hand, of course, it is reason which seems to occupy the 
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position of ethical starting point. And yet, in occupying this position, reason itself 
seemingly cannot also provide a foundation (a neutral starting point) for the notion 
of ethical value: of something's being treated as having value, and of being valued. 
(iv) Conclusions 
If it is clear that the accounts of controversial issues offered by Hand and Dearden 
differ from each other, then it could be considered misguided simply to lump both 
together as displaying shared 'rationalistic' tendencies. It was not, however, my 
intention to suggest that insofar as both thinkers reveal various rationalistic 
features, they have to agree with each other on every matter. Nevertheless, while it 
is also true that Hand's account of reason is more abstract, more centred on critical 
argumentation than is Dearden's, both accounts still reveal a concern to approach 
controversial moral issues epistemically. This means, effectively, to privilege the 
role of objective rational standards in deciding what ought to count as settled or 
definitely 'known', and what ought to be treated as merely contested and 
controversial. 
Although Hand also places greater emphasis on the selection and teaching of moral 
issues, particularly on the discovery of epistemically settled or uncontroversial 
issues, Dearden also seems anxious to show that at least some moral values can 
count as definitely known e.g. through his example of the baby who was subjected 
to cigarette burns. In both Hand and Dearden, then, the important point is that it is 
reason, so to speak, that decides the status of these issues. It is the correct 
application of standards of reasoning that provides the epistemic foundations to 
settle an issue; to allow us to properly grasp the moral wrongness or rightness of 
various beliefs or actions. The role of the individual in making moral decisions is to 
be a representative of reason: a mouthpiece through which the objective dictates 
of reason can be pronounced. An individual human being is, as far as morality is 
concerned, largely understood as an individual reasoner; a rational being who 
partakes in and applies various impersonal standards of rational assessment. 
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This sort of thinking also seems to be at work in the rather odd idea, adopted by 
both Hand and Dearden, of something's not being 'contrary to reason'. For both, it 
appears to function in the following sorts of way: 'One may disagree with this idea 
but not that strongly', or perhaps, 'One may come to think this idea wrongheaded, 
but yet acknowledge that it is not intolerably so'. However, that such things appear 
wrongheaded to any particular individual is also in an important sense irrelevant 
here. In declaring that something does not contravene reason one appears to be 
saying something quite separable from: 'It is not contrary to my general style of 
thinking', or 'I can't see that it is obviously or wilfully distorted.' To be contrary to 
reason does not seem to be equated with it is contrary to my reasoning, your 
reasoning, and so on, but with certain agreed rules of proper thinking that we all 
ought to acknowledge. Perhaps, then, we are supposed to acknowledge that in not 
contravening reason a given viewpoint does not break any of the very important, 
general rules of thinking, or at least, doesn't break them too often or too bluntly. Of 
course, even this would remain, at the very least, ambiguous. 
Another important similarity between Hand and Dearden that I would also describe 
as rationalistic can be found in the very idea that various ethical concerns and 
questions are best treated as 'moral issues', controversial or otherwise. The very 
idea of the existence of epistemically settled and controversial moral issues allows 
Dearden to deal with the positivistic suspicion that all ethical language was devoid 
of factual content and, for that reason, was not amenable to rational assessment. If, 
however, various ethical concerns and problems can be broken down into issues on 
which there exist various competing positions whose claims can be assessed 
epistemically, then ethics (or more correctly, morality) can itself be brought under 
the jurisdiction of rational standards. This move is taken seemingly without 
question by Hand, in whose account we see the further reduction of ethical 
phenomena into moral issues, along with the idea that moral education itself will 
be comprised largely of encouraging students to critically assess various claims 
pertaining to these more or less contested issues. 
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Hand's and Dearden's accounts of understanding and teaching controversial issues 
are also underpinned by a broadly shared, and rationalistic, vision of the basic 
educational endeavor. As we have seen, Hand spells this out explicitly, claiming that 
the development of rationality ought to occupy pride of place among the aims of 
education. We have also seen how Dearden's attacks on the educational adoption 
of the behavioural criterion as a way of identifying controversial issues, is also 
underpinned by a similar concern that pupils will not come to acknowledge the 
central place of reason in governing human thought and action. Moreover, both 
Dearden and Hand are united by what could be described as a fear of relativism, at 
least insofar as it takes a grip on education. Hence, two related questions I want to 
investigate more fully in the next chapter are: why is relativism is so threatening to 
these adherents of rationalistic aims? And what exactly is it in relativism that they 
seem to fear? 
It might appear that I have partly dealt with these questions already. I have after all 
suggested that Dearden fears the coming of a 'sociological carnival' where the 
young would simply think and do whatever they feel like, while Hand is concerned 
that young people will cease to be impressed by argument and become, say, overly 
swayed in moral matters by extra-rational considerations. This is, however, only 
part of the story. It is not at all clear that the sociological carnival, if it were to 
come, would involve people behaving any worse towards each other than they do 
already: that the number of muggings, rapes and murders, for example, must 
thereby increase". It is not at all certain that all young relativists, simply by virtue 
of being moral relativists, will suddenly become utterly 'morally' ambivalent. It is, in 
fact, far from clear that an inevitable increase in immoral behaviour is actually what 
is most feared by those who talk of the likely damage done by any epidemic 
relativism. This links to what I will go on to suggest in the next chapter about the 
sort of threat moral relativism could be understood to present. 
ii. Nor is it clear whether Dearden was in fact making such an empirical claim or assumption. 
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Chapter 5 
Rationalism, Relativism and Deep Concerns 
(I) 	 Introduction 
That there is often contrariness in the reactions of various philosophers towards 
moral relativism should at least strike us as worthy of comment. On the one hand, 
as we have seen in the accounts of Dearden and Hand, relativism is treated as 
something to be feared; something that will likely lead to a profound and pervasive 
loss of moral confidence. On the other hand, however, it is just as frequently 
dismissed out of hand as an incoherent and self-defeating moral 'position': nobody 
could, in fact, ever hold relativistic views consistently. The relativist is often 
supposed to simply overlook the logical precariousness of her position; her denials 
of the existence of non-relative values are effectively turned against herself. Her 
own position is often thought to reveal at least a tacit commitment to what it 
purports to be denying. And yet, if relativism is such a blatantly unpromising moral 
position for these sorts of reasons, it is at least legitimate for us to ask why it is also 
still so feared. A related question concerns why relativism, if it is so easily dismissed 
as hopelessly incoherent, remains as much, if not more, of an issue for us as it was 
for the ancients two or so thousand years ago? In other words: why is it still with us, 
saying many if not all of the same things, and yet being subject to all the same 
seemingly damning criticisms? 
In what follows, however, I should make it clear that it is not my intention to (a) 
defend or attack moral relativism, or (b) to produce a detailed study of a range of 
moral relativists and their philosophical critics. My exploration of relativism in this 
chapter has more modest aims. It is more concerned with the perceived 
consequences of relativism (its threat, if you will) for an understanding of the place 
of reason in the ethical life, than it is with delineating various accounts of moral 
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relativism that exist in the philosophical literature. In particular, I want to account 
for what I have described as the 'fear' of relativism revealed in the accounts of both 
Hand and Dearden, and to tie this disquietude with the rationalistic views they hold 
about the place of reason in the ethical life. I do this by arguing that relativism may 
be approached as a form of scepticism: an expression of doubt which is dependent 
on a more substantive host for its existence. That host, I will claim, need not be 'the 
ethical' as such, but may be something akin to the rationalistic approaches to the 
ethical life which, as we have seen through the work of Dearden and Hand, are 
themselves marked by a fear of relativism. The relativist, as I imagine her here, 
should be understood as not so much as sceptical about the possibility or the need 
to lead an ethical life, as she is dubious about certain ways of articulating and 
justifying such a life. 
I want also to take seriously the fear of relativism revealed through the accounts of 
Dearden and Hand. The potential problems presented by relativism as scepticism 
may indeed be substantial: for as I will picture her, the relativist is a sceptic about 
the place (and the power) of rational argument in thinking and living ethically. In 
taking the fear of relativism seriously, however, I am not suggesting the rationalist 
accounts of Dearden and Hand about the nature of reason or its place in the ethical 
life are, after all, correct. The subsequent chapters of this thesis will suggest and 
explore an alternative picture. What I will concede, however, is that the fears about 
relativism expressed by the likes of Hand and Dearden, roused by the relativist's 
doubts about rational argument as an ethical force, concern something that is 
understandably disconcerting. It is in just those (ethical) matters where we most 
want others to listen, and to be open to persuasion, that the power of compelling 
rational arguments would seem to be most welcome and, indeed, most sorely 
missed. To adapt Bernard Williams' related point about the amoralist in Ethics and 
the Limits of Philosophy, it would indeed seem to be a good thing for us if the 
relativist were to listen; if our reasoning about ethics engaged her, and found 
resonance in her life in ways that we might instead have to abandon all hope of 
achieving (Williams, 1985: 26). 
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(ii) Moral Relativism or Relativisms? 
There is, and perhaps there always will be, some philosophical disagreement about 
what exactly is entailed by moral relativism, or whether we are not perhaps better 
off speaking about relativisms instead.'2 Such finer distinctions need not interest us 
here. It seems straightforward enough to appreciate what, at least in essence, 
accounts commonly described as relativistic appear to be doubting or denying. 
According to Ruth Cigman, then, "A relativist is in thrall to an idea...", the idea that, 
"...there is no such thing as 'value', there are only your values, my values, Uncle 
Tom Cobbleigh's values." (Cigman, 2000: 646). You, me and Uncle Tom Cobbleigh 
could be living next door to one another, we could be living in very different 
geographical locations, we could even be living at different historical eras. Our 
respective views on, say, the rightness or wrongness of various actions may well be 
shaped by many different factors. The point, however, seems to be that the 
relativist is doubting whether any one of us can say that we really have the right 
values. We each lack some sort of independent, non-relative, measure against 
which such values could be identified; the most that any of us can say is that we are 
'right' according to one set of standards or another. Cigman is also correct, I think, 
to suggest that, "...there is a lot of theory packed into this idea". Although she 
understandably does not try to unpack it all in her paper, she does nevertheless 
conclude that, "...relativism cannot be sustained". That said, the question of what it 
might mean for relativism to be, or not to be, sustainable, is an interesting one that 
demands further investigation (Cigman, 2000: 646). 
12 Even a fairly small sample from the literature in the Philosophy of Education reveals such a 
divergence of opinion. When Dearden, for example, fears that the behavioural criterion might give 
'undue encouragement to relativism', Hand is at pains to point out that it is not relativism that 
Dearden describes, but the related idea that "consensus is the proper warrant for belief" (Hand, 
2008: 122). Relativism, or so it seems, is marked by something subtly different. Another example 
finds Paul Standish questioning Nick Tate's view that moral relativism is marked by the assumptions 
that, "...morality is largely a matter of taste or opinion", and that, "there is no point therefore in 
searching for the truth about moral matters" (Standish, 1997: 42). Such a view, for Standish, is more 
properly described as 'subjectivist', no doubt because it speaks of morality being relative to 
individual tastes, rather than say, to more broadly social or cultural norms and values. What seems 
clear, however, is that underlying these disputed positions is a common set of doubts about the 
possibility of establishing rationally that any set of values are simply 'true' (as opposed to their being 
or feeling true for one or more human beings.) 
69 
Cigman's idea here seems to be that human beings in general need to be able to 
"...distinguish good guys from bad guys", which is something that relativism is 
supposed to preclude. She continues by explaining how, "...people become 
relativists in order to disassociate themselves from Hitler," and yet end up with no 
way of being able to distinguish "...the moral beliefs of Hitler from those of the mild 
mannered man in the post-office" (Cigman, 2000: 646). In other words, if people, 
actions, beliefs and so forth are merely describable as bad or good, right or wrong 
relative to some particular moral standard or other, then we lack any way of 
identifying one person, one belief, one action, as really better than another. Hitler 
may indeed become 'no worse' that the postmaster. However, the question of 
whether one thing can really be thought better than another thing also worthies 
some unpacking. In one sense, it is not at all clear that the relativist could not, in 
the course of her life, distinguish good guys from bad guys. Neither is it clear that 
the relativist is denying the existence of any standards whatsoever. What she 
seems to be doubting, instead, is something like the absolute correctness of any 
particular set of standards. 
She may, perhaps, feel that Hitler was an evil man and prefer without hesitation the 
moral views of the mild-mannered postmaster. She might indeed be repulsed by all 
that Hitler stood for, and again without hesitation say that his values are wrong for 
her, and that she could never imagine herself adopting them. If it at least seems 
conceivable for someone to claim to be a relativist and yet still be willing to lay 
down their life for their moral beliefs, what would we want to say about such a 
case? Would it be that the person was, at some level, being insincere, misguided, or 
even deluded? Would we say that their commitment to a cause betrays the fact 
that they were not, after all a relativist; that relativism itself is inherently 
wrongheaded and unsustainable? Another way of thinking about this is to ask why 
it is that any relativist is thought to be ethically uncommitted, and any ethically 
committed person must be supposed not to be a relativist. 
The nub of the problem here seems to be that the relativist is supposed not to be 
entitled to hang on to the notion of truth in moral matters. In saying that something 
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can only be true for me as an individual, or, perhaps, as a member of one society or 
another, the relativist is seen to have abandoned the idea of truth in toto: it is 
tantamount to suggesting that no truth can be had in these matters. One seems to 
want to say here that in order to be committed to an ethical belief, one also needs 
to believe it is right, and not simply right for me. It would appear that one could 
hold something to be true only if one thinks that others ought to acknowledge this 
truth too: that its compellingness applies in an important sense to their lives as 
well. The idea of getting things right, or being wrong, ethically, seems to require 
that various values can be compared and contrasted directly, rather than simply 
declared to be different from one another. 
If the relativist's continued talk of truth and commitment seem to amount to little 
more than empty gestures, she may still want to say something along the following 
lines in reply. 'Of course I am committed to X because it is my belief, I have given it 
importance in my life. Nevertheless, it is ultimately a matter of indifference to me if 
others accept it too'. She could continue to talk of trying to persuade others about 
it, in a similar way that she might when discussing whether a particular football 
team is better than another. She may also say that although it would be nice or 
pleasing if others agreed with her, she would certainly not think less of them 
('judge them'), or of her belief in X, if they failed to do so. She may again add that 
this is because there does not exist any way of establishing the value of X as 
something others ought to be compelled to recognise. There is still much that is 
ambiguous here. Nevertheless, it seems that what we are often tempted to say in 
reply to the relativist is something akin to the following: that relativism cannot be 
sustained existentially because it cannot be sustained theoretically. It cannot be 
lived consistently because it cannot be held consistently as an idea or position: it 
simply makes no sense, for instance, to speak of something's being a value which is 
true or right only for me. 
What, however, if the relativist is doubting precisely the centrality of reasoning or 
theorising to the living of an ethical life? What if she were to greet our objections 
about consistency with a mere shrug of her shoulders? This would indeed go some 
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way to explaining why the relativist is often supposed to present such a danger: she 
may in fact be proposing to sustain an ethical life (existentially, as it were) that 
cannot at the same time be sustained rationally, certainly insofar as rationality 
presupposes adherence to a notion of truth that goes beyond what I have simply 
decided, or otherwise feel, is true for me. She has not, one might then say, so much 
lost all confidence in her ethical life, as lost confidence in the role of reason (as she 
sees it) in shaping such a life and providing it, say, with theoretical foundations. 
What is also important to understand, I think, is that this loss of faith does not 
simply stem from the fact that reason is seemingly unable to furnish us with the 
right answers ethically speaking, but from the idea that to conduct a quest for the 
'right answers' is already to go wrong ethically. The relativist suggests a radical 
fracture between personal belief and commitment (truth for me) and the possibility 
(and desirability) of establishing that 'truth' in a way that should also compel their 
commitment. It is, one might say, for the sake of the ethical that the notion of non-
relative truth in ethics has, for the relativist at least, to be abandoned. It is to the 
task of elucidating this apparent paradox of relativism that I now turn my attention. 
(iii) Relativism and Scepticism 
In order to shed further light on these concerns, I want to look now at two 
philosophical sources. One is Alan Bloom's idea, presented in his book The Closing 
of the American Mind, that relativism is not offered as a theoretical position by 
many of the student exponents he encountered in his classes, but as an ethical one. 
The other is the sceptical 'chronicles' of Sextus Empiricus, written in the 3rd century 
AD, about the attitudes and practices of the Pyrrhonian schoo113. I will begin, albeit 
briefly, with Bloom, and the idea that modern manifestations of relativism grew out 
of a certain internalisation of so-called liberal attitudes, including tolerance, respect 
for difference, freedom of choice and expression etc. For the student relativists 
encountered by Bloom, then, "The danger they have been taught to fear from 
13 Sextus, in Outlines of Pyrrhonism, describes himself as a 'chronicler' as opposed, perhaps, to a 
philosopher, or even a historian of scepticism. In doing so he seems to want to distance himself from 
any theorising about scepticism. He wants us, perhaps, to see his work as an exercise in merely 
reporting the 'facts', as he sees them, about what sceptics commonly say and do. 
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absolutism is not error but intolerance...the true believer is the real danger"(Bloom, 
1987: 26). The problem with non-relativistic ethical thought, it would seem, is one 
of being sure that one has got it right ethically: one becomes over-confident; 
hubristic, even. For Bloom's young relativists, then, the study of human history is 
also supposed to reveal how: 
...men always thought they were right, and that led to wars, persecutions, 
slavery, xenophobia, racism, and chauvinism. The point is not to correct the 
mistakes and really be right; rather it is not to think you are right at all. 
(Bloom, 1987: 27). 
Immoderate attachment to any lifestyle or set of beliefs has, for the relativist, 
always seemingly led to unethical behaviour. It is certainty that leads to dogmatism, 
a lack of openness and humility, and ultimately to intolerance. If the same might be 
said, in reply, about the relativist's apparent attachment to the wrongness of war, 
persecution, slavery, xenophobia, racism, and chauvinism, along with her apparent 
confidence in the virtues of openness and tolerance, the question is what we 
should now say about this possible oversight. Must we suppose that the relativist, 
buoyed perhaps by unquestioned commitment to various liberal values, simply 
would not notice (or otherwise admit) the precariousness of her 'position' — her 
own seemingly 'immodest' ethical commitments? I want at this point to draw 
attention to some similarities between how Bloom is apt to characterise relativism, 
and what Sextus Empiricus said, in antiquity, about the origins and nature of 
Pyrrhonian Scepticism. 
According to Sextus, the ancient sceptics, who began to philosophise about the 
nature of the good life in order to obtain ataraxia — the cessation of the mental 
perturbation they initially supposed to result from their lack of certainty — ended up 
winning the prize of tranquility not through settling on the 'right' answers, but by 
something akin to coming to terms with uncertainty. As Sextus puts it: "...the man 
who determines nothing as to what is naturally good or bad", in other words, the 
Pyrrhonist, "neither shuns nor pursues anything eagerly; and, in consequence, he is 
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unperturbed" (Outlines of Pyrrhonism; I: XII). Whereas the so-called dogmatist, or 
"...the man who opines that anything is by nature good or bad" is supposed by the 
sceptic to be forever disquieted, for "...when he is without the things which he 
deems good he believes himself to be tormented by things naturally bad...", and 
when he supposes himself to have obtained the good: 
...he keeps falling into still more perturbations because of his irrational and 
immoderate elation, and in his dread of a change of fortune he uses every 
endeavor to avoid losing the things which he deems good. (Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism; I: XII). 
Here we can see one of the more clearly controversial claims of the Pyrrhonist: that 
the dogmatist — he who believes that he has settled on the 'truth' in any given area 
of enquiry — never escapes a sense of mental perturbation or tarache. He is 
troubled by the very search for the settlement of an enquiry into a particular 
matter; he is also troubled when he supposes that he has in fact settled it, for fear 
that certainty might again slip through his hands. In other words, once the truth 
about a particular matter is established, the dogmatist is troubled in case he might 
'lose the sense' of certainty attached to his alleged discovery; he becomes worried 
that he is, perhaps, wrong about the matter. One wonders, however, why the 
trouble is supposed to return with such inevitability, and with what certainty this is 
known by the sceptic? Why should the dogmatist, then, always feel troubled about 
his solution, rather than, perhaps, a sense of relief? Is it due, perhaps, to the fact 
that in human affairs doubt is supposed always, at some point, to make a return? In 
this case, Dogmatism is presented as a particular 'side' in the battle with unease: 
fuelled by a promise to end doubt, one might say, by denying its power, or at least 
its necessity and ubiquity. If settling the enquiry never fully 'deals' with doubt, then 
dogmatism is, for the sceptic, a mismanagement of doubt. Opposing doubt is not 
indeed to end it. 
In Sextus' account, it is important to notice that the sceptic and the dogmatist share 
the same end: the achievement of ataraxia; the 'state' of being mentally 
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unperturbed. The dogmatist assumes that correct theorising about the nature of 
things, and the termination of his enquiry in the discovery of the truth about these 
matters, will help to end his anxiety and thus lead to ataraxia. The sceptic, as we 
have seen, disagrees. It is for the sake of the ultimate end of peace of mind that 
one must effectively give up the quest for knowledge of the ultimate nature of 
things. Although the sceptic is also described by Sextus as Zetetic, as one who 
continues to search and enquire, this should I believe be read in the light of what he 
also says about the ultimate telos of scepticism — ataraxia — as that for "...which all 
actions or reasonings are undertaken" (Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I: XII). Settling the 
enquiry on any matter involves cutting it short, and this means to fail to achieve the 
ultimate end of one's endeavours: it is to remain mentally troubled. Instead, 
ataraxia is something which can be achieved only through continued openness, 
continued suspension of judgement (epoche) on whatever 'matter of opinion' 
happens to arise. In other words, if it is peace of mind that ultimately matters to 
the sceptic, then the search for ultimate truth must be abandoned, and in its place, 
is a life lived, "...in accordance with appearances", and "...conformable to the 
customs of our country and its laws and institutions, and to our own instinctive 
feelings" (Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I: VIII). 
What then has all this to do with relativism as (in)famously described by Bloom? 
What I want to say here, although clearly speculative, concerns how the relativistic 
distrust of theorising about the ethical life might also be approached in the light of 
the sceptic's own generalised distrust of the need to settle questions of ultimate 
value or reality; to reach and establish a conclusive position. Here one might well 
say that if living ethically is what matters to the relativist, it is for that reason that 
one must abandon the idea of settling on the truth about ethical questions, e.g. 
which ethical 'values' to adopt. In a similar way to how the dogmatist's search for 
peace of mind was thwarted by his need to settle the issue about which was really 
good or bad; so to the desire to live well ethically is seen to be thwarted by the 
need to establish the non-relative truth of any set of ethical ideas or values. As we 
have already seen, this position has according to the relativist, led to a lack of 
openness to difference; to narrow-mindedness, intolerance and, in short, unethical 
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behaviour. One might also say that for the relativist living ethically is also to live in a 
way that was 'comfortable' with custom, law, intuition and instinctive feelings, but 
not living according to such things because they are seen as unquestionably correct. 
By way of further comparison it is also interesting to observe that Pyrrhonism too, 
since its origins in Ancient Greece, has faced various accusations of theoretical 
inconsistency. Doubts of the following sort are hardly exhaustive, but nevertheless 
are not uncommon: on what basis does the sceptic claim to know that ataraxia is 
the ultimate end of human endeavor? How does he know with confidence that 
scepticism will bring it about? Isn't the sceptic also troubled by the question of 
whether he will be able to continue to suspend judgement? The more interesting 
question for me, however, concerns why the sceptic is supposed to take such 
questions seriously'''. This again relates to the idea that philosophical argument can 
be some sort of ethical force. As far as his own theorising is concerned, Sextus is at 
pains to point out how: 
In the case of all the sceptical slogans, it must be understood right from the 
start that we make absolutely no claims as to their truth. We even say that 
they can be self-defeating, since they refer to themselves as well as to other 
things. They are like laxatives, which not only expel fluids from the body, but 
also expel themselves together with the fluids (Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I: 
VIII). 
The sceptic, then, admits that what he says is self-defeating. The important point is 
that this doesn't, in and of itself, appear to matter. Such concerns are themselves 
the marks of the troubled mind that the sceptic aims both to avoid, and also to heal 
in the dogmatist via his use of argumentative 'purges'. The ideal of consistency, one 
might say, always plays second fiddle to the desire for peace of mind, for ataraxia. 
14 The resonances here with Bernard Williams' discussion of the amoralist in Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy are again quite clear. In particular, one thinks of Williams' question about whether the 
amoralist ought to be convinced by something that the rest of us would count as an ethical 
justification, and whether or not he need be much concerned at the charge of inconsistency levelled 
against him if he did not. (see Williams, 1985: 26) 
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As such, scepticism only exists insofar as the urge to dogmatise exists; it is not 
supposed to offer yet another positive, and thus dogmatic, doctrine. The 
dogmatist's questions that aim to undermine scepticism as a doctrine also aim to 
undermine it as the 'way of life' that Sextus is at pains to describe it as, yet, if 
scepticism is not intended to constitute a positive or substantive philosophical 
position, why, one might ask, should he worry if it isn't supposed to stand up as 
such a position? In fact, the formulation of such positions is precisely what he thinks 
he needs in order to escape mental perturbation. As Sextus again points out, 
Scepticism is rather 'an ability, or mental attitude' — merely 'a way of doing things' 
conducted for the sole purpose of obtaining that very end. 
In a related way, if simply living an ethical life is what seems to matter to the 
relativist as an end, then theorising about it might need to be abandoned in a 
similar way to how for the sake of ataraxia the sceptic abandons theorising about 
the 'truth' which is supposed to lie beyond, or beneath appearance, custom, 
feeling, and the like. That both sceptic and relativist may be seen by their critics as 
presupposing, theoretically speaking, the 'absolute' value of these various ends; 
that their lives will betray an unwarranted commitment to these ends, will mean of 
course that they are accused of being inconsistent. This, however, could well be 
greeted by another, this time mutual, shrug of the shoulders, and the reply: 'Things 
just seem to me to be this way', or perhaps even, 'Your concern to see me as 
inconsistent reveals exactly the state of mind that it appears desirable for me (and 
indeed you) to avoid'. 
In the light of the comparisons drawn between relativism and scepticism here, I 
want to revisit Cigman's suggestion that there is a lot of theory packed into the idea 
of relativism. If Cigman seems broadly correct to say this, in what way, then, might 
she be correct? I want again to emphasise here the idea that relativism is, as 
Cigman herself suggests, based on doubt and denial: a denial of the existence of 
Values, appropriately capitalised. I want now to suggest that if relativism is 
understood as a form of scepticism about Values, the theory packed into it is the 
same sort of theorising that is packed into what the relativist denies: the idea that 
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the correctness of moral beliefs and values can be established or grounded through 
a process of reasoning, or through some other form of authority. The idea or 
'theory' here is that truth in questions of values could be settled; that there exist 
ways of demonstrating, through rational argument for example, that one set of 
values, say, ought to be straightforwardly preferable to another. The relativist is 
doubting, and thus reacting to, the idea that such rational foundations can be 
supplied which will ground and justify moral beliefs and values, and that it would be 
a good thing — ethically speaking — if they were so established. 
(iv) Rational Force and the Fear of Relativism 
It is instructive to remind ourselves again at this point of the nature of Dearden's 
concerns about relativism through the adoption of the behavioural criterion as a 
tool to identify controversial issues for teaching in schools. Broadly speaking, its use 
could lead to a situation where young people lose trust in reason and argument; 
they could thus be led to believe that issues are settled or unsettled simply because 
of the existence, or lack of existence, of agreement. People may even come to trust 
more in preferences, in instincts and feelings, rather than in reason and argument, 
when reaching decisions on various moral matters. What one can see here, I think, 
is that the fear of relativism comes not simply from the fact that it is wrongheaded 
or theoretically unsustainable, but from the notion that such considerations might 
simply not matter to relativists. In other words, a deeper concern about relativism 
seems to be that it could, and perhaps would, be sustained (and lived) in spite of its 
perceived theoretical flaws; even because of them. Epidemic relativism, Dearden's 
sociological carnival, may well be feared because it promises to usher in not so 
much a life of moral 'anarchy', but one of irrationalism, and thereby, of intellectual 
chaos. The more profound worry, one might say, is not about its mistakenness per 
se, but that such mistakenness simply won't be acknowledged as chaotic, but will 
perhaps be viewed as exciting, even liberating. It is also interesting to note in this 
respect how Dearden's image of a carnival does not necessarily connote increased 
crime or violence, but unbridled frivolity, a lack of order and control, the loss of 
reason: the coming of the Lord of Misrule. 
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With the perceived stakes set that high, it is perhaps a little unsurprising that the 
relativist is often pictured in many works of moral philosophy as, to borrow again 
the words of Bernard Williams, "...an alarming figure, a threat" (Williams, 1985: 25). 
Here again Williams' own discussion of the 'threat' presented by the amoralist or 
ethical sceptic (he names him Callicles after the character in Plato's Gorgias), 
provides another interesting comparison with the picture I have been sketching of 
the moral relativist, and of the threat she appears to pose for at least some moral 
philosophers. What is of particular interest is that the Callicles in Plato's dialogue 
seems to stand, in respect of his attitude towards the role of philosophy in 
informing the ethical life, closer to the relativist than to the 'ethical sceptic' 
Williams describes using his name. Plato's Callicles lives, one might say, at the edges 
of the ethical life, rather than outside it, as an 'amoralist'. It is fair to say that 
Williams does recognise something of this ethical involvement in his own picture of 
the amoralist, in that, "...we should not assume that a sceptic is someone who leads 
a life that goes against ethical considerations". He then goes on to clarify that, "...to 
be sceptical about ethics is to be sceptical about the force of ethical considerations" 
(Williams 1985: 29). Williams' own amoralist (Callicles) is thus pictured with the 
potential to be moved by 'limited benevolent or altruistic sentiment'; not as 
necessarily driven to acts of wilful sadism on account of his scepticism. The point 
remains, however, that for Williams, the amoralist's doubts are supposed to be 
centred on the compellingness of ethical considerations. This is not 
straightforwardly the case with Plato's own Callicles. 
It is not clear that Plato's Callicles is an ethical sceptic in Williams' sense. It is not 
the force of any ethical considerations that Callicles doubts; he seems, for example, 
quite prepared to suggest that it would be a good life for a man, "...to have all his 
desires about him, and to be able to live happily in the gratification of them" 
(Gorgias, 483-4). While his praise of self-promotion and of the absolute 'right' of 
the 'strong', may certainly strike us as 'unethical', what Callicles is explicitly denying 
is the compellingness of what he describes as restrictive, conventional, moral 
codes. Moreover, one thing that I find particularly striking about Callicles as he 
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appears in the Gorgias, is his conspicuous refusal to 'play ball' with Socrates: he 
does not so much refuse to engage with the question of how one should live, as he 
refuses to engage with it philosophically. His scepticism about philosophy, and its 
place in the life of an adult male citizen, rests on what we might describe as ethical 
grounds. That again is not to say that Callicles is not prepared to speak about the 
preferability, or the justifiability, of living one sort of life rather than another. 
Instead, he is conspicuously dubious about the approach that philosophy, certainly 
as it is practised by Socrates, takes to probing, questioning, and justification. It is at 
least noteworthy that Socrates is actually accused by Callicles of flouting certain 
important 'values': of 'running riot' in argument; of being 'sly', of 'entangling' Polus 
and abusing his modesty ("...he was too modest to say what he thought, he had his 
mouth stopped"). Despite his request for Socrates (the man) not to be offended by 
such accusations, which are spoken out of 'good-will', he persists in attacking 
Socrates the philosopher. Here he describes how a man, "...if he carries philosophy 
into later life," will become, "...necessarily ignorant of all those things which a 
gentleman and a person of honour ought to know." In short, to remain a 
philosopher is also to remain a child (Gorgias, 484-5). 
Socrates as a philosopher is nevertheless described by Callicles as a 'tyrant' and a 
'bully', which further links his sentiments to those of the moral relativist as I have 
described her. In questioning whether Callicles should be described as an ethical 
sceptic in Williams' terms, however, I am not suggesting that he must now be 
pictured as a moral relativist. The point is not simply to replace one label with 
another. The proposed overlap between Callicles and the moral relativist is, rather, 
confined to their shared distrust of what both appear to perceive as the tyrannical 
role given to 'reason' in thinking about the ethical life. For Callicles, Socrates uses 
reason during his attempt to undercover the essential nature of his ethical quarry 
as a tool to beat his opponents into submission. By engaging with him (which 
Callicles himself refuses fully to do) they are brow-beaten under the name of 
consistency to follow reason where Socrates takes it (or as Socrates might have put 
it: to follow reason where it wants to go). For the moral relativist too, as we have 
seen, the attempt to establish the rightness of any one set of values, exemplified by 
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a philosophical use of reason (although not unique to it) may be similarly tyrannical. 
What is disputed is something akin to the (ethical) legitimacy of any attempt to 
propose an overarching authority which might justly inform us all about the proper 
shape of our ethical lives. 
(v) Conclusions: Reason beyond Relativism and Rationalism? 
I certainly do not want to give the impression that relativism as I have depicted it 
here constitutes the only alternative to the rationalistic picture of ethics and 
education present in the works of Dearden and Hand. The relativist, as I have 
pictured her, might see things in that way, but she is I think misguided in doing so. 
In opposing the idea that a so-called 'faculty' of reason can, and ought, to be called 
upon to provide foundations for the ethical life, the relativist is, however, right to 
be sceptical. She is also broadly correct, I think, to be dubious about the idea that 
ethical beliefs, feelings, intuitions etc., must somehow be subjected to particular 
sorts of intellectual scrutiny before they could count as properly 'grounded', 
ethically. Where the relativist goes wrong (although it is not clear whether she 
would care much for this accusation) is in supposing that the notion of ethical 
rightness necessarily presupposes the provision of rational foundations, and that to 
deny the possibility or the desirability of such foundations must lead to the 
admission that the only truth worth preserving is 'truth for me'. It is here, I think, 
that she demonstrates her own dependence on a similarly rationalistic notion of 
the role of reason and argument in ethics, and of what might constitute their 
ethical force. She would be right, one might say, to reject rationalism as a 
foundational philosophy, but not thereby to abandon any role for reason in ethics. 
According to the sorts of views I go on to explore in the rest of this thesis, we need 
not endorse relativism once we have abandoned a particular (rationalistic) vision of 
reason, and the dominant, justificatory role it is supposed to play in establishing the 
shape of the ethical life. 
If relativism, as I have described it, need only be understood to directly oppose a 
rationalistic and foundational account of the role of reasoning in our ethical lives, at 
least the following related questions remain to be addressed: (1) How can one 
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propose a role for reason in helping to shape the ethical life, without also 
succumbing to the sort of rationalism I have been describing? And, (2), how is a 
denial of rationalism possible without one's also succumbing to relativism? As 
already indicated, I will attempt to unravel the various problems that surround 
these questions in the course of the remaining chapters of the thesis. In addressing 
the second question, I will not, however, seek to 'establish' the falsity of relativism. 
For one thing, we might well ask what would be the point? Why, again, would one 
suppose that those attracted to relativism would (or indeed should) attend to such 
a critique, rather than responding with the accusation that any attempt to discredit 
relativism rationally simply provides further grounds to prefer relativism ethically15. 
What we might do instead, I think, is to investigate through the provision of 
examples, what a life lived as a relativist might actually involve. Here we may offer 
some insights into the potential pitfalls presented by such a life, and into what may 
have to be sacrificed in order to live it. We will also be in a better position to ask 
whether this is, in fact, a life that we would wish for ourselves, or would 
recommend to others. 
This is not, of course, that I expect the moral relativist to be converted by any of 
these examples, or indeed, be convinced by the alternative, Wittgensteinian, 
account of ethics that I go on to consider in Chapters 7 and 8. Any attempt to probe 
the intelligibility of her ethical doubts would also risk being dismissed as just 
another piece of intellectual bullying; of not honouring the 'respect' that we 'owe' 
ethically to alternative sets of values. This sort of danger may, however, be 
something we simply have to accept and live with. It is interesting in this respect to 
notice how Socrates seemed to recognise the impossibility of winning round 
Callicles, through argument itself, to an appreciation of the ethical force of 
reasoning and argument. Instead he pled for Callicles' consent to be allowed to end 
their discussion by telling a story, supposedly as a 'proof' of what he has said. This 
move is interesting on a number of fronts. For now, however, I will consider only 
the sense that it could constitute a form of resignation in the face of a determined 
15 Again, see Williams (1985) on the provision of an Archimedean point in Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy, for a discussion of exactly these sorts of questions. 
82 
and unmoved interlocutor. Callicles has thus far shown himself resistant to 
Socrates' reasoning, and is more than likely to continue to be so. 
This form of resignation - if that is indeed what it is — is understandably difficult to 
carry out. As I indicated at the beginning of the chapter, the urge to confront the 
moral relativist with something akin to the inconsistency of her theorising about 
ethics, her own dependency on the authority of 'reason', can seem both urgent and 
necessary (as seems to be the case with both Hand and Dearden). The greater fear 
of course is that she will not listen, and that such selective deafness to 'reason' will 
spread to the epidemic proportions that Dearden feared. Yet, try as we might, the 
relativist may continue to see any attempt at reasoning in ethics as unduly 
authoritative; as merely comprising an attempt to establish the truth of some 
ethical beliefs at the expense of others. We too, at some point, may nevertheless 
have to be prepared to shrug our shoulders. 
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Chapter 6 
Rationalism and Deflection 
(i) Introduction 
Strange to know nothing, never to be sure 
Of what is true or right or real, 
But forced to qualify or so I feel, 
Or Well, it does seem so: 
Someone must know. 
--Phillip Larkin, 'Ignorance' 
If this chapter marks the conclusion of my account of rationalistic approaches to 
ethics and moral education, a brief recap thereby becomes necessary. So far, then, 
we have seen how - for at least some philosophers - Phillip Larkin's sentiments 
would appear more than a little pessimistic. For such thinkers, it is both possible 
and reasonable to feel sure, and to be right, about many moral matters. In the 
chapters devoted to Dearden and Hand, I have examined the idea that certain 
moral issues could be designated as uncontroversial or settled, epistemically 
speaking. Once identified, the rightness or wrongness of these issues could, 
particularly for Hand, be taught directively to young people as an integral part of 
the 'substantive moral guidance' that schools would be required to offer them. I 
have also identified how it is the faculty of reason that is supposed to provide the 
means of settling certain moral issues, and thus of inspiring levels of moral 
confidence far beyond that of Larkin's unduly hesitant, 'or so I feel'. It is this 
emphasis on particular approaches to reasoning and argument as being able to 
establish foundations for the ethical life, along with some unassailable imperatives, 
that marks (at least in part) what I have characterised so far as the rationalism in 
the accounts of Hand and Dearden. 
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In contrast to the confidence of the rationalist, we have also heard from those who 
would likely suppose that Larkin does not go far enough with his doubts about truth 
and being sure, certainly insofar as they relate to ethics. The relativist, then, might 
be more than comfortable with Larkin's 'it does seem so' or 'so I feel', but would 
likely baulk at his hope that 'someone must know', certainly if that involves their 
pretending to know what is best for all of us. Neither would there be much 
sympathy with the confessional tone of the poem, whereby for Larkin it seems not 
only 'strange', but also somehow disappointing, that our lives are marked by such a 
lack of certainty. For as we have also seen, it is certainty — and the quest to 
establish firm philosophical foundations for our ethical lives - that may, for the 
relativist, be the primary danger to overcome for the sake of the ethical. The 
rationalistic notion that it is philosophical reasoning that effectively gives us the 
ethical proper, that sets our ethical lives on firm and justifiable grounds, is 
effectively turned on its head. To understand the notion of 'getting it right' ethically 
as being in the possession of the right answers to ethical questions, of ideally 
knowing how to solve or settle ethical issues, is already to go wrong, ethically. 
In moving away from the problems or challenges raised by relativism, and on to 
different philosophical territory, it is important to note from the outset that this 
movement does not constitute a complete shift of emphasis. What one might 
conceive of as the deeper concerns of the relativist: the suspicion that a rationalistic 
approach to ethics constitutes, or involves, a sort of ethical failure, remain present 
for the philosophers that are the focus of this chapter, even if it is manifested in 
different ways. Here, one might well say that for a thinker such as Stanley Cavell, 
philosophy ought to begin with the human lives that we lead; the dramas we enact 
and endure. Our separation from others - our separateness as human beings - is 
indeed part of this life. Consider, then, something said by the early Cavell in this 
respect, that: "...skepticism concerning other minds is not skepticism but is tragedy" 
(Cavell, 1999: 453). Here, we are presented with the idea that what in literature is 
called tragedy, in philosophy is called scepticism. Literature, one could also say, is 
often for Cavell better placed to deal with the deeper, more personal, concerns that 
in philosophy are so-often deflected into general, abstract 'issues' or problems, 
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such as scepticism about other minds. Significant in this respect is Cavell's notion of 
'deflection', which describes the avoidance, through the ways in which philosophy 
is often practised, of life's deeper anxieties. Philosophising, to put it bluntly, can 
itself become a way of bypassing the ethical; at the very least, of distorting and 
narrowing one's ethical focus. 
What is denied by Cavell, broadly speaking, is that one should begin one's thinking 
about the ethical lives of human beings with a particular 'faculty' called reason. The 
contrast between beginning such a task with one's humanness as such, and the 
rationalistic focus on supplying arguments, is one of the main subjects of this 
chapter. In exploring it, however, my focus here is not on Cavell himself, but on 
Cora Diamond's development of his idea of deflection. In her seminal paper, The 
Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy, Diamond, one might say, 
presses Cavell's point about where philosophy begins, and emphases that our 
humanness means our flesh-and-blood lives as human animals. In developing the 
notion that certain kinds of philosophy are deflective, she explores the tendency to 
deflect our thoughts, and our attention, from our lives as animals. In doing so she 
prompts various questions relevant not only to my continued engagement with 
philosophical rationalism, but also to my subsequent exploration of the possibility 
of non-deflective, yet non-relativistic, philosophical approaches to the ethical. For 
example, if Diamond is clear that what she says in her paper ought not to be 
reduced to a series of 'typically' philosophical claims or arguments, an important 
question nevertheless concerns how one might engage critically (and, indeed, 
philosophically) with her ideas, and also do justice to what she has to say about, 
and indeed against, the deflectiveness of philosophical practices. This is important, 
not least because Diamond, like Cavell, but quite unlike the relativist, wishes to 
move us beyond a radical scepticism about philosophy, and preserve a role for 
philosophy in helping us to think well ethically. 
(ii) Diamond's Difficulty of Reality 
In order to appreciate, firstly, how Diamond's paper bears on my exploration of 
philosophical rationalism in ethics and education, we need first to understand the 
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'coming apart of thought and reality' that she calls, after John Updike, the difficulty 
of reality. This difficulty, Diamond wants to say, is one of "...the mind's not being 
able to encompass something which it encounters" (Diamond, 2008: 44). It is also 
described as a sort of 'experience' in which: 
...we take something in reality to be resistant to our thinking it, or possibly 
to be painful in its inexplicability, difficult in that way, or perhaps awesome 
and astonishing in its inexplicability (Diamond, 2008: 45-46). 
This difficulty, or indeed, perplexity, is supposed by Diamond to be of deep 
significance in the lives of human beings as 'flesh and blood' animals. It is 
exemplified in her paper through, among other sources, a poem by Ted Hughes and 
the character of Elizabeth Costello in J.M.Coetzee's novel bearing her name. I will 
explore some of these examples in more detail shortly. For now, and by way of an 
introduction to Diamond's use of this concept, it is crucial to recognise the 
following related, yet separable, points. Firstly, that for Diamond such experiences 
enable us to come into direct contact with the 'reality' of what it is to be human; 
secondly, that philosophical thought and enquiry does not tend to enable us to 
have direct access to this reality. In other words, one might say that for Diamond, 
philosophy tends often to pass-by the deepest problems of human reality which 
can, importantly, be encountered and experienced in other ways. 
A direct experience of the difficulty of reality is something Diamond sees expressed 
in the final stanza of Ted Hughes' poem, 'Six Young Men', which concerns the poet's 
encounter with a photograph of a group of young men who died in the First World 
War, six months after the photograph was taken. Here Hughes' writes: 
That man's not more alive whom you confront 
And shake by the hand, see hale, hear speak loud, 
Than any of these six celluloid smiles are, 
Nor prehistoric or fabulous beast more dead; 
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No thought so vivid as their smoking blood: 
To regard this photograph might well dement 
Such contradictory permanent horrors here 
Smile from the single exposure and shoulder out 
One's own body from its instant and heat. (Hughes, T., in Diamond, 2008: 44). 
Here the poet (or at least the speaker in the poem) describes being struck by the 
sheer aliveness, and the undisputable deadness, of the six men in a single 
photograph. Their smiles reveal their aliveness, their closeness, and one is thus 
drawn to react to them as to smiling men in the flesh. One is, however, reminded of 
what else is known about these men: they are indisputably dead, they are as distant 
from one as is any 'prehistoric or fabulous beast', and hence, one's seemingly 
natural reaction to their aliveness couldn't in fact be any more misplaced. Ted 
Hughes describes the horrors smiling out from the photograph as contradictory and 
permanent: one can, so to speak, cope with life or death, with life versus death, but 
not, perhaps, with life in death or death in life. The speaker in the poem becomes 
aware of both aspects at the same time, and of their inability as opposites to 
capture fully what he has experienced. This strangeness, this unfamiliarity, is indeed 
a horror, as opposed perhaps to an instance of doubt, or mere puzzlement. If one 
can speak of our familiar concepts failing here, then it seems to be less an example 
of uncertainty or of a temporary 'mental cramp', and more something captured by 
the Greek word aporia: of feeling oneself to be at a complete loss. Here at once is 
both a mental and a physical shaken-ness. The speakers body is 'shouldered out' 
from its own 'instant and heat'; his sense of aliveness, of presence, of the here and 
now, is knocked out of him by a failure to understand his experience in familiar or 
everyday terms. 
Diamond wants us to recognise the sheer physicality of the experience described by 
Hughes: of how the awareness of a difficulty is felt by the poet as by one who 
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inhabits (or rather, who is) a vulnerable living, yet mortal, body. What is also 
important to recognise here is how the 'difficulty of reality', insofar as to experience 
the difficulty involves not only perplexity but also a sense of bodily 'thrownness'16, 
is something that, for Diamond, philosophy tends to encounter only indirectly: as a 
series of more or less abstract problems, or 'issues'. And yet, Diamond also 
acknowledges how it is, "...plainly possible to describe the photo so that it does not 
seem boggling at all", for after all, it is only an old photo of young men who were 
once alive and are now dead (Diamond, 2008: 45). There should, or so it seems, be 
little that is shocking or unusual about an old picture: in a similar way, one may well 
be quite ambivalent about the fact that various artefacts in a museum were once 
worn, handled, looked upon, by people now long dead. Diamond is not, it seems, 
suggesting that the experience of the difficulty described in Hughes' poem is 
universal, or even necessarily commonplace. She also imagines, in terms of 
Wittgensteinian talk of language games, how a child might be taught how we 
commonly speak about relics from the past, such as old photographs; of how, for 
example, she is to make sense of a picture of a Grandfather who was alive and 
smiling then, and is now dead. In learning the language game the child learns the 
place of such things in our (and her) world, and is no longer inclined to ask 
questions such as 'Why is he smiling if he is dead?' Her concepts become adequate 
to the task of describing, say, the old picture of the young man. And yet, the 
'horrible contradiction' described by Hughes is, for Diamond, "...that of someone 
who can no longer speak within the game...", for language, "...is shouldered out 
from the game, as the body from its instant and heat" (Diamond, 2008: 45). In this 
sort of case it would seem fruitless to remind the speaker of the familiar language 
games, or otherwise try to articulate something akin to their 'rules' more explicitly, 
as if one were pointing out something that he did not already know, or of which he 
16 This idea of bodily `thrownness' is nevertheless puzzling. What Diamond seems to be referring to 
is an experience of renewed attentiveness to, and awareness of, one's body: a profound experience 
which 'throws' one, so to speak, back 'into the body'. One thinks here of William James' What is an 
Emotion?' - 'Can one fancy the state of rage and picture no ebullition of it in the chest, no flushing of 
the face, no dilatation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous action, but in 
their stead limp muscles, calm breathing, and a placid face? The present writer, for one, certainly 
cannot...' Perhaps we could, then, understand Diamond as referring to a particular sort of 
(Jamesean?) emotional reaction when she speaks of bodily thrownness. 
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was not already aware''. He is only too well aware of how we ordinarily speak of 
life and death, of the sorts of places they occupy in our everyday lives, and yet he 
has still experienced a 'coming apart' of thought and reality; a profound 
dissatisfaction with these concepts, here and now. 
Awareness of physicality or 'embodiment' is also emphasised by Diamond in her 
second example of the difficulty of reality, that of Coetzee's fictional novelist 
Elizabeth Costello. Diamond pays particular attention to chapters three and four of 
Coetzee's novel, which are published in their own right as part of The Lives of 
Animals (Coetzee, 1999). These tell of how the elderly Costello has been invited to 
the United States to deliver the annual Gates lecture at Appleton College, and to 
speak at a seminar organised by the English department at the same college. It is 
not simply the character of Costello or what she says about animals that helps to 
illustrate the problem of reality for Diamond, it is also the way some other 
philosophical commentators on Coetzee's novel understand (or fail to understand) 
Costello, and through her, Coetzee's 'own views and intentions'. 
The readings offered by, among others, Amy Gutmann and Peter Singer (in Coetzee, 
1999), miss something vital for Diamond because they tend to approach Costello's 
lectures as a forum for Coetzee the novelist to comment on various ethical 'issues' 
surrounding the treatment of animals. What they overlook is what Costello herself 
describes as her woundedness. She is, for Diamond, "A woman haunted by the 
horror of what we do to animals." And we should see her as marked and isolated by 
this haunting, and "...by the knowledge of how unhaunted others are" (Diamond, 
2008: 46). The depth of her isolation is revealed by the apparent ease with which 
she draws controversial, even highly inflammatory, comparisons between our 
treatment of animals and the evils of the Nazi extermination camps. In spite of this, 
for the thinkers who comment on Coetzee's novel: 
17 Of course, one might do this therapeutically, hoping again to return him to satisfaction with the 
way things ordinarily are, to carry on living with us, but this would resemble a gesture, a consoling 
hand on the shoulder or such like, and not a piece of new information or a convincing argument 
(although, of course, it may still convince). 
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...the wounded woman, the woman with the haunted mind and the raw 
nerves, has no significance except as a device for putting forward (in an 
imaginatively stirring way) ideas about the resolution of a range of ethical 
issues, ideas which can then be abstracted and examined... (Diamond, 2008: 
49). 
None of the commentators, then, seem to notice that the life of Elizabeth Costello 
is itself, "...one of the 'lives of animals' that the story is about...": an animal hiding 
her woundedness under clothing but at the same time revealing it to her audience 
in "...every word she speaks" (Diamond, 2008: 47). And yet, for Diamond, the 
difficulty of reality is again revealed through Costello's own inability to live with the 
knowledge of what we do to animals, and by the way she sees her fellow human 
beings bearing such knowledge with equanimity, even indifference. For Costello this 
seems to constitute a sort of failure in the human animal, a failure of humanity 
which makes her feel like a stranger in her own skin: could she even be said to 
share the same animal life as these other members of the human species? 
For all of this, one could find oneself inclined to say that what Diamond accuses 
Singer and Gutmann of is little more than an inadequate reading of Coetzee's novel; 
of paying, for example, too little attention to characterisation. One might point out 
here that Singer is hardly famed for his contributions to literary criticism, but to 
philosophy, and particularly to ethics. What is more, Costello does seem to offer 
various 'arguments' in her lectures, and says as much (c.f. Coetzee, 1999: 68-9). 
Why, one could also quite reasonably ask, does Diamond herself want to make 'a 
mountain out of a molehill' by treating philosophical assessment of Costello's 
arguments with such suspicion? For Diamond, however, the fact that these 
commentators approach the lectures, as it were, in spite of Costello herself, 
constitutes a sort of failure of 'feelingness'. They lose sight of this particular woman 
as a 'feeling' as well as a 'thinking' animal; they overlook not only what else she 
says in her lectures, but how she says these things, and why she might say them. 
If Costello offers what might be called philosophical arguments in her lectures then 
it is perhaps because, a little like Red Peter, Kafka's educated ape in Report to an 
91 
Academy, she views herself as having little choice: to speak to a gathering of 
scholars without adhering to the conventions of such argument would be to appear 
to "...gibber and emote and knock over my glass of water and generally make a 
monkey of myself..." (Coetzee, 2003: 68). She has, or so it seems to her, no other 
voice available to her in this setting; she is all too aware of herself as another 
performing animal, required to jump through various - in this instance, intellectual 
— hoops, in order to satisfy the audience's expectations. 
This interpretation might still be quite hard for some to accept. One may very well 
feel tempted to say that Costello herself ought to be understood as over-
sentimental (e.g. feeling far too strongly, perhaps, for her 'own good') to the point 
of being misguided or confused; and if we are to take anything at all genuinely 
interesting from her lectures, then we need somehow to leave the wounded and 
'raw-nerved' speaker behind and assess only the wider significance of the speech. 
Some commentators, perhaps those with a particular sort of philosophical bent, 
may indeed have a certain sympathy with this assessment. Yet, in accepting it as a 
reason to avoid paying much attention to Costello herself, they would likely reveal, 
for Diamond, the tendency in the human animal to understand itself in a 
'diminished and distorted way'. To suppose that we can simply put Costello to one 
side, and better view her lectures as simply contributing to the 'debate' on how to 
treat animals is, for Diamond: 
... to fail to see how 'debate' as we understand it may have built into it a 
distancing of ourselves from our sense of our own bodily life and our 
capacity to respond to and imagine the bodily life of others (Diamond, 2008: 
53). 
I will now say a little more about the role this supposed intellectualisation, this 
deflective 'distancing of ourselves from bodily life', is supposed by Diamond to play 
in much that passes for the post-Enlightenment practice of philosophy. 
(iii) The 'Difficulty of Philosophy' 
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If a renewed awareness of embodiment (through 'bodily thrownness') is key to 
understanding at least the first two of Diamond's examples of the difficulty of 
reality (i.e. Hughes and Costello), it is also seen as something that much philosophy 
tends not to get near, at least not without the benefit of a safe, intellectual, 
distance. This approach indeed reveals Diamond's indebtedness to Cavell, and in 
particular, the use she makes of his notion of 'deflection'. What are often imagined 
to be the core problems of philosophy tend not to touch directly on the reality of 
human engagement with the world, and with the sorts of 'deeper' or more exacting 
difficulties this can present. In a related sense, Diamond speaks of how such 
deflection of deeply felt concerns into, say, 'debates' about moral 'issues', is, "...a 
deflection which makes our bodies mere facts — facts which may or may not be 
thought morally relevant in this or that respect" (Diamond, 2008: 59). In direct 
contrast to such deflectiveness, Coetzee is understood by Diamond to be asking us 
in his Elizabeth Costello lectures to, 'inhabit a body'. In other words, he is 
encouraging us, perhaps, to think more feelingly. 
There seems little doubt, then, that recognisably philosophical attempts to make 
deeply felt experiences or difficulties thinkable, by abstracting from them or by re-
applying familiar or everyday concepts are, for Diamond, doing something 
inappropriate. One might even say that inappropriate is too bland a word to 
capture what Diamond is attacking, and yet, it does enable us to attend to two 
separable aspects of her thought. Such a response is inappropriate, then, not only 
because it seems to miss 'the experience', or fall short of reality, but also — and this 
is something that Diamond does not make fully explicit in her critique of the 
'intellectualising' tendency of philosophy - because such a response is also 
insensitive or shallow. It constitutes a sort of ethical failure. 
I want to pause at this point to examine, even to get a feel for, what is placed 'on 
the table' by Diamond's account. It certainly appears that what is at stake is nothing 
less than the status of philosophy as a recognisable 'practice'; at least as a way of 
enabling one to understand, and engage appropriately, with one's ethical life. One 
seems to be invited to acknowledge how the supposed reduction by philosophers 
of certain difficulties into 'issues' and 'debates', could well constitute a means of 
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shielding oneself from the concerns that belong to human life as the life of a flesh 
and blood animal: an embodied 'soul'. If, as T.S. Eliot wrote, "...humankind cannot 
bear very much reality", then such deflection could itself be viewed as a quite 
natural human reaction to such troubling difficulties of the 'soul', but then again 
such an idea hardly sits easily with the (still) familiar image of the philosopher 
grappling frankly and fearlessly with the deepest problems of reality, and indeed, 
with the supposed ability of philosophy to provide solid, rational grounds from 
which to approach our ethical lives with appropriate, justified, confidence.18 
It is, of course, highly unlikely that those who do hold such hopes for philosophy 
(including, of course, those whose philosophical approaches to ethics I have termed 
'rationalistic') would simply recognise Diamond's suspicions to be compelling 
reasons to abandon, or even amend, their philosophical practices. I pause again, 
then, to consider some lines of questioning that could, from such a perspective, be 
pursued in response to Diamond. In raising them, however, I do not offer any 
particular philosopher - or philosophers - right of reply. They are intended, rather, 
to be suggestive of the lines of critical response that might be offered from within, 
or on behalf of, the sorts of approach to doing philosophy that are a target of 
Diamond's paper. I ought also to point out that in raising them I do not believe that 
there is an onus on Diamond to engage with them directly. They are included, at 
least in part, because of what they might help to reveal about certain patterns of 
unease present in the critic himself. This includes something akin to the desire 
effectively to silence Diamond's attempt to criticise certain visions of doing 
philosophy: to by-pass her critique without engaging with it, as it were, in its own 
terms; to deprive her of a dissenting voice altogether. 
(iv) The difficulty of Diamond? 
For example, it could be that one is drawn to pose the following (critical) questions 
of Diamond's account: 
• What status do her claims about reality and philosophy have? (Does she 
write, so to speak, from within the realms of philosophy, or somehow from 
18 T.S. Eliot, Burnt Norton. 
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the outside looking in? Is philosophy problematic for Diamond simply 
because it is not literature? Does she want us to give up philosophy and, say, 
take up reading, writing and interpreting fiction instead?) 
• Doesn't her suggestion that philosophers deflect, also require, or involve, a 
sort of deflection? (Isn't the very idea of deflection an abstraction from 
what we ought, instead, to acknowledge as the more complex 'webs' of 
human motivation? Aren't there, both within and between individuals, 
many and various motivations for undertaking philosophical questioning and 
analysis? And can't various deep human needs be encountered, 
acknowledged, and served directly, through such philosophical practices? ) 
• Isn't what is described as deflection an entirely natural, even desirable, 
phenomenon? (What would it be like, for example, never to have deflected 
from 'the difficulty of reality' as Diamond describes it? Wouldn't we all 
become emotional wrecks, a little like Elizabeth Costello? And, where would 
this leave our moral lives, not to mention our educational practices?) 
• What if we deny that we deflect when doing philosophy? Wouldn't 
Diamond have to resort to a sort of self-confirming, psychological, 
theorising? (To suggest that underlying an attempt to think philosophically 
lies 'deeper animal needs and responses' that we attempt to deflect, could 
very well involve the further claim that any attempt to deny deflection is 
another form, or manifestation, of one's need to deflect.) 
At least one thing that most of these lines of questioning have in common is a 
concern with the supposedly ambiguous status of Diamond's 'critique' of 
philosophising. They are concerned, one might say, with pointing out that Diamond 
as a philosopher seems to think the unthinkable (or says the unsayable) in her 
paper. One thing, then, that concerns our imagined critic is how problematic it is for 
Diamond to suggest that there are articulable difficulties which philosophy does 
not, and perhaps cannot, tackle head-on. One might then want to see her 'claims' 
as self-confirming, or indeed, self-defeating - in much the same ways as the moral 
relativist is supposed to presuppose the very philosophical approach she attempts 
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to doubt. For perhaps the difficulty of reality described by Diamond as an 
experience of the tension between 'thought and reality', as a failure to understand 
and express, must also extend to her own (presumably philosophical) account of 
what the difficulty of reality itself is. This would clearly be seen as a shortcoming in 
Diamond's account, but an interesting question concerns what sort of shortcoming 
it is supposed to be. If it is indeed a shortcoming in her thinking about the nature of 
philosophy, then presumably Diamond ought to take this accusation seriously 
insofar as she writes as 'a philosopher'. If she supposes herself to be doing 
philosophy proper, then she ought - a rationalistic critic might then suggest - abide 
by its conventions and see her critique for what it is: inherently limited, even 
unsustainable. That is, of course, unless she views herself - and wishes to be viewed 
by others - as critiquing philosophy from the position of an outsider.19  
The risk here is that what can be described as the 'positional poles' will be erected 
thus: Diamond is seen either as doing poor philosophy, or as doing anti-philosophy. 
On the one hand, her claims could be viewed as inadequate because in criticising 
philosophical practice they are seen as self-defeating, in a similar way to how the 
relativistic viewpoint is supposed to be blinded to its own status as philosophy, its 
own dependence on conventions of philosophical thinking and argument. On the 
other, if her account is not really an exercise in philosophy at all, but an approach 
towards philosophy, then why, one could ask, should philosophers even attend to 
it, let alone take it seriously? The critic might then feel inclined to point out how 'us 
philosophers' have heard all this before. One might even be reminded of how 
attacks on philosophy have poured forth in recent decades from the pens of literary 
theorists, sociologists, and other ideological 'trendies': those who have sought to 
pronounce the demise of philosophy with so much 'gaseous' chatter about meta-
narratives, logocentism, ethnocentrism and the rest, but who have offered in its 
place little more than 'jargon-soaked' relativism, packaged as if afresh for 'our' 
postmodern era. If there is more than an element of caricature in my articulation of 
the positions here, it is because I want again to emphasise the risk of polarised 
19 The possibility that Philosophy might in fact more readily resemble a 'family' of practices does not 
seem to occur here. 
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responses to what Diamond might be up to in her paper, a risk that seems 
particularly acute when it is a popular or prevailing tradition of thought (in this case 
thought about the nature and purposes of philosophy) that is placed under attack.2°  
(v) Heart and Head: Philosophy and Feelingness 
If I have so far offered only a suspicion that a 'critique of philosophising', such as 
Diamond's, risks being understood in ways that distort its nature and purposes, it is 
useful to press the point by exploring a related, and in this case concrete, textual 
example. This is offered through some papers in another of Diamond's works, The 
Realistic Spirit, and in particular, through how she approaches the philosophical 
attacks made by Onora O'Neill on Stephen Clark's book The Moral Status of 
Animals. In a chapter entitled, 'Anything but Argument', Diamond portrays the 
thrust of O'Neill's critique of Clark's work as "...exemplifying a view of how 
philosophical discussion in ethics can be carried on, and how it should be carried 
on" (Diamond, 1991: 291). Through O'Neill's reaction to Clark we are also 
permitted, I think, to detect not only an approach to (moral) philosophy which 
Diamond is questioning, but also the same sorts of doubt that are expressed in the 
questions posed by my imagined critic about Diamond's own writings. 
If Clarke's book, for Diamond, seeks to change the way we think about animals - to 
'convince' us to look upon them as 'our kin' by 'enlarging our imaginations' - then 
O'Neill's response to this attempt is perhaps predictably dismissive. For O'Neill, if 
we are not already 'attuned' to Clark's vision, and require him to supply us with "... 
reasons for accepting his view that animals are kin...", we will find to our dismay 
that there are no such arguments, but only various 'appeals' directed at 'the heart'. 
For O'Neill, Clark's book is limited in scope and value as a work of moral philosophy 
precisely because he, "...seeks to do morality without metaphysics", and as such, 
20 That Diamond's doubts about some of the claims of one variety or tradition of philosophy would 
likely be treated as an attack on philosophy per se, is perhaps unsurprising. The problem, one might 
say, is that Diamond is attacking what she views as one (ethically limited) tradition of thought. 
Others, however, may well not view their approach as simply belonging to one tradition, but 
consider it to constitute philosophy proper. The almost reflexive response then made against the 
attacker is to lay claim to the territory inhabited by the attacker, and to the weapons used in her 
attack. Thus one deprives the 'enemy' of both the grounds, and the means, to conduct their 
offensive: they cannot, so to speak, mount an attack without at the same time attacking themselves. 
Diamond, then, cannot critique philosophy, philosophically, without critiquing herself. 
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"...his appeals can reach only the audience who share his commitment to animals" 
(Diamond, 1991: 291-2). It is worth pointing out that when Diamond describes 
O'Neill's response as underpinned by the idea that "...when someone is reasonably 
convinced of something, the convincing will have to proceed by arguments (or what 
could, at any rate, be set out as arguments)", she is also describing at least one 
hallmark of the philosophical thinking about ethics I have described in this thesis as 
rationalistic (Diamond, 1991: 292). 
A rationalistic tendency is also revealed through the idea that Clark's attempt to do 
morality without metaphysics (or, perhaps in the terms of Hand and Dearden, 
morality without epistemology) means that one cannot make plain what Diamond 
calls 'the grounds of moral standing'. Hence, if one does not supply the rational 
grounds in favour of a given moral position, then one is supposed to engage in mere 
assertion, and an effort to persuade the reader with extra-rational considerations. 
It is only a certain vision of 'reasoned argument' that is supposed to be properly 
convincing (rather than 'merely' persuasive) because it alone is directed at 'the 
head'. Whereas our 'hearts' are moved only by emotive appeal and assertion; our 
'heads' can be convinced only by the provision of general grounds proceeding from 
facts and principles. In short, for O'Neill, Clark as a philosopher ought to have aimed 
for the head, but aimed instead at the heart, and has failed thereby to provide a 
genuinely convincing account. 
The critical questions raised by my imaginary 'rationalistic critic' do indeed appear 
to aim at similar (perceived) weaknesses in Diamond's own account in the Difficulty 
of Reality. For such a critic, Diamond provides lengthy quotations from works of 
literature, makes various disparaging comments about the deflectiveness of 
philosophy, and seems simply to appeal to the reader to acknowledge certain 
'experiences' and thus 'see' things her way. They could well continue by pointing 
out that unless one is already 'attuned' to Diamond's account, there is nothing here 
that ought to convince the philosopher of the need to change his ways. There is, in 
short, little that aims directly at his 'head'. Indeed, Diamond seems to provide no 
compelling arguments against, say, the centrality of abstract argument in 
approaching the ethical lives of human beings and their relationships with non- 
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human animals. ('Indeed, how could she, without confirming what she seems to 
want us to deny!' — a rationalist would once again seem to be on comfortably safe 
ground here.) 
I want to close this discussion by pointing out what Diamond has to say in response 
to O'Neill's reading of Clark, and how the her response relates more generally to 
the questions I raised earlier about the 'problematic status' of her own work in The 
Difficulty of Reality. In doing so, we will be better placed to begin to understand 
Diamond as seeking to examine and critique philosophy insofar as it is underpinned 
by rationalistic ambitions, rather than as wanting to do without the notion of 
philosophical reflection and reason altogether. On the one hand, then, Diamond 
can be viewed as attempting to effect a shift of attention so that we might better 
notice the shortcomings of certain approaches to philosophical argument, certainly 
insofar as they are supposed by their proponents to occupy a privileged position in 
the tackling of supposedly 'deep' questions of human life and value. On the other 
hand, and in addition to this shrinking of the foundational ambitions of philosophy 
in respect of the ethical lives of human beings, Diamond can also be seen as wishing 
to expand what might actually count as philosophical engagement with the ethical; 
an engagement that moves away from the desire to establish, for example though 
abstract argument, the proper shape of our ethical lives. 
In so doing, it allows us to begin to grasp how a philosophical text such as 
Diamond's can effectively reach beyond itself: beyond the presentation of particular 
theories or claims, and yet enable us to reflect on our own ethical lives, and on the 
nature of our thinking about them2i. Moreover, we are also given the first hint of a 
possible response to the question of whether there can, indeed, be a role for 
philosophy in both understanding and shaping the ethical lives of human beings. 
This response is indeed something I intend to flesh-out in the next two chapters, 
which are devoted to exploring how the philosophy of Wittgenstein might allow us 
to better grasp what a non-deflective philosophical approach could look like, along 
21 I cannot help thinking in this respect of Raimond Gaita's preface to the second edition of Good and 
Evil, where he describes how the book, "...invites readers to see morality and philosophy from a new 
perspective; not so much by arguing for this or for that thesis, as by exposing assumptions, showing 
other possibilities and being sceptical about what we often think must be the case" (Gaita, 2004: II). 
99 
with how this would relate to thinking about various concerns in both ethics and 
education. 
(vi) Philosophy and the 'Literary Method' 
I return, then, to Diamond's responses to O'Neill, and to the style of her 
engagement with O'Neill's claims about Clark's failure to supply arguments to 
support the position he wishes to defend. Despite the familiarity of such 
accusations (e.g. 'X supplies no compelling grounds for us to accept Y') in 
philosophical texts, Diamond approaches what O'Neill says, and how she says it, 
with a renewed, and quite deliberate, sense of puzzlement. Rather than actively 
seeking to discover the 'missing' arguments in Clark's book, and thus accusing 
O'Neill of having ignored or overlooked them, Diamond's focus is more on the 
accusation itself - the notion of Clark's not having provided the necessary 
arguments in order to convince his readers - and on encouraging us to be puzzled 
about it. As such, Diamond pursues what one might well describe as a philosophical 
investigation of O'Neill's objection to Clark, one that is concerned in part with 
probing, from different angles, what it might mean for her to proceed in the 
manner that she does. She attempts to get clear, for example, about what sort of 
picture is being presupposed by O'Neill about the relationship between 
philosophical argument and ethical engagement, and what else might be involved 
in holding on to such a picture. 
It should also be noted, however, that Diamond is not so much rejecting the place 
of any sort of argument in our thinking about ethical questions, but is attempting to 
investigate and problematise what O'Neill seems to treat as the unquestioned 
centrality of the sort of argumentation that is supposed to be uniquely convincing, 
rationally speaking. Diamond does indeed suggest that, "...someone who rejects a 
good argument does so at a cost: for example, at the cost of showing his own 
incapacity to think carefully" (Diamond, 1991: 295). However, the point, contra 
O'Neill, seems also to be that someone who rejects as mere 'persuasion' other 
articulated ways of looking at things, may show limitations of other sorts: for 
example, "...a very limited moral imagination" (Diamond, 1991: 295). To fail to be 
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convinced, say, by a novel (such as David Copperfield) written in part to lead people 
to share a concern for children, may well help to reveal in one the existence of 
other limitations or incapacities, rather than simply provide support for the view 
that a novel, unless it contains arguments, must always fail to be convincing. 
Diamond thus seeks repeatedly to probe the notion that there is only one way of 
attempting to move beyond assertion: that of argument; and that unless one 
already shares the commitment to animals by a writer like Clark, arguments are 
thereby required in order to win us over. 
Diamond's puzzlement here at least in part centres on the question of why one with 
such a disinclined heart would be expected to listen to argument? If one's heart is 
not already inclined, how does O'Neill think an argument, as a 'heart indifferent' 
method, will result in a change of belief, or indeed, of heart? One key assumption 
here seems to be that a good argument will simply induce one to adopt a view in 
spite of one's heart. This itself presupposes a certain prominence of the workings of 
'the head' over the supposed inclinations of 'the heart': something that the 
philosopher ought both to personify and aim to encourage in others. One may not 
like the view being expressed, but one's broader commitment to the power and 
scope of rational argument will be supposed to overpower such feelings of 
disinclination: one is thus able to operate with a certain disassociation, or 
dislocation, of heart and head; feeling and reason. Yet, at the very least, it can be 
viewed as odd for O'Neill to include in her critique of Clark any talk of 
disinclinations of the heart. Presumably, those who would require 'good 
arguments' to change their minds on a given issue, should (if they correctly 
privilege the place of 'rational arguments' in their lives) only be 'intellectually 
disinclined' to believe in the view we seek to promote. If they were indeed the sorts 
of people who would regularly privilege rational argument over other techniques of 
assertion or persuasion, then any disinclination they would have towards our 
preferred view would (it seems) already be a mere disinclination of the head (i.e. 
that one was already convinced by another, competing set of 'compelling' 
arguments). 
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There is, however, more going on in Diamond's approach both to O'Neill and in the 
Difficulty of Reality than probing and problematising. This is something that her 
discussion of David Copperfield, to which I alluded above, helps us in part to 
recognise. To bring this aspect of Diamond's style of doing philosophy more fully to 
the fore, it is helpful to consider a passage from another of her chapters in The 
Realistic Spirit, where she describes what she calls the 'literary technique' in 
philosophy. She begins with a passage from Wittgenstein's Tractatus, and moves to 
link Wittgenstein's approach here with her own. Hence, when someone says 
something 'metaphysical', Wittgenstein suggests that we should: 
...demonstrate to him that certain signs in his propositions had been given 
no meaning. This method would be unsatisfying for the other person—he 
would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—but this 
method would be the only strictly correct one. [Tractatus, 6.53] What is to 
be learned by the reader of such a philosophical text would not be anything 
in the text; the person to whom such philosophy is addressed must take 
philosophically seriously the use of a literary technique, that of not enabling 
the reader to find what he expects in a certain sort of work. Just as Iser [a 
philosopher], reflecting on Tom Jones, emphasises that the novel teaches us 
how to think about human nature by making us think about it and not by 
giving us what to think, so a philosophical text may aim to make us think 
about things in a new way, not by giving us what to think about them, not 
by presenting new views or doctrines (Diamond, 1991: 371). 
This passage is puzzling, and clearly demands unpacking. What, for example, could 
be meant by getting us to think without telling us what to think, or of our learning 
something from the text which is not itself in the text? We might point out that 
surely the text, any text, will be communicating something rather than nothing. We 
think: it must surely have something to say. Such responses are understandable, 
particularly if we think that a philosophical text will, in virtue of its being a 
philosophical text, attempt to get us to think about an issue precisely by telling us 
what we ought to think. That it must provide us with claims and theories, and with 
the arguments that are supposed to support them. Nevertheless, in the 'literary 
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technique' Diamond is describing, the intended effects on the reader of a 
philosophical text seem more closely to resemble those experienced by a person 
engaged with a substantial work of fiction, such as Tom Jones. Although the author 
may clearly guide our reactions to the characters in his novel, he does not explicitly 
teach us what to think about what, say, they are supposed to represent. Neither 
can his work simply be understood as constituting a series of claims about what 
must be the case with the 'human condition'. Rather, as readers of fiction, we come 
to reflect on such general themes via our engagement with particular examples; for 
example, with particular characters in a novel. 
It is also important to recognise that reflecting on a novel is not simply a matter of 
being made to feel certain things, of simply being moved 'emotionally' — as if 'heart' 
and 'head' live in complete isolation from each other. Insofar as we are reflecting 
well, we will also likely be questioning, probing, wondering, making connections, 
drawing comparisons, and so on. We may also be discussing and even arguing with 
others. As such, Diamond's literary method provides a direct challenge to polarised 
thinking about the separateness of 'head' and 'heart'. It also helps to emphasise the 
differences between her approaches to philosophical thinking, and of the role of 
'reasoning' in the ethical life, and those rationalistic approaches I have described 
elsewhere in the thesis. Indeed, Diamond's description of a 'literary method' 
connects closely with what Alice Crary describes as the possibility of a different, less 
narrow, conception of rationality. A conception on which 'rational thinking' is not 
conceived as essentially independent of various personal sensitivities and 'affective 
endowments', but inextricably wrapped-up with them. For indeed: 
...a person's ability to make the connections constitutive of a rational line of 
thought necessarily presupposes sensitivities characteristic of her as a 
possessor of a language and on which modes of discourse that cultivate a 
person's sensitivies may therefore make direct contributions to rational 
understanding in virtue of doing so (Crary, 2007: 128). 
The connections between Crary's notion of what we might describe as an 
'embodied rationality', and Diamond's talk of a 'literary technique' are important. 
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They also help reveal that the style of Diamond's writing cannot be radically 
separated from the content of her philosophy: the style, rather, reveals ('shows' us) 
something about the nature of the subject of philosophy —and of its relationship 
with ethics - as Diamond sees it. This is not, as I have suggested, simply a matter of 
Diamond writing 'poetically', and as such, believing that we too ought to write 
philosophy in such a manner. 
Her own use of literary works, such as Elizabeth Costello in The Difficulty of Reality, 
encourages our philosophical reflections to go beyond her own text, and to look 
more deeply at the works she discusses. And to look more deeply at them as the 
sorts of writings that can bear directly on our ethical lives, and on our thinking 
better — and more rationally - about them. Diamond's writings, and her talk of a 
literary method, appear to offer a way of expanding the idea of what can count as 
'rational' engagement; of attempting to "...enrich our inventory of modes of 
discourse that are capable of directly contributing to rational understanding" 
(Crary, 2007: 119). Part of this is to encourage us to acknowledge that what for 
O'Neill (and indeed the rationalistic critic) might be described as merely 'persuasive' 
modes of discourse, ('modes...that aim to elicit affective responses') can as such 
make direct contributions to such understanding (Crary, 2007: 119).22 It is, at least 
in part, to emphasise the role works of fiction can play in encouraging ethical 
development. I will say more about this in the final chapter. 
(vii) Conclusions 
For now, and by way of a conclusion to this chapter, I want attend to something 
else that Alice Crary mentions in this connection, and which will also help us better 
to appreciate Diamond's notion of a text being able to point us in ethically relevant 
ways beyond what is said in the text. In discussing Tolstoy's short story, The Death 
of Ivan Illich, Alice Crary describes how the story, "...attempts to get us to look at 
death (and our lives as beings who will die) is a more appropriate way...", but does 
22 See also Crary's description of her larger aim in Beyond Moral Judgement, which is: "...to show 
that once we recognize that the moral interest of certain literary works needs to be understood in 
widely rational terms, we position ourselves to see that literary works are frequently in the business 
of eliciting moral thinking that, while rationally fully legitimate, does not take the form of moral 
judgement-making" (Crary, 2007: 132). 
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not do so through the provision of claim or doctrine, for, "...the story doesn't aim to 
provide information about death that we are lacking..." (Crary, 2007: 156). Instead, 
the story resonates with the notion of deflection I have discussed in this chapter in 
connection with a rationalistic conception of what it might mean to lead an ethical 
life. Not only does it help us better to understand Diamond's own use of literary 
examples such as Ted Hughes and J.M Coetzee, it also helps to aid our appreciation 
of what may be the ethical and educative advantages of such examples over the 
arguments which the rationalist supposes will establish certain moral truths. 
If Tolstoy's story teaches us about death, and in particular how it can be tempting 
to reduce its ethical significance into a matter of accepting a claim or a doctrine 
(Ivan himself recognises that he as a man is indeed moral by extending the 
syllogism 'Caius is a man, men are mortal, therefore Caius is mortal'), then it is done 
in different ways. It comes, rather, through the development of, "...a narrative 
technique that is designed to invite identifications of different sorts with its various 
characters" (Crary, 2007: 156). By inviting identification of various sorts with its 
various characters: we are given, so to speak, a choice, or a number of choices, of 
'emotional' identification with any or all of them. Rather than encouraging us to 
address the question of how we might make sense of death through abstract 
argumentation, we are encouraged by the author to look at how different people, 
different characters, actually understand and react to death. We are, on Crary's 
reading, also "...asked to feel repugnance for the empty life that Ivan lives with his 
wife..."; to "...feel a sort of horrified exasperation with Ivan's doctors and friends 
who lie to him while he is dying". In contrast, we are invited to feel 'relief' at the 
"...simple solicitousness of the peasant Gerasim...", who helps Ivan through his last 
days with compassion, and without any obvious condescension (Crary, 2007: 156- 
7). 
This hardly constitutes mere manipulation of 'our hearts'. In short, we are able to 
understand what Crary calls the 'moral message' of the story only insofar as it 
enables us to "...make sense of certain features of Ivan's life that he has somehow 
forgotten or obscured", and that we have also been enabled to "...make sense of 
analogous features in our own mortal lives" (Crary, 2007: 157). This involves both 
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intellectual and emotional effort, even struggle. In particular, it seems to require an 
openness that involves our not seeking to obscure or deflect ethical problems into 
mere questions and debates to be settled through abstract patterns of 
argumentation. In the view that I have been sketching here, and seek to extend in 
the rest of this thesis, Tolstoy — and indeed, Diamond — are not offering us, as my 
imagined philosophical critic might suspect, an alternative to thinking hard, to doing 
philosophy. Instead, they are suggesting what we might describe as an alternative 
form of philosophical or rational engagement with ethical questions: an intellectual 
engagement which is nevertheless bound-up with our emotional responses. 
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Chapter 7 
Wittgenstein: Philosophy without Deflection? 
"Nothing is so difficult as doing justice to the facts." 
--Wittgenstein, Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough 
I. Introduction 
I begin this chapter with a rather bold claim: that is, for me, Wittgenstein's 
philosophical writings can be read as fundamentally ethical in nature. The task of 
developing this idea will occupy much of my attention both in this chapter and in 
the next. It may, nevertheless, seem a rather an odd thing to be suggesting. Even a 
glance at the index of the Philosophical Investigations will reveal one solitary 
reference to the word 'ethics'23; and this (at section 77), would seem simply to 
constitute a warning about the possibility of saying anything definite about 'our 
concepts' in aesthetics and ethics. This would, at the very least, seem strange if it 
were indeed Wittgenstein's intention to write a book about ethics. Another way of 
pressing this point is to ask: if Wittgenstein was so interested in ethics why does he 
say so precious little about it, particularly in his later writings? What is more, it is 
perhaps not even clear what sort of distinction I am making with this claim: with 
what, or with whom, am I contrasting the supposedly ethical nature of 
Wittgenstein's writings? For even my discussions of the 'rationalistic' writings of 
Dearden and Hand on teaching controversial issues reveal certain underlying, or 
underpinning, ethical purposes. Does not Hand in particular aim at establishing the 
right criterion for selecting such issues for teaching in schools, so that certain 
supposed 'goods' (the need for young people to receive 'substantive' moral 
guidance; the need to develop their 'capacity' for rational choice and action etc.) 
are best achieved? It would certainly be strange to say that these were simply 
educational goods rather than ethical ones, as if the two things could be cleaved 
neatly apart. 
23 Along with no explicit entries for 'value', 'values', 'moral', 'morals', or 'morality'. 
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In order to see how, in spite of appearances, Wittgenstein's writings might be 
described as concerned with the ethical, and how this separates them from that 
philosophising about ethics I have called rationalistic, I will again take seriously the 
idea introduced at the end of the last chapter in the context of approaching 
Diamond's talk of a literary technique. This is the idea that a certain style of writing 
philosophy aims to direct us beyond the text itself: that it gets us to think without 
telling us what to think; engages our minds without advancing novel theories or 
claims. 'That is all very well and good', one might still say, 'but isn't it also revealing 
that when Diamond talks of this, she quotes from the Tractatus (at Section 6.53) in 
order to evoke something like Wittgenstein's distinction between 'saying' and 
'showing'?' And surely', one might continue, 'the Wittgenstein who wrote about 
that, was a quite different philosopher from the one who penned later works such 
as Philosophical Investigations.' It is interesting that one would likely have less of a 
problem in describing the Tractatus as revealing an ethical, even a spiritual, 
purpose. Wittgenstein seems to says as much in his letters to Von Ficker, when he 
speaks of the Tractatus as really consisting of two works: the one that he wrote and 
the one that could never be written. And it is the second that he supposed to be the 
important one.24 
However we take such statements, and whether or not we see the 'claims' in the 
book as strictly nonsensical, the point remains that Wittgenstein does speak about 
ethics in the Tractatus. In fact, he seems to begin to expound certain ideas that are 
developed in what has become known as the Lecture on Ethics, a few years later, in 
1929. The main task for this chapter, then, is to show how we might treat 
Wittgenstein's later writings as fundamentally ethical in nature, in spite of the fact 
that they say so precious little about familiar ethical themes or issues. The task of 
the next chapter is to clarify how the story I begin to develop here about 
Wittgenstein's 'ethics' can nevertheless be variously misunderstood and 
24 To cite the relevant passage at length: "The book's point is an ethical one. I once meant to include 
in the preface a sentence which is not in fact there now but which I will write out for you here 
because it will perhaps be a key to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was this: My work 
consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this 
second part that is the important one." 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1969/jul/10/wittgensteins-strategy-2/?pagination=false 
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misappropriated. For now, I begin the task of elucidating what I see as the ethical 
nature of these writings through an exploration of the character or 'style' of his 
approaches to philosophy. 
II. On reading, and writing about, Wittgenstein 
I want to confess from the outset of this chapter that I find reading Wittgenstein 
difficult. I speak, in particular, of the challenging process of 'finding one's feet' with 
him: of how, for instance, to approach the relationship between what Wittgenstein 
writes, and how he writes; between the 'content' and the 'style' of his 
investigatory, descriptive, and dialogic approaches to philosophy. Consider, in the 
first place, the following comments about Wittgenstein's style made by philosopher 
and psychotherapist John Heaton, in his book entitled Wittgenstein and 
Psychoanalysis: 
He uses no technical vocabulary and is explicitly aware that any 
philosophical assertion he makes has an imprecise and dubious status. His 
remarks are hints to be applied to confusions and are not dazzling novelties 
of technical insight. (Heaton, 2000: 9) 
Heaton hits upon what may indeed strike the reader on his or her first encounter 
with Wittgenstein's later work. There is this, of course, and the fact that there are 
no discernible chapters, no section headings, little sense of overall structure, or 
even of continuous prose: in all, there seems to be an almost flagrant disregard for 
academic conventions. We may even be similarly confused about Wittgenstein's 
intentions, or aims, in writing philosophy. Of course, one can discover a few passing 
references which suggest that his approach could be conceived of as a kind of 
'therapy'25, and yet, one may also come across the idea that the "...sickness of 
philosophical problems get cured only through a changed mode of thought and life, 
not through the medicine invented by an individual (RFM, 23)"; or indeed, the 
recognition that his writings ought to be treated as "...nothing more than the mirror 
in which my reader sees his own thinking with all its deformities & with this 
assistance can set it in order" (CV, 25). Of course, the fact that all this can be rather 
25 For some familiar examples, see Philosophical Investigations, 133; 254- 255. 
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startling for the Wittgenstein novice, does not prevent it from being completely 
familiar to the more seasoned reader. One may well want to say: 'the question of 
why such a reader ought to be reminded in this section of what she already knows, 
remains unanswered'. To this I would add that familiarity can cut both ways. It can 
of course tell of a progressively deeper awareness of Wittgenstein's philosophical 
intentions; but it may also mean that his ways of writing philosophy have ceased to 
be striking: perhaps even coming to blur with other, perhaps more familiar ways of 
thinking about and writing about philosophy. 
One might, perhaps, find oneself troubled about where, say, the so-called private 
language 'argument' starts and ends in the Philosophical Investigations26, or about 
the status of Wittgenstein's 'claim' about the 'common behaviour of mankind' in 
section 206 of the same book (e.g. If certain behaviours transcend 'culture', which 
ones? What, then, about values? Are there for Wittgenstein universal moral or 
aesthetic beliefs? Universal virtues?) In other words, there is a risk that one's 
writings about Wittgenstein may, in spite of their undoubted scholarly credentials, 
become distinctly un-Wittgensteinian. What, exactly, am I saying here? There are at 
least two things that I am not saying. Firstly, I am not suggesting that one must seek 
to emulate Wittgenstein's investigative style of writing in order to understand and 
write successfully about his philosophy. Clearly, one does not have to write about a 
poem in verse in order not to misrepresent, say, the poet's 'intentions'. Prose is not 
peculiarly doomed to failure in this respect; likewise, essays or chapters on 
Wittgenstein are not rendered worthless in advance on the basis of their expected 
format. Secondly, I am not attempting to explain away, or to put down any possible 
misrepresentation of Wittgenstein's ideas or intentions (of how, say, one ought to 
understand his uses of the terms 'ordinary' or 'everyday' language) to over-
familiarity with, or a lack of attentiveness to, his style of writing. I refer instead to 
there being a risk that one might cease to be struck by the ways Wittgenstein 
writes about familiar philosophical problems; and that it is possible to come to miss 
26 There is some well-known puzzlement here: does such an 'argument' run from sections 243-315, 
or is it, as Kripke (1982) has suggested, `contained' in section 202? 
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the novelty in what he is saying by overlooking what is novel about how he is saying 
it. 
One might also be tempted to revert to familiar, sharp distinctions between style 
and substance: over here is the 'style', and over there is the 'substance' or 
'content'. The style is there to deliver the content: a decorative envelope, however 
attractive or unusual, is still just a casing for the contents — the all-important 
Wittgensteinian message. 'And what', one may again insist, 'is wrong with this 
picture?' To so much as think of abandoning it is surely to risk getting bogged down 
in some sort of 'literary analysis', and to forget the proper business of exploring and 
assessing Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas. Part of my point here is that this sort 
of objection can itself reveal the sort of polarity into which it is easy to descend 
when doing philosophy; and reminding us about the allure of such extreme and 
misleading pictures seems to constitute no small part of Wittgenstein's 
philosophical remit. To put my point in a more positive, indeed Wittgensteinian, 
way: allowing oneself to be 'struck' by Wittgenstein's style of writing about common 
philosophical problems can help to focus one's attention on what is peculiar about 
his treatment of these problems, and what it is that makes these problems 
'problematic'. 
One thing that is initially striking, although not strictly unique, about Wittgenstein's 
later writings is the dialogic style of many of the passages. For example, consider 
passage 278 from the Philosophical Investigations, where Wittgenstein writes: "'I 
know how the colour green looks to me' — surely that makes sense — Certainly; 
what use of the proposition were you thinking of?" While one may be quite used to 
a philosopher considering, and dealing with, objections or counter arguments to 
her stated position, in Wittgenstein's use of an imagined interlocutor, one also gets 
the impression not simply of a dialogue taking place between representatives of 
different philosophical positions, but also of his own struggle with certain thoughts 
and ideas - an internal dialogue, if you will. Even, perhaps, of an attempt to free 
himself of certain temptations as he is writing philosophy. And so we do not simply 
have: 'here is my idea', and 'here is the expression of the idea'; 'here is the all-
important thought' and 'here are the words that 'carry' it'. We find instead a more 
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intimate relationship between thought and expression; one that is in keeping with 
what may be described as Wittgenstein's 'de-polarising' writings about topics such 
as the 'inner' and 'outer'; 'thought' and 'language'. 
At various times in these writings, it can even be difficult to tell who is saying what: 
Wittgenstein or his imagined interlocutor. Consider for example the following 
passage from Philosophical Investigations: 
'But still, it isn't a game, if there is some vagueness in the rules'.—But does 
this prevent its being a game?—'Perhaps you'll call it a game, but at any rate 
it certainly isn't a perfect game.' This means: it has impurities, and what I am 
interested in at present is the pure article.—But I want to say: we 
misunderstand the role of the ideal in our language. That is to say: we too 
should call it a game, only we are dazzled by the ideal and therefore fail to 
see the actual use of the word 'game' clearly. (PI, 100) 
One has, so to speak, to take one's time with such passages. It is not immediately 
clear who is insisting, here, on the idea that games cannot be games if they have 
only vague rules; on the seeming distinction between 'imperfect', and 'prefect' or 
'genuine', games. Although this supposed lack of clarity may indeed be put down to 
a poor reading of Wittgenstein's prose (e.g. of his use of dashes and quotation 
marks), or even, perhaps, to his taciturn style of writing, it has also, I suspect, 
something to do with the sorts of problems Wittgenstein is dealing with: with how 
such problems arise, and with the forms they are apt to take. One might say here 
that Wittgenstein's dialogic style itself throws light on his ideas of bewitchment, 
being 'dazzled', being 'irresistibly' tempted – it provides, if you will, a certain 
personification of such ideas. One may, as I suspect did Wittgenstein, recognise 
such temptations in one's own thinking27. John Heaton again helps to bring out this 
point with the following comment about Wittgenstein's 'style' of doing philosophy, 
which: 
27 Cf. PI 299: 'being irresistibly inclined' 
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...invites direct involvement in the text by the reader because it is a drama of 
self-interrogation inviting the recognition of wishes, temptations and 
entanglements rather than arguments for the passive acceptance of theses. 
(Heaton, 2000: 9) 
One is intended precisely to engage with, to 'open oneself' to, Wittgenstein's text: 
the style of writing encourages one to see oneself as a participant in an 
investigation; not as a disinterested yet ever-critical reader who must remain 
poised to counter any 'challenge' made by Wittgenstein to one's hitherto favoured 
'position'. One thinks, perhaps, of watching ('experiencing') a Brecht play: where, 
so to speak, one is 'invited' to view oneself as a participant, as involved, in the 
drama rather than being allowed to remain a merely passive spectator, sitting in a 
privileged or distanced position. One might say that for Wittgenstein, too, one must 
tackle and resolve philosophical problems not from a position of abstraction, as a 
detached and critical observer of various 'Problems', but by seeing oneself — one's 
own attitudes etc. - as part of the problem at hand; part of the drama. We might 
also say, then, that Wittgenstein's way of writing philosophy presupposes a certain 
seriousness on behalf of the reader; a preparedness to engage afresh with one's 
philosophical problems28 - to 'plunge' again and again into the waters of doubt and 
to feel at home there (c.f. P0,7: 119). 
To this end, another important and distinctive feature of Wittgenstein's later 
writings is his use of examples. Here, examples often appear to function as a sort of 
method of investigating, and tackling, particular philosophical problems from 
different directions, rather than simply as a means of providing supplementary 
'evidence' to reinforce a stated point of view. This perhaps ought to be seen in the 
light of certain comments made by Wittgenstein in the preface to the Philosophical 
investigations, which are quoted below: 
28 Although it is speculative, I would suggest that one might view this demand for 'seriousness' in the 
light of Wittgenstein's remarks about writing from 'good-will' rather than, say, from 'vanity'; and 
also of his dismissal of 'cleverness' in the types of articles that he saw published in academic 
journals. (e.g. CV, 57-58; PR, 181-182) 
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After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a 
whole, I realized that I should never succeed. The best that I could write 
would never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were soon 
crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their 
natural inclination.--And this was, of course, connected with the very 
nature of the investigation. For this compels us to travel over a wide field of 
thought criss-cross in every direction... (PI, preface: vii) 
Part of what interests me here is the idea of thoughts being 'crippled'; and why 
such crippling ought to lead to the provision of 'nothing more' than philosophical 
remarks or examples, and how this is supposed to be related to the nature of 'the 
investigation'. For being compelled to travel across a wide field 'criss-cross' in every 
direction may indeed give the impression not simply of being lost, but of being 
disorientated: of having utterly lost one's bearings. And, we would hardly expect a 
person familiar with a particular terrain to behave in such a manner, let alone to 
expect others to benefit from such a seemingly aimless tour. We might even 
suggest that Wittgenstein, like any good navigator, ought to take us the most direct 
way to the desired destination. For although we might accept that he had taken 
many wrong turnings before finding the 'right way' in philosophy, we would still 
want him still to spare others the need to take these various detours. 
The impression of being lost and disorientated connects, however, with 
Wittgenstein's oft-cited comments later in the Investigations that, "A philosophical 
problem has the form: 'I don't know my way about" (PI, 123); and that the aim in 
doing philosophy is to "...shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (PI, 309). Here 
one might well suppose that the fly can see the world 'outside' the bottle: it can 
see, or has a sense of, where it needs to get to in order to be free. And yet, as it 
does not have a clear view of the nature of its trap - of what is barring its exit - it is 
liable merely to buzz and bump ever more frantically against the walls of its 
supposed confines. It may itself become incapable of escape; it may in the end be 
'crippled' by so many failed attempts to do so. Wittgenstein's writings, too, give us 
this sense of 'buzzing about', as we are invited to journey with him around and 
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around numerous philosophical landscapes. Wittgenstein joins us - if I may 
continue to press the image — on the various journeys of a fly around a fly bottle. 
He does not simply hold up a map or picture of an exit that he alone has discovered 
at the top of the bottle (What, after all, would one do with such a picture? What, 
for example, would one suppose it to be a picture of?)29 There are no short-cuts or 
simple 'best routes' here; and the risk of losing one's bearings — even for the 
navigator - are ever present. One must, however, be able to find for oneself the 
complex and criss-crossed nature of the philosophical problems being investigated: 
the possible wrong-turnings, the dead-ends, the ring-roads, the diversions etc. It 
would not be enough simply to be told that such problems are somehow 
'multifaceted': one must, so to speak, be made to bump repeatedly against the 
walls of the bottle - to feel a certain discomfort for oneself. 
For Wittgenstein, then, it would seem that if we are to investigate philosophical 
problems we are somehow 'compelled' to travel far and wide: to move from 
philosophical remark to philosophical remark; often from one example to another. 
Not to do so is to put oneself at risk of crippled thoughts, and thus of rendering 
one's thinking immobile: stuck, perhaps, in one comfortable position or another. 
The use of continuous prose and a linked paragraph structure, may too easily3° give 
the impression of steamrolling a straight path through a deep forest, whereby one 
would miss so much else of interest, and still not find one's sense of direction 31. It 
could add to the sense that some sort of extended, abstract argument was what 
was required in order to find one's way about in philosophy. Such 'structured' 
writing can easily make it appear, for example, that one point is simply more 
fundamental than another; that this is the essential issue, and that merely follows 
from it, qualifies it, etc. It can make it seem as if one were communicating a sort of 
discovery, the recognition of which should simply be acknowledged as one's 
29 One may draw an interesting parallel by imagining Plato's escaped prisoner (from the cave in The 
Republic) returning simply to show the other prisoners a map he sketched of the escape route, and a 
picture he had drawn of the outside of the cave. Here he shouts excitedly: 'This is what I have seen... 
this is what is outside. Follow me and you too will see what I have'. 
30 But not necessarily, of course. 
31 The forest image is borrowed from Wittgenstein: "I ask countless irrelevant questions. If only I can 
succeed in hacking my way through this forest". (CV, 67). 
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distinctive theory or solution (a type of medicine) to what troubles us all when 
doing philosophy. So while there is a sense that Wittgenstein is walking with us in 
his writings, and providing examples, erecting signposts, offering reminders, even 
giving 'the right tip'. (cf. PI, II: xi), he does not walk for us; he does not want to 
spare us the trouble of thinking for ourselves. His approach to writing philosophy —
the various examples, the interlocutor, the imagined situations, and all the rest —
provide, I believe, a strong indication that there is no discovery or theory being 
provided: nothing that might be supposed to solve or bring to an end, once and for 
all, one's difficulties in doing philosophy. 
It is time to take a pause, and to press the following question of the account I have 
offered so far: what exactly does this discussion of Wittgenstein's style of writing 
philosophy have to do with my aims in this chapter? In other words: what, if 
anything, can be drawn from it in terms of an understanding of the non-deflective, 
and ethical, nature of Wittgenstein's writings? If I have suggested that the nature of 
his investigative style of philosophy reveals something important about the nature 
of philosophical problems for Wittgenstein, my story remains, to say the least, a 
little sketchy on the (ethical) details. Apart from a seemingly casual reference to the 
'seriousness' presupposed by his writings, and some further talk of temptations, 
lost-ness, the idea of therapy, the need for openness etc., little of substance has 
been said of these matters. To remedy this, I aim in the next two sections to make 
clear that Wittgenstein's conception of the role of philosophy, revealed or 
'modelled' through the ways he conducts his philosophy, brings to light the idea of 
philosophy being conducted for the sake of the ethical, albeit in a radically different 
sense from how the philosophically rationalistic account I described earlier in the 
thesis would conceive of this relationship. In this rationalistic account, philosophy is 
called upon to give us the ethical proper: without its intervention, and without the 
bolstering of certain 'moral' beliefs and practices by means of reason, the ethical 
life threatens to fall apart, or more accurately, to collapse given its very lack of firm 
foundations. We would seem to be left with anything goes: with relativism, with 
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mere preference, consensus, feeling, supposition, conjecture, intuition, and all the 
rest of this seemingly inadequate company.32 
This sort of approach seems, in an important sense, to assume that human beings 
by nature resemble ethical sceptics33 who stand in need of something akin to a 
justification for the ethical life before they will (or should?) be prepared to accept 
and to live it. I want to say that Wittgenstein's approach seems to reverse, or 
upturn, the role philosophy is supposed by the rationalist to play in the ethical life, 
and also points to very different educational possibilities. We get a sense that the 
lives of human beings need no such philosophical crutches; no foundations in the 
shape of theories or explanations. Rather, it is the ethical, and not philosophy, that 
is in an important sense the given here: the taken for granted, often unnoticed, 
landscape on which philosophy itself stands and, so to speak, peddles its wares. I 
will expand this slightly cryptic idea later. For now, suffice it to say that the 
supposed relationship between philosophy and ethics, which sees the later as 
somehow dependent for its flourishing on the former's use of reason is, for 
Wittgenstein, symptomatic of a deep-seated but misleading picture.34 It is itself 
something that stands in need of 'philosophical' treatment of a quite different sort. 
If I may briefly digress into anecdote at this point, according to Norman Malcolm in 
his Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, one of Wittgenstein's favourite phrases when 
Malcolm was tempted to meddle with something (anything from a philosophical 
32 As for 'moral education', perhaps it might be thought to exist only as the teaching of various 
competing ideas or theories without any possibility of choosing rationally between them. Or 
perhaps, rather, it would form part of various cynical attempts at 'mere' persuasion into the 
preferences of the teacher, the school, the community, the government etc. Without the possibility 
of Reason's firmly guiding hand, the choice might well be conceived to be between mere nihilism on 
the one side of the abyss, and sheer totalitarianism on the other. 
33 Bernard Williams makes a similar point in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985:30). However, 
it should also be noted that such an idea is not solely the property of the accounts of 'philosophical 
rationalists.' Albeit in a different context, it is still interesting how social theorist Zygmunt Bauman 
describes human beings as, by nature, 'morally ambivalent' (Bauman, 1993:14). 
34 It may be captivating, even irresistible, for its proponents, but it may still be described as a form of 
cheating oneself. Perhaps it is in a similar way to how a religious person (e.g. Father Copelston in 
conversation with A.J Ayer) who looks for arguments to support the fact of God's existence, is 
described by Wittgenstein, as cheating himself. (See Recollections of Wittgenstein 1984: 158) In 
Cavellean terms, one might speak instead of failing to take responsibility for oneself; a failure of 
acknowledgement. 
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idea to a toilet in Malcolm's house that they were mending35) was, "...leave the 
bloody thing alone". There is indeed something in this slightly irreverent 
exclamation that I could imagine Wittgenstein wanting to say to the rationalist 
about an attempt to set the ethical lives of human beings on supposedly firm 
rational grounds. 
III. On doing 'justice' to 'the facts'. 
I quoted from Wittgenstein's Remarks about Frazer's Golden Bough at the start of 
this chapter in part because what is said here seems quite ambiguous. Doing 
'justice' to the 'facts' certainly sounds Tractarean ('The world is the totality of facts 
not of things' etc.) Moreover, it also brings to mind the infamous modern 
distinction between fact and value. It sounds rationalistic; even positivistic. Yet this 
would, I think, be to misunderstand what Wittgenstein is suggesting about this 
supposedly profound difficulty, and what 'not doing justice to the facts' might also 
imply in terms of a contrast. It seems clear enough that when these remarks were 
written,36 Wittgenstein's talk of 'the facts' (tatsachen) seem to have lost something 
of the more technical meaning assigned them in the Tractatus. The great difficulty 
of doing justice to the facts would seem now to refer more generally to how 
extremely tempting it can be to extrapolate: to offer an explanation or hypothesis 
which is supposed to 'make sense' of what is 'presented' or 'given' (in Frazer's own 
case, what is presented is the various religious practices of the 'primitive' peoples 
he writes about). Yet, this still sounds odd; even radically sceptical. If doing justice 
to the facts requires that we curb our urge to hypothesise or theorise, it seems also 
to imply that we (and Frazer) ought to give up any attempt to understand the 
phenomena, the practices, we encounter. In rejecting this implication, I want to 
suggest that Wittgenstein is drawing our attention here to the types of 
understanding that can emerge from different ways, or forms, of engagement with 
what are called here, 'the facts'. 
35 Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (1958:85) 
36 As Klagge and Nordmann (1993: 115) point out in the preface, it is difficult to establish an accurate 
date for these remarks. They suggest that some were written in or after 1931, whereas others "not 
earlier than 1936 and probably after 1948". 
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Of particular relevance is the distinction between description and explanation as it 
appears in his later writings. This distinction does, however, have certain clear 
connections with what is said in the Tractatus. I think in particular of the passage I 
quoted in connection with Diamond in Chapter 7, which suggests that the 'correct' 
method in philosophy would be, "...to say nothing except what can be said", and to 
'demonstrate' that any desire to say something metaphysical, will be to fail "to give 
meaning to certain signs" in one's propositions (TLP, 6.53). Following from this 
observation, I want to do at least two things. Firstly, I want to say something about 
what I see as the overlap between this statement from the Tractatus and some 
equally familiar passages in the Philosophical Investigations. Secondly, I want to 
discuss what I see as the ethical implications of these passages: something I 
attempt to make explicit by approaching them via some of Wittgenstein's related 
remarks in the Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough. If this seems a complex, even 
convoluted, process, it is nonetheless helpful in bringing out these connections 
more clearly. What Wittgenstein has to say about Frazer's inability to do 'justice' to 
the 'facts' of the religious practices of 'primitive' peoples has, I think, strong 
resonances with what he supposed, in the Tractatus, was the proper task of 
philosophy, and also with what he describes in the Philosophical Investigations as 
the confusions and errors involved in the ways other philosophers often approach 
human language, and through it, the lives of human beings. 
The first thing to notice about the passage from the Tractatus is its idea that the 
role of philosophy is clarificatory: as not concerned with advancing knowledge 
through the making of claims, but as being in the business of clearing-up 
confusions, of drawing lines between what can and cannot be expressed with 
sense. Although this is idea is wrapped-up in the Tractatus with the idea that only 
propositions of natural science are sayable, the distinction between the sorts of 
roles, or methods, appropriate to philosophy and the natural sciences remains 
present throughout Wittgenstein's later thought. "Philosophers...", he says in The 
Blue Book, "...constantly have the methods of science before their eyes" (BB, 320). 
The questions, then, are: in what ways might this be the case? And what sort of 
problem (or problems) is this supposed to generate? The clues can, I think, be 
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detected in the following passages from the Investigations about what it might 
mean to Wittgenstein to do philosophy: 
...we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything 
hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, 
and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, 
that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems...The problems 
are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have 
always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our 
intelligence by means of language (PI, 109). 
Consider also: 
Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in 
the end only describe it (PI, 124). 
Or indeed: 
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor 
deduces anything. — Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to 
explain (PI, 126). 
These passages are so often quoted that it might seem surprising that anything 
novel can be made of them. So much, then, seems so familiar here: philosophy 
should be 'descriptive' rather than 'explanatory'; it should not 'meddle' (to change, 
to 'improve' etc.) what is described as 'the actual use of language'; it should not be 
viewed as being in the business of aiming at anything more ambitious, anything 
'beyond', conceptual clarification. To do philosophy is to battle against 
'bewitchment', or the 'entanglement' we face because of our inability to "command 
a clear view of the use of our words" (PI, 122). Language use is essentially rooted in 
human practices, in forms of life, which as philosophers we overlook at our peril in 
our various attempts to penetrate beneath our everyday language use, rather than, 
say, 'surveying' it by 're-arrangement' (PI, 92), or of "...substituting one form of 
expression for another" (PI, 90). Unlike the natural scientist who proceeds by 
hypothesis to an explanation of phenomena, the philosopher should aim instead at 
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the achievement of various 'perspicuous' representations, of 'seeing connexions' 
between various forms of linguistic expressions etc. (PI, 122). If this seems 
acceptable enough as a rough sketch of Wittgenstein's continuing idea of 
philosophy as involving 'description' rather than 'explanation', the following 
remarks from Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough allow a more interesting picture 
to emerge. Consider, then the following passages in which Wittgenstein reflects on 
Frazer's description of the ritualistic sacrifice of a human being: 
The very idea of wanting to explain a practice — for example, the killing of 
the priest-king — seems wrong to me. All Frazer does is make them plausible 
to people who think as he does (RFGB, 119). 
Or, indeed: 
I believe that the attempt to explain is already therefore to go wrong, 
because one must only correctly piece together what one knows, without 
adding anything, and the satisfaction being sought through the explanation 
follows of itself. 
And the explanation isn't what satisfies us here at all. When Frazer begins by 
telling us the story of the King of the Wood of Nemi, he does this in a tone 
which shows that he feels, and wants us to feel, that something strange and 
dreadful is happening. But the question "why does this happen?" is properly 
answered by saying: Because it is dreadful. That is, precisely that which 
makes this incident strike us as dreadful, magnificent, horrible, tragic, etc., 
as anything but trivial and insignificant, is also that which has called this 
incident to life. 
Here one can only describe and say: this is what human life is like (RFGB, 
121). 
One thing that is again noticeable is the distinction between explanation and 
description in these passages. Another is the idea that what is being sought though 
an explanation, in this case of a religious practice, is a sort of 'satisfaction', which 
may yet be achieved by correctly piecing together what one already knows (what 
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already lies open to view). However, the desire to explain, to make such practices 
plausible to ourselves and others, seems to emerge from something deep within us: 
as an attempt to cope, 'deal' with, or do justice to what we have encountered ('the 
facts'). We can pick this up from Frazer's tone. For Wittgenstein, the tone of his 
writing reveals, if you will, something beyond what is being said; it betrays Frazer's 
feelings; his reactions to what he has encountered. Through it we can be put into 
contact directly with a man who feels that something 'strange and dreadful is 
happening' in the lives of these human beings, and who seeks to get us to feel as he 
does about the matter. One might even conjecture that he is seeking to express 
these feelings of dread and terror, and have these feelings affirmed, or 'justified', 
through an act of communication with others. 
The more important point, however, is that any such communication takes the 
form of an explanation: an attempt to answer plausibly the question, 'Why does 
this happen?' through offering various claims. The form of such a question can also 
make it appear to demand the same sort of answer one might give when asked 
why, say, a bowler in cricket repeatedly rubs the ball on his or her trousers. It seems 
to require one to explain the practice through something like one's superior 
knowledge: 'e.g. it's because they believe it will make it spin in the air, or move off 
at an unpredictable angle when it hits the ground etc.' And yet, the behaviour of 
cricket players may indeed appear strange or baffling, but hardly ever shocking, 
frightening, or terrifying. The shining of a ball and the ritualistic killing of a man call 
forth different reactions from us, and the question, 'Why does this happen?' in the 
second case can more closely resemble an expression (a cry) of horror and disbelief, 
than a call for various reasons to be provided (More: Why does this happen! Less: 
'Explain why this happens?') 
It is interesting that contra Frazer, the only answer Wittgenstein thinks suitable to 
the question 'why?' in the case of the fate of the King of the Wood is, 'because it is 
terrible.' And it is precisely because it is terrible that it strikes us as significant: it 
becomes the sort of thing that one might also feel deserves (or demands) an 
explanation. For Wittgenstein, however, the proper approach would seem simply to 
be to describe what goes on in these practices, and to say, 'this is what human life 
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is like'. This may strike us as completely unsatisfying, we want to say: 'Well, it really 
shouldn't be like that!' We might add: 'They must do this sort of thing for a reason!' 
But what sort of reason are we looking for here? What would (or could) it look like? 
And what purpose/s would it serve? When faced with something that strikes us as 
grave and serious we seem to be demanding a justification, a defence of some sort 
('explain yourselves!'). And yet, it might also seem that what we require are the 
grounds to form some kind of definite judgement: to be able to disagree with how 
these people conceive of this practice. Frazer's desire to make this instance of 
human sacrifice plausible to us, is, one might say (again evoking Cavell), a form of 
deflection from the unease, the horror even, that he clearly felt at this activity. 
Explanation seems to promise refuge; intrigue a shelter from the emotional storm. 
In this case, then, a hypothesis may offer to quell the distress by allowing one 
effectively to distance oneself from these human beings. We might well desire to 
have them 'explained away', or 'resolved', so that they need tell us nothing about 
human life that we are prepared to recognise and acknowledge as 'ours' ('These 
primitives were, after all, not like us at all.'). Our connection with these people as 
human beings seems to be what we most desire to sever, yet we seek to do so 
through the provision of explanation or hypothesis. 
And yet Wittgenstein seems to want to point out that the explanation itself isn't 
what satisfies us at all here. But who is us? Does he suppose that the explanation 
Frazer offers us does not, in fact, satisfy Frazer himself? Or is it that Frazer is 
supposed to be satisfied (expressed?), only not through the explanation he offers 
us? There are no easy answers here. However, at least part of what Wittgenstein 
might be getting us to think about is that the satisfaction sought through 
explanation in such a case is not akin to that achieved by solving some kind of 
puzzle: this is not a case we would readily describe as driven by curiosity, 
intellectual challenge, even 'wonder'. Although curiosity and wonder might well 
constitute attempts to 'deal' with shock and horror, they fail to get to the heart of 
what troubles us (or, in this instance, what unsettles Frazer). If Frazer seeks 
satisfaction through an explanation it will not be the explanation that provides it, 
although the possibility that his unease might abate through communicating that 
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explanation might indeed help him ("...if Frazer's explanations did not in the final 
analysis appeal to a tendency in ourselves, they would not really be explanations." 
RFGB, 127 My emphasis). 
If we are somehow being warned against explanation here then it seems to be 
because it can fail to provide the sort of reassurances we need when we are 
affected deeply by something in our lives ("But an hypothetical explanation will be 
of little help to someone, say, who is upset because of love. —It will not calm him." 
RFGB, 127). What also seems important to note here is that this distancing need 
not apply only to the religious practices of historically distant or 'primitive' people. 
Let us consider instead some of the 'shock examples' which we sometimes find in 
moral philosophy. I am thinking now, say, of Dearden's case of someone's stubbing 
out a cigarette out on a baby, or of Bambrough's example of performing a surgical 
operation on a child without anaesthetic (Dearden, 1981; Bambrough, 1979). To 
say: 'this is what human life is like' in such cases would seem to betray a sense of 
moral dumbness, even powerlessness, in just those matters where we want most to 
say something forceful; something definite. They must not, we feel, serve merely to 
show how human beings can sometimes behave terribly to one another, but also 
must prove, reveal, establish, something fundamental, say, about the way we all 
ought and ought not to behave. They ought to help us to reveal, for example, the 
foundations of at least some basic sense of morality. But it seems they can do 
nothing of the sort, or at least those foundations could only be of the sort where 
we could expect most people to be horrified at hearing these stories, and not to 
reply, `So what!' or 'What do I care!' As with Frazer, we want people to feel as we 
do about them, and it looks as if an explanation aimed at establishing their absolute 
moral wrongness will satisfy this need37. And yet, this sort of explanation or account 
in these cases will fail to satisfy: it looks as if we need justification, or certainty in 
the shape of knowledge, but we do not - it will again fail to 'calm us'. 
37 To establish, say, moral foundations might seem to be the `proper' way to express one's horror at 
the acts described. ('How dreadful! via 'How can this happen!' is perhaps transformed into `This 
ought never to happen, and here is why..."). But what if this horror can already be described as 
ethical? 'Well, surely' one thinks: 'we can defend or justify this feeling'. (As if that was what was 
needed.) 
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This is, at least part, what Cavell seems to have recognised in The Claim of Reason 
about the use of such examples: that they never achieve what they were intended 
to achieve because, "Mere morality is not designed to evaluate the behaviour and 
interactions of monsters..." (Cavell: 1999: 265). An explanation of such atrocities 
will, as with Frazer's attempt to explain the killing of the King of the Woods, merely 
render them plausible to people who already think as we do. Few of us are tempted 
to do such things, fewer still would find them readily defensible, and yet the 
knowledge that these acts may still be perpetrated by human beings remains 
unsettling. We seem still to feel the need to mark-off these acts as absolutely 
unacceptable, and to separate ourselves from these people and their behaviours. 
What our explanation seems to do, however, is merely to tie them in to a vision of 
morality that they ought as fellow human beings to share (but which they have in 
fact transgressed or perhaps abandoned). We may feel that we do not want them 
with us as human beings, but our explanation merely serves to connect them with 
us once again. They remain, in a sense, problematic; unresolved. We may also 
speculate that to seek an explanation here stems in part from a need to be 
reassured that one, as a human being, will never act like this; that one is not 
capable of such misdeeds. We again need reassurance, and mistakenly suppose 
that the certainty provided by an account of the foundations of morality, or of, say, 
how moral weakness and failure arise, would seem to help us here38. This at least 
suggests why it might be so tempting for us to explain, to 'go beyond the facts' in 
such ethical matters, despite the suspicion that it is actually something more 
'primitive', more rooted in reactive feelings of horror, disgust, insecurity etc., that 
can serve to spur this desire to establish and to justify. 
(IV) In the beginning was the deed... 
38 I am also interested here in J.M. Coetzee's description in Elizabeth Costello of Elizabeth's abusive 
sexual encounter, as a young woman, with a sadistic docker. By her encountering the evil in his 
actions, "...through the docker, all that time ago, the devil entered her: she can feel him crouched 
inside, folded up like a bird, waiting for his chance to fly" The knowledge, the experience of evil, can 
corrupt us. The following images now resonate: 'to pick the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good 
and evil'; `to fall from a state of grace'. What seems to be communicated here is how one can 
become most painfully struck by what we human beings are capable of (Coetzee, 2000: 167-8). 
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Writing about this reminds me of an experience I had as a young man, which I recall 
here with due fear of digression. I remember once going to a museum of 'Roman 
artefacts', and being made to feel deeply uneasy by one of the exhibits. It was a 
skeleton of a very young child, a little girl, whose teeth were discoloured by a coin 
that was placed in her mouth in order to pay the boatman who was to ferry her 
soul to the underworld. She kept intruding in my thoughts for quite some time 
after. The feeling in the pit of my stomach returns as I write this now. One of the 
'visions', if that is the right word to describe these interloping thoughts, was of 
someone — a loved one - placing the coin in her mouth, and of what it must have 
meant for that person to have done this. It did not interest me so much as disturb 
me, and I tried always to stop myself from thinking about, and picturing, it. Yet, it 
was never at all a question of what the placing of a coin could have meant in terms 
of the beliefs the Romans had about the hereafter. The placing of the coin never 
struck me in terms of such beliefs at all, but in terms of love, pain, despair, hope, 
even. There was something definite, something concrete, in these experiences, that 
speculation seemed simply not to get near. Although I am not sure what exactly to 
make of this story (perhaps I was just a pretty strange kid!), it does seem that 
forming an exact explanation never seemed to be the point. An explanation, or so it 
seems, would not have 'calmed me'; it would not, to once more borrow the phrase, 
have done 'justice to the facts'. 
I may, nevertheless, stand accused at this point of taking my own explanations or 
theories about Wittgenstein too far (or perhaps, even, not far enough in terms of 
explaining what is supposed to be 'ethical' about his writings.) For one thing, if I 
spoke earlier of making links between talk of description and explanation in the 
Philosophical Investigations and those in his Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough, 
then those links still seem tenuous at best. The first set of quotations form the 
Investigations seem to speak of philosophical misunderstandings of 'language use', 
while the second set centre on how certain religious practices might be 
misunderstood. 'Surely', one might object with some justification, 'you have still 
done precious little to connect the two!' To finally draw out this connection more 
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strongly, I want to consider some further passages from Wittgenstein's remarks on 
Frazer. Firstly, consider: 
Burning in effigy. Kissing the picture of one's beloved. That is obviously not 
based on the belief that it will have some specific effect on the object which 
the picture represents. It aims at satisfaction and achieves it. Or rather: it 
aims at nothing at all; we just behave this way and then we feel satisfied. 
One could also kiss the name of one's beloved, and here it would be clear 
that the name was being used as a substitute. 
And also: 
In the ancient rites we have the use of an extremely developed gesture-
language. 
And when I read Frazer, I continually would like to say: We still have all 
these processes, these changes of meaning, before us in our verbal language 
(RFGB, 135). 
What Wittgenstein seems concerned to do through these passages is draw our 
attention to the kinship we have with the very primitive people from whom we 
might desire to distance ourselves. It appears that one of the things we are being 
reminded of here, is that human life, including our lives as speakers of language, is a 
life rooted in various practices. Our uses of words are themselves tied to various 
practical purposes, and, what is more, he suggests that, "An entire mythology is 
stored within our language." (RFGB, 133). A 'mythology' that has grown up because, 
I suggest, human beings continue to act and react in certain recognisable ways: we 
continue to love, laugh, cry, suffer, fear, wonder, feel pain, and in the end, of 
course, die. Mythology is not something unique to primitive people. The idea of 
kissing the name of one's beloved, as a substitute for the picture itself throws some 
light on the idea that words may indeed come to replace, or stand in place of, 
certain gestures. "One could almost say that man is a ceremonial animal...", says 
Wittgenstein, and although he goes on to suggest that such a statement, "...is no 
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doubt, partly wrong and partly nonsensical", there is, nevertheless, he thinks, 
"...something right about it" (RFGB, 129). For, as the following passage points out: 
If a narrator places the priest-king of Nemi and "the majesty of death" side 
by side, he realizes that they are the same. The life of the priest-king shows 
what is meant by that phrase. 
The meaning of the words 'the majesty of death' are shown in the living of a 
life: revealed by and communicated through the ritualistic actions of these 
human beings (RFGB 123). 
If this sounds as if Wittgenstein wants us to accept a claim such as: 'There is such 
thing as human nature after all. We share a common 'ritualistic' nature with the 
people Frazer describes', then this implication would, I think, be mistaken. We are 
returned once more to the idea that establishing claims and providing explanations 
will remain unsatisfying: they will not calm the sorts of troubledness that led us to 
want to make them in the first place. Kinship here is not something that needs to 
be established once and for all, but instead acknowledged for a certain purpose or 
purposes: e.g. to rectify a misleading picture that we are inclined to accept e.g. 
Frazer's need to explain these practices; to see them as primitive hypotheses, as 
'errors' ('pieces of stupidity') that we in virtue of our scientific progress are no 
longer inclined to make (see RFGB, p.119).39 We might in such cases need to be 
reminded that the words we speak in our everyday lives, and the range of ways that 
we use them, involve innumerable sorts of activities, and of course, various and 
diverse gestures. 
The linguistic connection with gesture is, in so many cases, by no means as easy to 
detect as in the kissing of a name of one's beloved, and we often fail to see clearly 
what is being expressed, or shown, through various acts of speech. Sensitivity to 
the range of ways that we use words, and the different although often more or less 
loosely related purposes that they serve, is instead required. But this hardly implies 
39 Here I reveal, once again, a certain indebtedness to the early Cavell; particularly to the distinction 
he draws between knowledge and acknowledgement in his collection of essays Must we Mean What 
we Say? (1969) 
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the mandatory study of linguistics, or the immersion in some other domain of 
expert knowledge. For, "Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting..." are, as 
Wittgenstein points out, "...as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, 
drinking, playing" (PI, 25). Sensitivity to words is always also a sensitivity to our 
lives as beings who use words. This is, at least in part, what Alice Crary seems to be 
getting at when she describes in her book Beyond Moral Judgement, Wittgenstein's 
approach to ethics, as "...concerned with the full array of sensitivities that 
individuals possess as language-users". And whereby: 
An organizing preoccupation of his later writings is criticizing approaches to 
language that presuppose that we can survey and assess judgements, or 
moves in a language game, without relying on sensitivities we acquired in 
leaning to judge (Crary,2007: 121). 
For Crary, then, Wittgenstein's later approach to philosophy, as concerned with 
untangling our confusions, is fundamentally, "...an ethical enterprise directed 
towards bringing us face-to-face with our responsibility for what we say and think" 
(Crary, 2007: 122). Philosophy seems, in this sense, to be placed in the service of 
the ethical; it is conducted for ethical purposes other than the justification of these 
human practices through the provision of certain 'rational foundations'. 
However, this may again appear misleading. For one thing, it is not clear what not 
taking responsibility for what we say and think would look like, or who (or what) 
else might be supposed to be able to do this for us. Of course, I am in a sense 
implicated in all that I say and do, but why should this be supposed to matter, 
ethically? Are we not simply stating the mere truism that my thoughts and actions 
are indeed my thoughts and actions (rather than someone else's)? What Crary 
might be getting at, however, is best revealed by bringing out once more the 
connections with Cavell's notion of deflection, and with Wittgenstein's own writings 
in On Certainty. The idea of seeing language use as rooted in practices, in 'forms of 
life' which can resemble each other in some ways and yet not in others, connects 
with what Wittgenstein speaks of as reasons coming to an end. Consider, then, the 
following two passages: 
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Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the 
end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a 
kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the 
language-game (OC, 204). 
We could doubt every single one of these facts, but we could not doubt 
them all. Wouldn't it be more correct to say: "we do not doubt them all". 
Our not doubting them all is simply our manner of judging and therefore of 
acting (OC, 232). 
The emphasis on 'our acting' again resonates with the familiar Wittgensteinian 
image of a spade turning once bedrock has been reached: the idea is then, 'this is 
simply what I do'. My criteria are rooted in my living in certain ways and not in 
others; reasons and explanations, must terminate in these doings, these 'deeds'. 
Where Crary's point comes in here (and connects with a Cavellean reading of 
Wittgenstein) is via the idea that the question of justification could well still arise 
here, perhaps in the following way. Hence, a critic might ask: 'So, are you not now 
saying that for Wittgenstein all ethics is, at bottom, unjustifiable?' If this sort of 
question or objection seems understandable, the more important questions 
concern why it is understandable, and what exactly it might be supposed to be 
driving at. 
Here, I think, we might raise a different set of related questions, for example: what 
would this absent justification be supposed to achieve? Why do we so much as feel 
that we need one? We are thus returned to the notion of satisfaction I mentioned 
earlier in connection with Frazer: a justification in the shape of some form of a 
defensible and compelling explanation is what would seem to pacify me; to placate 
my doubts. We seem again to stand in need of evidence, but once more have 
something akin to the methods of the natural sciences before our eyes. Our 
difficulties make it look as if we need to be able to prove something; to settle the 
matter to everyone's satisfaction. This explanation or justification would, in a sense, 
take responsibility for our practices (for the 'this is simply what I do'). We could in a 
sense defer to its authority; allow it to speak for us. In short, we seem to be 
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tempted to deflect our unease through the attempt to encounter an intellectual 
solution, and thereby reach satisfaction through 'certainty'. Although this deflection 
may, if I may put it like this, result in a philosophical or intellectual achievement, it 
can also involve a sort of ethical failure: a failure to engage honestly, and with 
proper seriousness, with what troubles us about a particular aspect of our lives. 
(v) Conclusions 
It sounds odd, but the fact that philosophical problems are indeed experienced as 
somebody's problems helps throw light on the general form they are supposed by 
Wittgenstein to take: i.e. 'I don't know my way about'. Wittgenstein's remarks on 
Frazer again resonate with this idea, for he speaks here of, "The awakening of the 
intellect..." occurring with "...a separation from the original soil, the original basis of 
life" (RFGB, 139). Philosophical problems too may arise from a sense of separation; 
of separateness from the 'soil' of our everyday lives as language users. The 
philosopher's treatment of a problem is 'like the treatment of an illness' says 
Wittgenstein in the Investigations, for we may indeed feel ill at ease, even at odds, 
with particular facts about human life (e.g. the seeming groundlessness of our 
practices) and seek to cure ourselves of this discomfort through intellectual effort -
through the provision of certain grounds. And yet, in the midst of our puzzlement 
we may so easily lose sight of what can be problematic for us. Nevertheless - as we 
have seen before - it is not for Wittgenstein some medicine invented by an 
individual that will 'cure' us, although we may be nevertheless be treated (but not, 
as it were, in spite of ourselves; not without due ethical seriousness on our part). If 
explanation or theory will often fail to root out the source of the discomfort, we 
may yet be enabled to have a clear view of what it is that afflicts and troubles us: 
what it is that we find problematic about the 'original soil'. 
Finally, then, I want to return to the claim I made at the outset of the chapter: that 
for me, Wittgenstein's philosophical writings can be read as fundamentally ethical 
in nature. In revisiting this claim here, I want to spell out more clearly the 
relationship I have been exploring between ethical seriousness and philosophical 
deflection. This is to say that I find Wittgenstein's writings ethically serious because 
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they are non-deflective. Philosophical problems in the sense that they are serious, 
or posed seriously, are for Wittgenstein problems in living; they are wrapped up 
directly with the senses in which living can be problematic for us. The claim is not, 
of course, that all philosophical questions concern recognisably ethical topics, nor 
that every person who asks every philosophical question is much troubled about, 
say, the direction of her life or her position in the world. It is to say, rather, that a 
philosophical problem is always someone's problem, and that to be captivated 
('bewitched') by the problem can mean that one feels distanced, separated from 
the lives we lead as human beings. The experience of philosophical illness means 
that one could well be inclined to think: 'there is something wrong with us, with 
me, with the way we speak and act in relation to x or y'. In investigating these 
problems or feelings of illness, Wittgenstein returns us to 'everyday' life, to the 
'rough ground' (the original source) that invites our doubts because it looks as if it 
stands in need of philosophical improvement (or as the rationalist supposed, 
justification). And yet, for Wittgenstein, our ethical lives which must nevertheless 
be lived in the midst of this supposed roughness, must also, in a sense, be allowed 
to speak for themselves; which is to say that I must also be prepared to speak for 
myself, to speak in the first person, to say: this is what I, or indeed we, do. 
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Chapter 8 
Ethical Development after Wittgenstein 
(i) Introduction 
Having in the previous chapter sketched what it is, for me, that makes 
Wittgenstein's approach to ethics non-deflective, I now aim to confront two related 
questions. The first concerns what ethical learning or development might look like 
on a Wittgensteinian account of the ethical; the second, is about how this sort of 
learning might best be advanced or promoted in formal educational settings. 
Tackling the first of these questions is the main task of this chapter; the second will 
occupy my attention in the next. If I am concerned here, in Chapter 8, to explore 
what Wittgenstein's attempts to return to the 'rough ground' of ordinary usage 
might mean in terms of ethics, I will also pay attention to what I think it does not 
mean. Hence, despite the prima facie plausibility of those views which suggest that 
Wittgenstein's return to 'ordinariness' leads to ethical conservatism, or to some 
related form of relativism based on the respective inviolability of competing 'forms 
of life', I will argue that such understandings appear to be based on a 
misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's philosophical intentions. Later in the chapter, I 
will discuss the importance of the idea of developing various sensitivities to a 
Wittgensteinian understanding of ethical growth. It is in this light that I also explore 
a comment made by Ray Monk in his richly philosophical biography of Wittgenstein, 
the Duty of Genius, which develops certain remarks made by Wittgenstein in the 
later parts of the Investigations (cf. PI, II; 227-8). Here I take it that Monk is correct 
insofar as the growth in our moral sensitivities for Wittgenstein will involve, "...alert 
and observant sensitivity to people's faces, voices and situations..." and also that, 
"...this kind of sensitivity can be gained only by experience" (Monk, 1991: 547-8). 
(ii) Common sense and the problem of 'Ordinariness'? 
I start this section with a comment from Derrida, and what seems to be its direct 
challenge to the non-deflective approach I attributed to Wittgenstein in the 
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previous chapter. I include it, in part, because I do not disagree with the challenge it 
makes to the idea that ordinary or everyday language can be regarded as a sort of 
safe-house: a sanctuary where we may take shelter from 'philosophical error'. 
Nevertheless, I do regard it as mistaken to implicate Wittgenstein in the vision of 
ordinary or everyday language that it places under attack. The idea that 
Wittgenstein was in any straightforward sense a defender of common sense against 
philosophical abstraction is important for the direction of this chapter. As I will go 
on to show, such an approach seems to lie at the heart of certain 
misunderstandings of what it might mean to approach ethics in a Wittgensteinian 
manner. Getting clearer about what Wittgenstein intended in his talk of ordinary 
language is not, then, simply of esoteric interest as an issue in Wittgenstein 
scholarship, however needful it may also be to offer a fair and consistent reading of 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy.40 Rather, it will enable me, as I have already 
indicated, to begin to dismantle the idea that Wittgenstein need be understood as 
an ethically conservative thinker; the sort of traditionalist for whom moral 
education may involve little more than encouraging the 'blind' acceptance of 
prevailing norms and values in any given culture. 
To move, firstly, to the promised challenge to the very idea of 'ordinariness', I want 
to consider the following: 
...'everyday language' is not innocent or neutral. It is the language of 
Western metaphysics, and it carries with it not only a considerable number 
of presuppositions of all types, but also the presuppositions inseparable 
from metaphysics, which, although little attended to, are tied into a knot... 
(Derrida, 2002: 19). 
And "...the same", says Alan Bass in his introduction to Derrida's Positions (2002:19-
20), "...can be said of Wittgensteinian talk of shared 'language games' or cultural 
'forms of life". Although the idea of the ordinary is sometimes supposed to provide 
40Even if I am misguided about the nature of Wittgenstein's intentions, the treatment of the 
ordinary/everyday that I attribute to him here nevertheless provides a way of distinguishing 
between an unhelpful approach to 'ordinary language' and a more promising one, ethically 
speaking. 
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an "...escape route from needless philosophic perplexities...", it should, according to 
Derrida, be recognised as carrying "...all kinds of covert metaphysical baggage". As 
everyday language is neither 'innocent' nor 'neutral', it cannot be relied upon to 
provide a sort of 'non-metaphysical' sanctuary: a 'benchmark' by which one might 
hope, say, to distinguish the meaningful from the meaningless; sense from 
nonsense. Furthermore, to those tempted to confront the philosopher with the 
accusation that she has taken 'genuine speech-acts' out of their 'proper' or 
'everyday' context, Derrida introduces the notion of the generalised 'iterability' of 
speech-acts, which, as Bass explains, "...enables them to function in various roles or 
across an open-ended range of possible contexts..."; or of 'grafting' from one 
context to another (Bass, 2002: 19-20). It thus becomes important to recognise that 
some of these contexts may indeed be, "...maximally remote from any putative 
'normal' or 'everyday' mode of communicative utterance...", and that any attempt 
to avoid the errors of 'metaphysical' language by contrasting it with 'ordinary', or 
'everyday' ways of speaking, is itself likely to collapse into the same sort of problem 
with regard to the ordinary. 
One might say that Derrida is presenting something of an et in arcadia ego 
situation: the return from metaphysical to ordinary language promises some sort of 
honest, rustic purity, but closer inspection shows how the 'rough ground' has itself 
been cultivated with the very tools used by the metaphysician to tend his 
immaculate lawn. Any approach to philosophy that aims to contrast ordinary or 
everyday language with the speculative 'nonsense' of metaphysical discourse, looks 
highly unlikely to provide either a distinctive or a useful contrast. While Bass is no 
doubt correct to be suspicious of certain appeals to ordinary or everyday language 
that he brands 'Wittgensteinian', it is far from clear that his doubts rightly extend to 
Wittgenstein's own uses of these terms41. While 'everyday language' is in a certain 
41 This area, as with so many others in Wittgenstein scholarship, is subject to frequent, and 
sometimes passionate, disagreement. With one such flurry of indignation, philosopher Rupert Read 
(2010: 63) goes on to describe how what he calls 'the prevailing wisdom' in Wittgensteinian 
scholarship is 'crucially' mistaken on the issue of what 'ordinary/everyday language' is supposed, by 
Wittgenstein, to be contrasted with. Although I am not wholly convinced that Read's 'prevailing 
trend' is not, in fact, a little 'last-season' as far as Wittgenstein scholarship is concerned, he is surely 
correct to flag-up the existence of a fairly prominent strand of thought (in some respects typified by 
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sense laden with 'metaphysical baggage' (it is, for example, home to all sorts of 
misleading polarities), the way Wittgenstein wants to understand it is as a source 
not simply of dissatisfaction but also of freedom: a means of escape from various 
misleading pictures, and as an opportunity to re-engage the gears of a working 
engine that, when idling, accounts for many difficulties in philosophy. 
(iii) Wittgenstein and an extra-ordinary picture 
If attentiveness to the variety of ways in which words are actually used42 ('The 
multiplicity of language games' PI, 24) holds an integral place in Wittgenstein's later 
philosophy, how, then, are we to understand what he means when he speaks of 
how, in conducting a philosophical investigation, one might "...bring words back 
from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (PI, 116)? It is easy here to read such 
comments as pertaining to a generalised method of reminding the troubled 
philosopher how one ordinarily or commonly uses words such as, say, beauty, 
knowledge or meaning, in the so-called weave of our lives, thereby enabling her to 
understand how her quest for de-contextualised 'essences' must give rise to so 
many forms of sophisticated nonsense. Even when the dialogic style of 
Wittgenstein's later writings, along with his suggestion that, "There is not a 
philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies" 
(PI, 133) are duly recognised, it nonetheless remains tempting to view him as 
offering a single, distinctive explanation of how every philosophical difficulty arises; 
what it is that makes each of them 'philosophical'; and how they may ultimately be 
'eliminated'. 
One might even begin to imagine Wittgenstein repeatedly chanting the following 
question at 'the metaphysician', as if it were a form of therapeutic mantra: "...is the 
word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original 
home?" (PI, 116). Here, the idea of bringing words back from their metaphysical to 
their ordinary use becomes analogous to the releasing of a caged animal back into 
comments made by critics such as Bass) which seems to be fundamentally mistaken about the 
nature of Wittgenstein's engagement with ordinariness. 
42 See also: PI 592: "But let us really think out various different situations and conversations, and the 
ways in which that sentence will be uttered in them." 
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the wild. If the philosopher can be helped by Wittgenstein's 'therapy' to understand 
that he has removed a word from its everyday habitat, and taken it on a 
metaphysical holiday where it can no longer function 'normally' or 'naturally', then 
he will be inclined in show greater respect for the everyday linguistic environment 
in the future. He will be returned to something like the wildness of ordinary life and 
begin to feel at home there. Such readings of what Wittgenstein meant by talk of 
returning to ordinary usage do have their prominent champions among 
Wittgenstein scholars, albeit in more sophisticated forms than I have so far 
described. Eminent commentators such as Anthony Kenny and Peter Hacker both 
seem committed to the idea that, "Wittgenstein was ruling out various ways of 
expressing ourselves as untrue to our language...or as incompatible with sense" 
(Read, 2010: 71). Marie McGinn also speaks of how, for the Wittgenstein of On 
Certainty, words are used inappropriately if their use is outside the context of 
"...the framework of judgements which together constitute our view of the world" 
(McGinn, 1989: 119). On her picture, G.E. Moore was supposed by Wittgenstein to 
speak nonsense when he famously claimed to 'know' that 'here is a hand': he failed 
to talk with sense precisely because his use of the word know could not be squared 
with the everyday conditions that shape what is a meaningful application of the 
word. 
On this interpretation, everyday uses of words are - to use Alice Crary's term -
inviolable: they not only provide a stable bedrock from which one can distinguish 
legitimate usage from philosophical deviations and abuses; they are also seemingly 
immune to philosophical critique, which is necessarily advanced in a manner that 
transcends the framework of shared, everyday judgements which allow any sort of 
critique to make sense. As Crary also puts it: 
McGinn thus invites us to understand Wittgenstein as championing the view 
that the judgements that make up the 'framework' of our language cannot 
be subjected to rational scrutiny (Crary, 2007: 108). 
If this sort of reading of Wittgenstein is indeed mistaken, it is not because it is 
impossible to find support for it in Wittgenstein's texts. Certain passages in the 
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Investigations, and elsewhere, do seem to point in this direction: not least the 
remark I quoted earlier about the requirement to bring words back from their 
metaphysical to ordinary uses, or even Wittgenstein's reminder, seemingly aimed 
at the philosopher, that, "When I talk about language (words, sentences, etc.) I 
must speak the language of the everyday" (PI, 120). One might even consider the 
statement in the Investigations that I cited in the previous chapter, that: "If I have 
exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I 
am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do." (PI, 217). For here, we might also 
begin to suppose that one's justifications, for Wittgenstein, have their terminus in 
the particular habits ('ungrounded ways of acting' OC, 110) of various communities, 
and these are what ground those 'basic judgements' that are supposed to 'stand 
fast for us', and establish the inviolability of the everyday from rational critique. 
It is also fairly easy to see how this sort of reading can make Wittgenstein appear as 
a sort of moral relativist (moral bedrock is provided by 'the forms of life' of 
whatever wider linguistic community one happens to inhabit), and in a related way, 
a moral conservative (the ethical practices of cultures, communities etc. are 
immune from rational critique and, therefore, must simply be acknowledged and 
accepted). I return, nevertheless, to what I said earlier about how this approach to 
Wittgenstein's talk of ordinary language, which sees it directly contrasted with 
deviant 'philosophical' or 'metaphysical' uses of words, nevertheless fails to do 
justice to Wittgenstein's intentions. While it would, of course, be absurd to suppose 
that so-called inviolability interpretations fail to acknowledge Wittgenstein's talk of 
the existence of various therapies for various purposes, or that they simply do not 
recognise that his approaches to doing philosophy can, in fact, be quite varied, the 
idea of Wittgenstein's operating with a commitment to the inviolability of 'ordinary 
language' does, I would suggest, reveal (what could well be described as) a sort of 
lingering bewitchment. 
In short, such readings suggest a rather alien, almost deferential understanding of 
Wittgenstein's uses of the term 'everyday language'. It is as if Wittgenstein refers to 
'it' as a 'thing': a domain, perhaps, that can be kept substantially separate from 
others, and provide, as Read puts it, "...one's definitive guide to what is 
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legitimately...sayable" (Read, 2010: 70). In doing so, they seem to foist on 
Wittgenstein a theory that he would surely have striven hard to resist (c.f. Baker, 
2004: 103)43. Alice Crary also convincingly takes aim at this sort of understanding as 
constituting a genuine legacy from Wittgenstein. Part of what she has to say in 
response to McGinn's inviolability interpretation of On Certainty takes the following 
form: 
According to this analysis, Wittgenstein is supposed to be assuming both 
that Moore's utterances of "I know that such-and-such" are nonsense and 
that it is nevertheless possible to identify the meanings of the sentences to 
which Moore prefixes "I know" — at least well enough to inquire whether 
they can be made to 'fit' with "I know" (Crary, 2007: 113). 
To suggest, with McGinn, that Wittgenstein understands Moore's uses of 'I know' 
as nonsensical because they deviate from the set of conditions in which we 
ordinarily speak and make sense of 'knowing', seems to involve the following 
absurdity: in order to dismiss Moore's usage as nonsensical, Wittgenstein holds that 
it is possible to make sense of what he wants to condemn as nonsensical usage. 
This looks to be quite damning; unless, of course, one amends the position (as does 
Crary) so that Moore's usage, insofar as it deviates from ordinary usage, is such that 
one does not know how to make sense of it at all. (Crary, 2007: 111). On this 
amended interpretation, one need not see Wittgenstein as committed to 'making 
sense of nonsense', in order simply to dismiss it, but as suggesting that one cannot 
in fact be sure of what, if anything, Moore means by his various uses of 'I know'. In 
short, it is simply not clear what type of judgement Moore is supposed to be 
making. 
43 Rupert Read develops a legalistic metaphor for this sort of essentialist reading of Wittgenstein, 
whereby, "If one thinks that 'the' everyday is something that can be mined, explored, made 
explicit..." then, he states, "...one becomes a word-policeman" (Read, 2010: 70). While I am 
suspicious that Read overstates the case, his talk of 'policing' does successfully draw-out a fairly 
familiar idea - one that has certain historical precedents in 'ordinary language philosophy' - that to 
be a follower of Wittgenstein means to be concerned with clamping down on any deviations from 
ordinary, 'lawful' usage; from preventing the hallowed order of the everyday from descending into 
something like a midnight chorus of metaphysical noise. 
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Although this interpretation does seem to provide a more fruitful approach to 
Wittgenstein's discussion of Moore's comments in On Certainty, as things stand it 
might still appear compatible with the idea that Wittgenstein is committed to the 
inviolability of everyday language and forms of life, and the associated idea of 
'philosophical usage' as deviating from the vast, yet bounded, 'edifice' of ordinary 
(sense-making) language. In other words, the idea of viewing Wittgenstein as 
holding some sort of deferential view about 'the ordinary' appears to remain, even 
on this amended interpretation of what might be amiss with Moore's supposed 
defences of common sense. Clearly more still needs to be said about why this type 
of contrast between 'the philosophical' and 'the everyday' may not have been one 
to which Wittgenstein was committed. I turn, now, to an examination of some 
recent re-readings of Wittgenstein's uses of terms such as ordinary and everyday 
language, with the aim of exploring how far such accounts can take us in 
understanding the point of such uses in his later philosophy. This examination will 
then lead me directly to an assessment of the idea that Wittgenstein's 'picture' of 
ordinary language necessarily engenders morally conservative or relativistic 
implications. 
(iv) Rethinking Ordinary Language 
Following the lead of Gordon Baker (2004: 100), Rupert Read" develops a critique 
of the idea that "...the everyday is some secure area of language that we can look to 
for forceful guidance as to how logic will 'permit' us to speak." The phrase 
'everyday language' he argues is often intended by Wittgenstein to be pleonastic: it 
is just language, or at least, language with which we do not struggle to find our feet. 
For Read then, as for Baker, Wittgenstein's talk of ordinary/everyday language does 
not constitute an "...attempt to categorize or theorize language...", but functions 
instead as a contrast which, "...serves a therapeutic purpose". The purpose is, "...to 
focus one's attention on one's target in philosophy... 'uses' of language that are 
systematically unclear, and that are not satisfying even to their purveyors." (Read, 
2010: 72). When Wittgenstein speaks of what might happen when one is doing 
44 Read, R (2010) 'Ordinary/Everyday Language', in Wittgenstein: Key Concepts, ed. Jolley, K. 
(Durham: Acumen) 
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philosophy (e.g. "...we may indeed fancy naming to be some remarkable act of 
mind, as it were a baptism of an object". PI, 38), he speaks, for Read, of various 
attempts to 'weave' uses of familiar words that "...we do not (as yet) find our feet 
with in our existing grasp/use of our concepts". On this picture, then, 
Wittgensteinian reminders that invoke various familiar or 'ordinary' uses of words 
serve a recognisable purpose only when someone has been enticed by strange or 
novel uses of words, and is yet prone to overlook this very strangeness or novelty. It 
is also thought that it forms no part of Wittgenstein's intention to provide a simple 
rule, or gauge, by which we might readily distinguish meaningful, ordinary word 
usage from novel, 'philosophical' uses once and for all (c.f. Read, 2010: 65). 
If it seems clear that, for Read, Wittgenstein's reminding us of familiar or everyday 
uses of words is not a matter of his re-asserting the superiority of any established 
set of everyday word usage over meaningless, philosophical expressions, what may 
still be harder to grasp is what exactly they are supposed to be reminding us of or 
about. At least one thing that still seems to be lacking is an adequate account of 
what enables one to find one's feet with certain uses of words and not with others. 
For whether or not we use terms such as 'ordinary' to describe various uses of 
words with which one can indeed 'find one's feet', we still seem to be owed an 
account of what is it for Wittgenstein that provides this 'footing' beyond the mere 
fact of our familiarity with certain well-rehearsed ('everyday') uses of particular 
words. To put it another way, if Read is correct that inviolability interpretations lose 
sight of what it is that renders, say, G.E. Moore's uses of 'I know' profoundly 
unclear, we could still be left wondering what else for Wittgenstein separates 
meaningful from 'as-yet-meaningless' uses of words beyond the fact that some uses 
are indeed familiar. What, then, can finding (or indeed, not finding) one's feet with 
certain uses of words look like for Wittgenstein? 
Alice Crary's idea that for Wittgenstein, "...the minimal unit of language is the 
complete judgement", becomes helpful here. According to Crary, Wittgenstein is 
rejecting the idea that one could identify "...the logical character of expressions or 
features of speech-situations outside the context of complete judgements." (Crary, 
2007: 114). This idea helps us better to see how, on Crary's reading, Wittgenstein's 
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attacks on G.E. Moore's anti-sceptical uses of 'I know' are not, as inviolability 
theorists such as McGinn suggest, based on the notion that such utterances 
"...involve judgements such that no claim to know them can be squared with the 
conditions of knowledge". Instead, Wittgenstein is taken, correctly I think, to be 
suggesting that, "it's not clear what judgements are at issue at all" (Crary, 2007: 
111). To state, straight off, that 'I know that I am a human being' is, for 
Wittgenstein, 'unclear' at least in part because we cannot imagine what sort of 
judgement this speaker is making; perhaps what sort of contrast he has in mind 
(OC, 4). Another way of putting this is to suggest that, for Wittgenstein, what is 
unclear about, say, Moore's uses of 'I know', is that their place in practice - in a 
human life - is not yet clearly grasped. What is common to uses of words with 
which we indeed find our feet is that they are — so to speak — embedded in types of 
doing: certain forms of living45. To borrow from Crary once again, Wittgenstein is 
thus rejecting the idea that "...it is possible to grasp what a set of words means 
independently of the practical point of using it on a particular occasion..." (Crary, 
2007: 116). 
What would, however, enable us to turn the particular collection of words, 'I know 
that I am a human being', into a complete judgement is - one might say - the 
possibility that we could come to imagine a situation with which it could be made 
to fit. The point, to reiterate, is that Moore's uses of 'I know' are not, as McGinn's 
inviolability reading supposes, inherently nonsensical: they could come to be 
understood as constituting judgements of various sorts. Consider, for example, the 
following passage from On Certainty, where Wittgenstein imagines a situation 
where one of Moore's anti-sceptical slogans could indeed come to make sense: 
I could imagine Moore being captured by a wild tribe. And their expressing 
the suspicion that he had come from somewhere between the earth and the 
moon. Moore tells them that he knows etc. but he can't give them the 
grounds for his certainty, because they have fantastic ideas about the 
45 Consider in this context the following comment from On Certainty: "My life shews me that I know 
or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. — I tell a friend e.g. 'Take that 
chair over there', 'Shut the door', etc. etc." (OC, 7). 
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human ability to fly...This would be an occasion for making that statement. 
(OC 264) 
This would be just such an occasion where the claims to knowledge made sense 
because Moore is encountering others for whom certain doubts are reasonable; 
who live in such a way that the reasons for Moore's statement about knowing he 
has never been to the moon becomes clear to us. 
Let us now pause briefly to pursue the implications of the forgoing discussion for 
inviolability interpretations of Wittgenstein, and for the related idea that 
Wittgenstein's thought leads to ethical conservatism. We have seen how 
inviolability interpretations such as McGinn's seem tied to the idea that 'ordinary 
language' is not subject to rational criticism because to do so would be to climb 
outside the limits of sense-making language: our objections would, on this basis, be 
rendered nonsensical. However, as I have attempted to make clear, there are —
following Crary - good reasons to suppose that the limits of sense for Wittgenstein 
are not set in this way, as if once and for all. Here, I think, Crary is once again 
correct to argue that: 
Wittgenstein repeatedly observes that learning to judge is ultimately a 
matter of nothing more than cottoning on to, or developing a sense for, 
what different judgements have in common (Crary, 2007: 115) 
If this is indeed the case, then Wittgenstein wants to draw our attention to the 
possibility that we may indeed 'cotton on' to the sense in certain uses of words 
which initially strike us as unclear. To begin to see their place in forms of living is, 
among other things, a matter of enlarging one's imagination. The relationship 
between expanding one's imagination and effecting changes in certain language 
games can also be seen as the factor driving the following comment from 
Wittgenstein: 
If we imagine the facts otherwise than as they are, certain language games 
lose some importance, while others become important. And in this way 
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there is an alteration — a gradual one — in the use of the vocabulary of a 
language (OC, 63) 
This statement from On Certainty seems relevant to a wider assessment of the 
ethical implications of inviolability accounts of Wittgenstein when we read it in 
combination with the familiar idea that for Wittgenstein "...to imagine a language 
means to imagine a form of life" (PI, 19). In this respect, when Wittgenstein speaks 
of the possibility of language games changing as a result of imaginative 
engagement, as he does in the passage from On Certainty, it at least suggests that 
forms of life are themselves neither fixed nor stagnant, but are potentially subject 
to re-imaginings, and thus to various changes. 
It could, of course, be objected that my account has not dealt adequately with the 
claim that any change to a form of life could not, for Wittgenstein, emerge as the 
result of external, rational criticisms. We should be clear, then, that an inviolability 
interpretation of Wittgenstein need not involve the denial that changes can and do 
occur within various forms of life. Their point, one might say, is that if such changes 
do emerge as the result of rational criticisms, then these criticisms must for 
Wittgenstein have been couched in the terms of existing ('ordinary') language 
games. There is no place outside or beyond such everyday language games which 
could provide an external point from which to engage in rational critique of a form 
of life (c.f. Crary, 2003: 119)46. Of course, the idea that any sense making language 
usage has for Wittgenstein to be embedded in language uses already existent 
within particular forms of life, again seems to imply that he is some sort of ethical 
conservative. For, if ethical grounds or justifications are supposed by Wittgenstein 
to come to an end, or terminate in 'forms of life' or ways of 'acting', then it does 
seem plausible to conclude that forms of life as they are embedded in various 
46 Another way of putting this is as follows: the meaning of ethical terms is always relative to one 
form of life or another. To criticise the social practices of, say, culture X from the standpoint of 
culture Y, is to risk failing to make one's criticisms intelligible, except perhaps in terms of the ethical 
lights provided by one's own distinctive form of life. 
144 
'communities' or 'cultures' do indeed provide a particular ethical bedrock or 
foundation for each of these collectives'''. 
Moreover, we might continue to suppose that any community or culture wedded to 
a particular form of life cannot engage rationally with another form of life from 
outside that other way of living; we have no way, for example, of asserting the 
superiority of one set of conventions over another. We thus become, as Ernst 
Gelner (1979: 71) puts it, 'caged' by Wittgenstein within our own particular 
traditions; trapped in "...a cozy, self-contained conceptual cocoon" which renders 
us unable even to examine the traditions of our ancestors and neighbours (c.f. 
Crary, 2003: 122). The next part of my task, then, is to attempt to make clear that 
such a view of Wittgenstein: (a) seems to rest on a mistaken view of the sort of 
'bedrock' forms of life are supposed by Wittgenstein to provide, and (b) 
presupposes too narrow a conception of what rational engagement with various 
forms of life might actually look like. 
(v) Could there be 'rational engagement' between forms of life? 
While it seems clear that Wittgenstein's philosophical approaches do seek to return 
us in various ways - and for various purposes - to the 'rough ground' of ordinary 
usage, this by no means implies that 'forms of life' are supposed to comprise the 
ultimate foundation or justification for anything. To suppose otherwise is to miss 
the wider impact of one of the key insights in Crary's 'anti-inviolability' reading of 
Wittgenstein: one where the bounds of sense are not set or secured in such a way 
as automatically to render novel uses of words nonsensical. Here, Wittgenstein 
seems to want us to 'grasp' or acknowledge that there is no such thing as a vantage 
point which could reveal that the meanings of our words are, as Crary notes, 
"...fixed in one way or another," or which will: 
...enable us to bypass the (sometimes enormously difficult) task of trying to 
see whether or not a new employment of a given expression preserves 
important connections with other employments. His aim is [instead] to get 
47 Talk of forms of life, as Crary (2003: 120) puts it, is often taken to be, "...equivalent to talk of social 
conventions governing our linguistic practices..." 
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us to relinquish the idea of such a vantage point and, at the same time, to 
relinquish the idea that what we imagine is to be seen from such a vantage 
point has some bearing on our ability to submit practices to criticism. (Crary, 
2007: 138) 
And if we give up the idea of such a vantage point whereby that the meanings of 
our words are fixed by certain practices or conventions, then the charge that 
Wittgenstein is championing some form of ethical conservatism begins also to look 
a little more vulnerable. The sorts of 'foundations' with which forms of life do 
provide us, do not cut us off from thinking or saying particular things (c.f. Crary, 
2003: 139). If it is indeed, for Wittgenstein, "our acting, which lies at the bottom of 
the language game", and which determines the point at which our 'giving of 
grounds' must give way, then the 'foundations' provided by certain ways of acting 
more resemble a 'river bed,' rather than solid, impermeable, grounds (OC, 204). For 
unlike more concrete foundations there is, for Wittgenstein, frequent "movement 
of waters on the river-bed" and, albeit less frequently, a "shift of the bed itself" 
(OC, 97). 
Nor, I think, do the sorts of ethical foundations offered by forms of life on 
Wittgenstein's 'river bed' picture necessarily cut us off from engaging with, and 
learning from, others whose worldviews are different. To make this point more 
clearly, I want to suggest that the Wittgensteinian picture of communication 
between different forms of life has important similarities with the following 
comments from Mary Midgely, who also speaks of the possibility of rational 
communication between those inhabiting quite different cultures. In 'On Trying Out 
One's New Sword on a Chance Wayfarer', Midgely argues that such communication 
is not impossible, but 'just hard work'; while the obstacles which are likely prevent 
it are not so much specialised or technical ones, but "...simply those of ordinary 
ignorance, laziness and prejudice" (Midgely, 2005: 222). On the reading of 
Wittgenstein I am endorsing here, he too can be seen to be suggesting that the 
possibility — or indeed the failure - of such communication rests on imaginative 
effort and the employment of various personal sensitivities. One might put the 
matter in the following way: we are, for Wittgenstein, cut-off from productive 
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communication with others by the limits of our ethical imaginations, and perhaps 
by our desire or will to expand them, and not by certain special features of the 
world, which include of course our unavoidable embeddedness in certain forms of 
life. 
To develop this reading further, we need firstly to recognise that Wittgenstein is 
suggesting that those who share very different world views can come to adapt or 
change their views as a result of communication with one another. Consider, for 
example, the following passages from On Certainty. In the first, Wittgenstein 
imagines a hypothetical conversation between G.E. Moore and a tribal Rain King 
who believes that the earth began with his birth; in the second, he imagines 
conversing with another man who has also grown-up believing that the world has 
existed for only fifty years. Hence: 
I do not say that Moore could not convert the king to his view, but it would 
be a conversion of a special kind; the king would have to be brought to look 
at the world in a different way. 
Remember that one is sometimes convinced of the correctness of a view by 
its simplicity or symmetry, i.e., these are what induce one to go over to this 
point of view. One then simply says something like: "That's how it must be." 
(OC, 92) 
And also: 
I can imagine a man who had grown up in quite special circumstances and 
been taught that the earth came into being 50 years ago...We might instruct 
him: the earth has long...etc. — We should be trying to give him our picture 
of the world. 
This would happen through a kind of persuasion. (OC, 262) 
One thing worth noting is that in speaking of Moore's potential conversion of the 
Rain King, Wittgenstein ends by discussing how one may come to be impressed by 
the 'simplicity' or 'symmetry' of a certain view, seemingly in spite of the fact that it 
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could have its origins in a culture or world-view which hitherto seemed quite alien. 
Of course, these passages still tell us precious little about the means of persuasion 
being used; we may not yet be able to imagine the conversations that could take 
place here. Indeed, to bring either a tribal Rain King, or a man grown up in 'special 
circumstances' to look at the world in different ways, could make it sound as if the 
means of converting or persuading them would have themselves to be 'special', or 
indeed quite unusual. I will return to this idea a little later. 
What now needs to be accounted for, however, is not simply the possibility that 
someone inhabiting a certain culture might persuade another from a different 
culture of the rightness of certain aspects of her world view. The following question 
needs also to be addressed: could any such uses of persuasive methods constitute 
rational critique or persuasion? Wittgenstein could, after all, accept that someone 
from one culture could come to persuade person from another to abandon view X 
in favour of view Y, and still hang on to some form of conservatism (or relativism). 
This is something that Alice Crary also seems to acknowledge when she says: 
Wittgenstein only appears to be a relativist if his remarks about how certain 
cultural gulfs need to be bridged by persuasive methods are construed as 
remarks about how certain gulfs can only be bridged by non-rational means. 
(Crary, 2007: 118) 
In arguing that various 'persuasive modes of discourse' may instead serve as points 
of rational contact between people with quite different worldviews, Crary" points 
out how, for Wittgenstein, "...the exercise of rational responsibility requires a 
distinctively human form of activity in language." (Crary 2003: 140). If the sense of 
her point is not immediately clear, it is, I think, related to what I pointed out earlier 
in respect of how one might come to make sense of G.E. Moore's various uses of 'I 
know.' To make Moore's statements intelligible, I argued, requires that we discover 
the spaces that they could occupy in practice; in a human life. Attempting to 'find 
our feet' with any one of Moore's particular uses may, indeed, as Crary puts it: 
48 Albeit in a different paper: i.e. 'Wittgenstein's philosophy in relation to political thought' (2003). 
148 
...require us to try to see it in a different light, to use our imagination in a 
variety of ways, to seek new experiences which help us to refine our 
sensitivities and so on (Crary 2003: 141). 
Talk of drawing upon, and perhaps further extending, the range of sensitivities we 
acquired as language users, also connects with what I described elsewhere (i.e. in 
Chapter 6 in connection of Diamond's talk of the literary technique in philosophy) 
as Crary's development of an expanded, 'embodied' view of rational engagement. 
On such an expanded account, which Crary also detects in Wittgenstein, rational 
engagement, or 'getting our minds around how things are', necessarily presupposes 
the possession of various personal and affective sensitivies; where engaging 
rationally with others - including others who inhabit other forms of life – calls upon 
us, as Crary puts it, to "...use—and perhaps stretch—our imagination" (Crary, 2003: 
140). In short, it is only though imaginative effort that we will can begin to know 
how 'things stand' with the other; how to make sense of her uses of words as the 
sorts of judgements with which we may begin to find our feet. This is as true of our 
attempts to make sense of G.E. Moore's anti-sceptical statements as it is of any 
effort to make sense the words of the Rain King's chant when he invokes, say, the 
benevolence and mercy of his gods. 
Here another comment from Mary Midgely chimes readily with this account of 
Wittgenstein. For in encounters with other cultures, Midgely points out that despite 
the fact that "...we must ask questions from where we stand, questions which we 
can see the sense of...", this hardly means that we cannot also "...extend our 
questioning by imaginative effort". And through this we may indeed: 
...come to understand other societies better. By doing so, we may make 
their questions our own, or we may see that they are really forms of the 
questions which we are asking already" (Midgely, 2005: 222). 
How constructive communication between representatives of quite different 
cultures (or 'forms of life') might be achieved in practice is not something Midgely, 
or indeed, Wittgenstein, seem to make clear. This raises the following objection: it 
all well and good to say that conversational participants will need to excerpt 
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imaginative effort, but we still have no clear idea of what this is supposed to look 
like. If we might, in Wittgenstein's case, not expect him to provide us with 
something akin to an inventory of readily generalizable communicative techniques, 
we may still feel a little short-changed; that we are owed at least an example or 
two49. 
There are, however, at least two separate points or objections here. One is that 
Wittgenstein fails (for whatever reason) to offer adequate exemplification of what 
rational communication between two quite different forms of life is supposed to 
look like. The other is that Wittgenstein's account of forms of life as inviolable 
prevents, on principle, such communication from occurring. To be clear, it is 
countering the second objection which is relevant to my aims in this section. These 
are achieved via the suggestion that we should view Wittgenstein as endorsing a 
view of rational engagement along the lines of Crary's 'expanded' reading. On this 
account we are also permitted to see how Wittgenstein's talk of our unavoidably 
inhabiting various 'forms of life' does not also require his approval of a conservative 
moral 'isolationism'. We are not, by virtue of inhabiting one form of life, necessarily 
cut-off from purposeful, imaginative, and rational engagement with others. 
Moreover, in the rest of this chapter, I will look more closely at the sorts of 
sensitivies one might cultivate in order better to achieve such engagement, and 
what might also be involved in its cultivation. 
(vi) Imagination, ethical sensitivity and 'experience' 
After examining various wrong turnings in the first part of this chapter, such as the 
idea that Wittgenstein's philosophy leads us to ethical conservatism, I want to be 
more explicit about what ethical development might actually look like on the 
Wittgensteinian approach I have been developing. I want also to consider the 
challenge of fallibility, or the notion of what going wrong, or failing to develop, 
might look like here. In doing this, I want to look closely at a comment made by Ray 
49 One may, perhaps rather uncharitably, suggest that the demand for such examples can itself be 
borne of the need to spare oneself the (ethical) efforts required in order to find one's own feet with 
others whom may indeed appear quite incomprehensible. Such a reply could, nevertheless, easily be 
seen as a piece of evasion: an excuse for offering nothing of substance to a person who, perhaps, 
denies that rational communication in such cases is possible. 
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Monk, which follows from a discussion of how one might, or might not, come to 
understand the variety of ways in which the statement, 'I am afraid', can be used: 
Far more to the point would be an alert and observant sensitivity to 
people's faces, voices and situations. This kind of sensitivity can be gained 
only by experience — by attentive looking and listening to the people around 
us (Monk, 1991: 547-548). 
What Monk describes here as the gaining of alertness and sensitivity can, I think, 
take us some way towards understanding what ethical learning or development 
might look like for Wittgenstein. Monk is also right to move on to connect this 
observation about the development of sensitivity with Wittgenstein's own 
comments in Part 2 of the Investigations concerning 'imponderable evidence', and 
also with Wittgenstein's own well-documented admiration for the writings of 
Dostoevsky5°. We can see something of the role of imponderable evidence in the 
following comments from Wittgenstein in the Investigations regarding how one 
might come to judge the genuineness of expressions: 
It is certainly possible to be convinced by evidence that someone is in such-
and-such a state of mind, that, for example, he is not pretending. But 
'evidence' here includes 'imponderable' evidence. 
Imponderable evidence includes subtleties of glance, of gesture, of tone (PI, 
2: xi). 
If it is clear that Wittgenstein believed that dealing with imponderable evidence 
was wrapped up with the possibility of 'expert judgement' about the genuineness 
of expressions of feeling, it is equally evident that the sensitivities required to do so 
can be taught. However, if Monk is right to suggest that they can indeed be gained 
only through experience, the sorts of experience (or 'varied observation'51) that 
could contribute to their growth need not always involve 'looking and listening to 
the people around us': certainly if this is supposed to preclude any of these people 
from being characters in works of fiction. I will indeed look more closely at the idea 
5° See Monk, (1991) pp.549-50. 
51  Also see Philosophical Investigations, 228. 
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of ethical learning from works of fiction in the next chapter. What is of particular 
interest to me at this juncture, however, is the question of how to understand the 
development of the sensitivities that Monk describes. It is interesting that in 
discussing the notion of sensitivity to the subtleties of glance, gesture, and tone, 
Monk cites Wittgenstein's admiration for the character of Father Zossima in The 
Brothers Karamazov. This character is described by Dostoyevsky as having: 
...absorbed so many secrets, sorrows, and avowals into his soul that in the 
end he had acquired so fine a perception that he could tell at first glance 
from the face of a stranger what he had come for, what he wanted and 
what kind of torment racked his conscience (Monk, 1991: 548-9). 
What makes this example interesting is that Monk sees Dostoevsky's description of 
him as representing "...Wittgenstein's ideal of psychological insight". While Monk is 
surely correct to suggest that, for Wittgenstein, Zossima's insightfulness, borne of a 
wealth of 'experience' of the fears and sufferings of human beings, has "...more to 
teach us about understanding ourselves than the experimental methods of the 
modern-day 'science' of psychology...", much more still needs to be said about this 
insightfulness (Monk, 1990: 549). For example, it is easy to overlook what else 
might be involved in what Monk terms 'psychological' insight, compared, say, with 
the sorts of insight that might be obtained through experimental psychology. I want 
to raise and discuss the following three questions in connection with this point: (1) 
What is it that Zossima is supposed to be able to see that so many others may easily 
miss? (2) What is it that he does and does not do with this insightfulness? And, 
finally, (3) What might it mean for someone to be able to detect this sort of 
insightfulness in another? 
(vii) Psychological or Ethical 'Insight'? 
In The Moon and Sixpence, Somerset Maugham famously writes about how, "It is 
not true that suffering ennobles the character; happiness does that sometimes, but 
suffering, for the most part, makes men petty and vindictive" (Maugham, 2012: 69). 
Whether or not we recognise something truthful in his observation, we may 
nevertheless accept that great knowledge of the sufferings of others could 
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potentially lead to something similar: to pessimism, coldness, irritability, 
resentment, even self-pity. Rather than remaining attuned and responsive to the 
misfortunes of others, one may become precisely de-sensitised to any further 
instances of human misery or suffering. I will take it that it is at least plausible that 
someone in roughly the elder Zossima's position could, because he had been so 
frequently 'pestered' by others, and so often subject to their emotional 
outpourings, develop a profound disinclination to listen attentively; to continue to 
advise and to help other people. What is more, he could if he were so inclined use 
his great psychological insight to serve his own ends, perhaps manipulating us 
lesser mortals for his own entertainment, or to further his own material advantage. 
When I asked questions about the sort of knowledge Zossima might be supposed to 
possess, and what he is supposed to do with this knowledge, I wanted to bring to 
light just how different his psychological insights could be compared with those 
which might be obtained scientifically (e.g. experimentally). To see this more 
clearly, we need only consider the following comment made by Wittgenstein in a 
conversation with Drury. When discussing Zossima, Drury reports Wittgenstein as 
having said something along the following lines: "Yes, there really have been people 
like that, who can see directly into the souls of other people and advise them." 52 
When we now reconsider Monk's idea that Zossima represents Wittgenstein's 'ideal 
of psychological insight', we can see that such insight might better be described as 
insight into the state of someone's soul. It is certainly does not seem simply to 
involve knowledge of a human being as an object of scientific study, of the sort of 
being that one (as an expert in psychology) has discovered to be significantly more 
likely to react in way X under set of conditions Y. To see directly into one's soul 
seems to be, or at least involve, among other things, that one approaches the other 
as a human soul (in other words, with an ethical attitude.) 
This talk of approaching a soul is not, however, a piece of metaphysical or pseudo-
scientific speculation; peering into a soul is not a sort of empirical discovery of a 
52 For the full quotation see Drury's 'Conversations with Wittgenstein', in Pascal, F., Leavis, F. R., 
King, J. & Drury. M. O'C. (1984) Recollections of Wittgenstein, Rhees, R. (Ed.), Bristol: Oxford 
University Press 
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'thing'. To look into someone's soul is not simply to have perceptively noted their 
age, sex, likely occupation, marital status etc., and be able to conduct something 
similar to psychic cold-reading: educated guesswork based, for example, on various 
statistical probabilities. It is not simply a matter of being, or appearing to be, 
insightful or clever. It would seem that for Wittgenstein Zossima is not 
straightforwardly a mind-reader, an arch-predictor of likely human behaviour, but a 
'soul-reader': his insight would seem to be borne of an inherently ethical relation to 
the other. His sort of psychological insightfulness is, one might also say, a peculiarly 
ethical insightfulness. 
If Zossima's wealth of experience of humankind has developed his psychological 
insight, then this insight has also continued to shape what it is that he continues to 
learn from experience, and how he learns from it. If this sounds a little confusing, 
even confused, it is because it is difficult to express without misrepresentation. The 
point, if I might try to put it this way, is that if he didn't continue to take an attitude 
towards others that was an attitude towards a soul, then the knowledge that he 
acquired of those people would no longer be knowledge of a soul. Yet, instead, he 
uses his knowledge of humankind precisely in order to help advise others, to guide 
them; and this is not in spite of the numerous sufferings he has had recounted to 
him in the past, but in part because of them. One might say that he preserves the 
view (the attitude) that these others are bearers of a soul: in other words that they 
are capable of deep suffering, of possessing a conscience that may well be 'racked 
with torment', and as such, demand and deserve his help and guidance. They are 
approached not only as beings who lead ethical lives, but as beings whose way of 
inhabiting, and engaging with, the world is fundamentally ethical. He responds to 
them as his own kind: as en-souled.53  
One is, of course, quite at liberty to disagree with my reading of the character of 
Father Zossima as he appears in Dostoevsky's novel. In fact, as I will argue in the 
next chapter, the possibility of disagreement and discussion about what to make of 
him exemplifies a particular strength of using works of literature in facilitating 
53 We might say that he 'connects' with them; for me, this has clear resonances with the sense of 
E.M. Forster's injunction: 'Only connect' in Howards End. 
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ethical growth and learning in a Wittgensteinian sense. Of greater importance at 
this stage, however, is Wittgenstein's comment about the existence of such 
insightful, ethically developed, and sensitive characters in everyday human life. This 
brings me again to another question I raised earlier, that of what might it mean for 
someone to be able to detect this sort of insightfulness in another. What might be 
involved for a person, Wittgenstein for example, to so much as speak of the ability 
to peer directly into the soul of another? 
For Wittgenstein, it is the ability to 'read' - to develop a 'nose' for - evidence that is 
imponderable that would mark out the person who might see directly into 
another's soul; a person with well-developed ethical sensitivities. He says: 
I may recognize a genuine loving look, distinguish it from a pretended one 
(and here there can, of course, be a 'ponderable' confirmation of my 
judgement). But I may be quite incapable of describing the difference. And 
this not because the languages I know have no words for it. For why not 
introduce new words? —If I were a very talented painter I might conceivably 
represent the genuine and the simulated glance in pictures (PI, 228). 
If I recognise a loving look on someone's face as genuine (rather than feigned), I can 
no doubt point to something that can be discussed with, or 'pondered' by, others. 
They might disagree with my conclusions, and I could find myself incapable of 
communicating why exactly they should agree with me. Of course, I could also turn 
out to be wrong about my conviction of her love for me. But, even so, the question 
would then be the following: what is then suggested about human beings, as the 
sorts of beings about whom one could be mistaken in this manner? And perhaps, to 
pose the question again in a more Wittgensteinian manner: what do being certain 
or being mistaken look like here? 
One thing that is suggested is that certainty and mistakenness in this area of human 
life is of a radically different sort from certainty or mistakenness about the 
properties of a physical object. However, suppose that my loved-one's brain is 
connected to a new, high-tech computer in a laboratory. After conducting the 
required tests on her brain activity, the scientist then turns to me and says: 'Listen, 
155 
there was a distinctive pattern of neural firing in her cerebral cortex when she 
looked at you in that way. Believe me: she's faking!' What would I think then? What 
should I think? In such a case, I can only speak in the first person: I would probably 
laugh and dismiss the scientific test as 'interesting' or as a 'bit of fun'. If it did help 
to change my attitude towards this person, if it filled me with fresh doubts about 
her love for me, then it would likely not be because I supposed the scientific test to 
know her better than I do - that it could provide certainty where I could only 
speculate (because, for example, I have never been privy to the patterns of 
electrical or neuro-chemical activity in her brain.) It would more likely be that I was 
not much convinced of the genuineness of her love; that my eyes, so to speak, were 
not fully closed in the face of doubt. 
The important point here seems to be that I come to recognise, or otherwise 
acknowledge, the differences between the ways that I relate to my loved one, the 
ways that I talk about knowing her, and the ways that one might relate to, or come 
to know, a participant (or her brain) in an experimental setting. The fact that I am 
not in a relationship with a brain, but with a particular, complete, human being, will 
shape what it means to for me to 'have evidence' of this or that; about how I might 
go about being certain here ("If someone is love-sick, a scientific explanation will 
not bring him peace, but the right gesture might help" Heaton and Groves, 1994: 
124). In many everyday situations, ways of coming to understand, and of continuing 
to be baffled by others, more closely resemble what I have been describing above. 
And yet, as we will come on to see, Wittgenstein wants to accept that 'better' and 
'worse' apply here too, that there is such a thing as learning to understand people 
better, and of developing the sort of ethico-psychological insight personified by 
Father Zossima. 
(viii) The Problem of Fallibility? 
One important point which emerges from my account so far is that one could quite 
reasonably deny that such people, or such abilities, actually exist. Perhaps it's all 
just a case of wishful thinking, an inability to face certain painful facts about human 
nature; perhaps of attempting to salvage something religious in the material 
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universe so elegantly explained by the physical sciences. It may indeed be argued 
that if there are any Zossima's in this world then they will likely be clever, 
perceptive, and patient people, and that 'soul-talk' is just a florid and romantic way 
of expressing this. What is more, there may even seem to be a distinct 'blindness of 
faith' in what I've said in connection with Zossima: that I've treated him as if he is 
quite infallible in his assessments of others. 
The idea that Zossima might always be fallible is, in one sense, related to the 
suggestion that Wittgenstein might also be wrong to stress the role of 
imponderable evidence in the Investigations, because all evidence in human affairs 
ought in fact be ponderable. Someone may then wish to push Wittgenstein's 
account harder. Surely, it could be objected, talk of imponderable evidence is 
simply evasive: it risks requiring one to accept certain things on trust without 
providing adequate grounds for this trust. The following sorts of questions are now 
readily invited: how can we know if the so-called ethically sensitive person — let's 
continue to call him Zossima - has 'read' someone correctly or incorrectly? How can 
we know if he, or indeed anyone, is developing or failing to develop in this respect? 
I do not think Wittgenstein wants to answer these sorts of question directly54. 
When considering how we can know whether any assessment of another is correct 
or erroneous, or of how we can know if various people are better or worse at 
reading the 'souls' others, he would, I suspect, ask us again to consider the practical 
consequences of being right, wrong, better or worse here: in other words, ask us to 
explore what being correct or mistaken might look like in practice. An investigation 
could well reveal that certain people, such as Father Zossima, continue to have 
people ask for their advice and guidance; build a reputation for insightfulness; have 
friends or acquaintances who commend them on their good judgement etc. If these 
features hardly constitute an exhaustive list of criteria to determine infallibility, 
they nevertheless help to remind us of how terms such as 'good judge of character' 
might be used in everyday life. Of course, none of this could satisfy one who 
54 For one thing, the sceptical challenge presented by such a question cannot be addressed in the 
terms in which it is set: it is as if what troubles us about our diagnosis of, say, another's 'real 
intentions', were always simply a matter of needing to know something that we do not already know 
(e.g. what is going on in her head). 
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continued to push for something (a proof?) more definite here. And yet, if sceptical 
doubts regarding fallibility are always remain possible in matters of, say, reading 
others' feelings, expressions and intentions, Wittgenstein's account need not leave 
us with 'blind' faith as the only response. We might try to imagine what human life 
would look like if people always doubted whether one's understanding of another 
could improve; what it would be for human beings to have abandoned all talk of 
degrees of quality in assessments of character or intention (perhaps on the basis 
that no-one could prove herself infallible in such matters.) In such a way one can 
indeed ask whether certain doubts are sustainable. 
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein speaks of how we might say that the 'reasonable 
man' simply does not have certain doubts55, but believes that, say: 
...the earth has been there since long before his birth, that his life has been 
spent on the surface of the earth...that he has a nervous system and various 
innards like all other people, etc., etc. (OC, 327) 
This talk of the 'beliefs of the reasonable man' need not imply that Wittgenstein is 
simply defending 'common sense' in such a way that will allow one simply to 
dismiss another's doubts as nonsense. Rather, the idea of reasonableness once 
again invites us to imagine the consequences of someone's doubting the very 
things that I know in just such a way "as I know that my name is L.W". If someone 
were repeatedly to raise doubts about such things, what we might simply have to 
say of such a person is that "...he will never learn this game" (OC, 329). If he 
persisted in doubting whether we could ever 'really' know better what someone 
else is thinking, feeling, intending etc., or whether there can indeed be better or 
worse judgements of character, we might say that such a person simply will never 
learn certain uses of the words better or worse. He will not be able to participate in 
certain of our language games which relate to understanding others. 
55 C.f. On Certainty, 220. Also consider when Wittgenstein in the Investigations calls upon someone 
to try to doubt, in a real case, whether someone else is in pain, he does not mean that it is 
impossible for one to do this. Nevertheless, we might wonder what such doubt would look like other 
than crass, insensitive, or heartless. 
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In discussing the non-deflective insights offered by works of literature, I will in 
Chapter 9, say more about how insights into the 'souls' of others may be both 
deepened and improved in the manner I see as Wittgensteinian. Without wishing to 
anticipate this discussion here, there is something that can usefully be drawn from 
it in respect of my present discussion of fallibility, and how there might be better or 
worse readings of human beings. Here, I want to draw on Gilbert Ryle's image of 
'wine tasting' which he uses to describe the sort of rational tutelage offered by the 
novels of Jane Austen. For Ryle, Austen seeks carefully to shape our emotional 
responses through her narrative techniques, whereby a character trait such as pride 
(in Pride and Prejudice) is not developed in a single character but through a range of 
characters in whom pride is manifested in different ways. Just as a wine taster 
might come to judge the quality of, say, the tannic structure of red wine by 
sampling it in various different bottles from different regions, Austen too invites the 
reader to investigate the quality of, say, pride in her characters by, "...matching it 
against the same quality in different degrees, against simulations of that quality, 
against deficiencies of it, against qualities which, though different, are brothers and 
sisters of that quality" (Ryle, 1990: 278). 
For Ryle, then, Austen's Pride and Prejudice can help to teach us about appropriate 
or 'proper pride' by eliciting our emotional responses to her characters' various 
displays of this quality. We are drawn, for example, to see Jane Bennett as 'too 
diffident', Mrs Bennet as having 'no sense of dignity at all', Mr Darcy as 'haughty 
and snobbish', and Mr Bennett as having 'genuine pride' albeit pride which is 'inert' 
(Ryle, 1990: 278-9). We are thus, for Ryle, invited to place value on certain ways of 
behaving: some as being worthy of pride; some not, through our reactions to the 
thoughts and actions of various characters. We begin to see the consequences of 
various degrees or manifestations of this trait as it played out in their lives. As such, 
we begin not only to make better sense of the novel and the fictional world it 
creates, but also transfer this learning into our own lives; to our own assessments 
of character. Our palate, so to speak, can become more refined. 
Importantly, we may disagree with Ryle's own reading of how pride is manifested in 
Austen's characters, but such disagreement can, it seems, go only so far. This 
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connects, I think, with the idea that although it may always be possible to doubt 
whether someone has 'read' someone correctly, it is not always reasonable to do 
so. Suppose, then, that after reading Pride and Prejudice, someone announced that 
Mr Darcy as he appears in the early chapters of the novel was a modest, humble 
and rather diffident sort of man. In such a case, I would want to say that this was a 
clear misreading of his character; I might even wonder if the other person were 
joking, and if not, whether we had in fact been reading the same book. I could offer 
to show him why I thought he had misread Austen's character — I could give 
evidence — but he could simply refuse to listen. He might maintain that all such 
readings are radically subjective, and there was no place for better or worse here. 
He might then insist that I could not prove he was wrong. Yet, the fact that I would 
not be able to change his mind or to meet his exacting criteria for proof, hardly 
ought to convince us that there are no better or worse ways of reading Jane 
Austen's characters. In a directly related way, the fact that one cannot prove that 
someone, such as Zossima, has correctly peered into the soul of another, should 
hardly imply that someone seeking his help may as well have, say, read the 
horoscope in the daily newspaper. 
(ix) Conclusions: developing an ethical 'nose' 
I want to end this discussion, and this chapter, by considering the following 
passages from the Investigations which again relate to the development of the 
sensitivies needed for ethical growth, and with what I have described as the ability 
to look directly into a soul. Consider, then: 
Is there such thing as 'expert judgement' about the genuineness of 
expressions of feeling? —Even here, there are those whose judgement is 
'better' and those whose judgement is 'worse'. 
Correcter prognoses will generally issue from those with better knowledge 
of mankind. 
Can one learn this knowledge? Yes; some can. Not, however, by taking a 
course in it, but through 'experience'. — Can someone else be a man's 
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teacher in this? Certainly. From time to time he gives him the right tip. —This 
is what 'learning' and 'teaching' are like here. —What one acquires here is 
not a technique; one learns correct judgements. There are also rules, but 
they do not form a system, and only experienced people can apply them 
aright. Unlike calculating-rules (PI, 227). 
It seems quite clear that the knowledge of 'mankind' of which Wittgenstein speaks 
cannot result from 'direct' instruction via particular sets of methods or techniques. 
Instead we find talk of a teacher from time to time offering a student the right 'tip', 
and of one's learning various 'correct judgements'. If learning of these judgements 
in various 'concrete' cases can help us to better see into the souls of others, it will 
not be because they form a system, and can simply be transferred without 
alteration - without thought - to any new situation. 
If offering 'tips' is the only way teaching and learning can proceed here, then one 
may not read them correctly, or perhaps choose not to accept or heed them. A 
critical commentator will still always be at liberty to say: 'Well, this is just not 
precise enough for me: it's too vague, too unscientific.' And, of course, he or she 
will be quite right to say this: the language games simply work in this way. It is 
always possible to see what Wittgenstein is describing as expert knowledge here as 
mere guesswork; as a poor, 'folksy' replacement for scientific precision. Yet, if such 
precision is hardly the point in the development of the expertise of which 
Wittgenstein speaks, what could help someone else to acknowledge this? What 
sort of evidence could we provide that would convince him? In short, it seems clear 
that he would have to allow himself to be 'struck afresh' by certain things; that he 
would have to be 'open' to acknowledging that it involves, we might say, breathing 
a different sort of air. An argument or demonstration of some sort might help him 
here, but it is unlikely that a piece of theorising aimed at establishing the truth of 
the matter will satisfy him. Perhaps the provision and discussion of certain 
examples — such as the literary of Father Zossima - might work better. But then 
again, perhaps not. This is not something where a fool-proof set of techniques 
seems possible, or indeed, desirable. 
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At this point, I want simply to point out that for Wittgenstein it is indeed possible to 
be another person's teacher in respect to, say, judging the genuineness of 
expressions; and that one's learning is nevertheless tied up with being better able 
to make use evidence that is 'imponderable'. If being able to make use of 
imponderable evidence also seems integral to ethical growth on a Wittgensteinian 
picture, I have also stressed that we will need to acknowledge that it is not open to 
the sorts of testing that could establish the truth or falsity of a hypothesis in the 
natural sciences. If one can indeed learn better to develop a 'nose' for reading the 
souls of others, the comparison with a connoisseur of wine is useful. For unlike how 
one might come to distinguish, say, a French Cabinet Sauvignon from a New World 
version by its nose, we have no independent way of checking whether we have got 
our judgements of human beings correct: we cannot simply check the label; remove 
our blindfold. We can in this sense 'prove nothing'. Nevertheless, as I will argue in 
the final chapter, particularly in connection with educational uses of literature, the 
suggestion that ethical development involves dealing with imponderable evidence, 
does not imply that such evidence may not be rendered discussible, and be 
discussed in the classroom. In such a way, one may still grow to become more 
competent in one's judgements (as will the novice wine taster with her wines), and 
indeed, become more confident in one's 'dealings' with people — and better see 
into their souls. 
162 
Chapter 9 
Literature and Encouraging Ethical 
Confidence 
(i) Introduction 
I now turn my attention to the question of how best to encourage the sorts of 
ethical development I discussed in Chapter 8 as following from Wittgenstein's 
philosophy. My focus here will be on its encouragement in the school setting: in 
particular, in the sorts of settings with which as a teacher I am most readily familiar 
i.e. secondary schools and sixth-form colleges. Two separable yet related aims will 
run throughout this chapter. The first is to make a case for the use of literature -
particularly but not exclusively works of fiction - in helping to promote the sorts of 
ethical learning and development that follow from a non-deflective, 
Wittgensteinian approach. After considering other possible approaches to 
promoting such learning, I argue that the use of literature may have various 
advantages in the classroom. These advantages also connect with the problems of 
doubt and scepticism which have exercised my thoughts at various points in this 
thesis. Moreover, I spoke in Chapter 7 of the dialogic quality of Wittgenstein's 
philosophical writings; of how his concern with self-interrogation, of engaging with 
doubts raised by an imagined interlocutor, are intimately connected with an 
overriding ethical concern of exploring, probing, and if possible getting clear about 
the sources of one's troubles in philosophy. I contend that the dialogic 
opportunities offered by literary texts are also one of the peculiar strengths of their 
use in helping to encourage the forms of ethical learning. I also want to emphasise, 
however, that the dialogic nature of literary texts can enable rational engagement 
with pupils, not simply, as we saw in McGinn's comments cited in Chapter 6, 
various ways of appealing to the 'heart' and bypassing the 'head'. 
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The second aim is a more explicitly pedagogical concern, and relates to the fact that 
my proposed use of works of literature in facilitating moral education hardly 
constitutes an original suggestion. Here I am concerned to point out how some 
other approaches to the use of literary works can appear rather prescriptive and 
even didactic. I argue this point through a recent article by philosopher of 
education, Paul Standish (2009), which begins by imagining a sequence of lessons 
devoted to discussing human relationships with animals, using J.M. Coetzee's novel, 
Elizabeth Costello, as a stimulus. Standish's paper is selected not because it is 
unique in discussing the morally educative roles of works of literature, but because 
his approach can be read as a challenge to the sort of non-deflective moral 
education I imagine as being possible in the classroom. For although we seem to be 
in agreement about the possibility that works of literature can generate non-
deflective ethical insights, Standish seems far more sceptical about realising or 
developing these in schools. In considering Standish's 'suggested' approach to 
teaching Elizabeth Costello, I go on to imagine some less didactic, and as I 
understand them, more Wittgensteinian uses of works by the same novelist in a 
similar classroom setting. The chapter, and indeed the thesis, will then end in 
exactly the same place as I started it in Chapter 1: in the same classroom; in the 
presence of Emma, Jeremy, and their peers. Nevertheless, when we meet them 
again it will be with a different teacher: one who approaches ethical concerns with 
the class in a different manner from that of Ms Comberton. 
(ii) Depth, doubt and discussiblity 
Just as you feel when you look on the river and sky, so I felt; 
Just as any of you is one of a living crowd, I was one of a crowd; 
Just as you are refresh'd by the gladness of the river and the bright flow, I was refresh'd... 
--Walt Whitman, Crossing Brooklyn Ferry 
Truly a futile way of passing the time, some of you may say, and not altogether creditable to a 
grown-up man. And yet, from the deepest point of view, who knows more of truth, and who knows 
less, - Whitman on his omnibus-top, full of inner joy with which the spectacle inspires him, or you, 
full of the disdain which the futility of his occupation excites? 
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-- William James, Talks to Teachers on Psychology 
I begin with a question, a doubt, that arises from William James's comment that I 
cited by way of an epigraph. It is also something that I want to connect with my 
concern with developing ethical learning in schools. What, one might well ask, is 
this deepest point of view that James mentions in connection with Whitman's 
poetry? How does one know it is the deepest, and that there isn't, in fact, a deeper 
one? I do not want to try to answer this directly. Instead, I think of Francis Bacon's 
confident assertion that a little philosophy inclines a man to atheism, while still 
more returns him to religion. Now, what if someone else were to say, perhaps with 
a sly grin playing over his face, that still more philosophy returns one yet again to 
atheism? What should one say then? What could one say, and what could it 
achieve? One might equally imagine the person filled with disdain at Whitman's 
'futile' poetic musings wanting to say, contra James, that it is he who knows more 
of truth; who has a better idea of how things really go in this world. He might, then, 
be inclined to a version of Callicles' response: that poetry, much like philosophy, is 
not a proper enterprise for a grown man or woman. One should be aiming to better 
bend the world to one's will, rather than remaining content to gaze in wonder at 
rivers, lakes, daffodils, or any other quite everyday, mundane, things. Could James 
then say nothing in reply? Say nothing in support of the depth of poetic imagination 
that he detects and values in Whitman's verse? Well, of course there is much that 
he could choose to say, but as was the case with the relativist in Chapter 5, there is 
no guarantee that the other will listen; that he will be at all persuaded. 
Given this, perhaps the question ought to be whether James should bother to reply 
at all in support of Whitman? In a related sense, perhaps we should not bother 
speaking with a sceptic who is similarly dismissive of the ethics, or the deepening of 
the sorts of ethical learning that might follow from Wittgenstein's philosophy. Why 
not, as did Nietzsche's Zarathustra when he met the old saint in the forest, simply 
walk off in the opposite direction; agree to part and to have nothing further to do 
with the other56? Another question that might not immediately occur, but is 
56 Nietzsche gives us the evocative image of two people, the saint and the prophet, for whom 
conversation is no longer possible; for whom words are replaced by laughter. It is, I think, a mutually 
165 
nevertheless of some importance, concerns why one might suppose that speaking, 
and the possibility of speaking - or, indeed, of not speaking - is of such great 
importance here? In other words, why do I write as if a crucial consideration were 
whether or not James, or indeed we, can say something to the doubter? There are 
at least two reasons which might help to account for this. 
Firstly, when I spoke in Chapter 5 of what I saw as the need, at some level, to be 
able to shrug one's shoulders in the face of the persistent doubter, I also spoke of 
how this could be an almost impossibly difficult gesture (for some of us) to make. 
Something of this difficulty no doubt lies beneath or behind my desire that William 
James, in his imagined confrontation with the modern Callicles, is able to say 
something: not simply to resign; to walk off as if in defeat57. This seems to matter 
because what we disagree about with a sceptic truly matters to us: if Whitman's 
poetic attitude, or indeed, a Wittgensteinian inspired ethics, can reveal or 
otherwise point to something deep or truthful, then one would want the sceptic to 
see this, if not to share in our enthusiasm, then at least to acknowledge it as 
worthwhile. 
The second reason has more to do with what I see as the connections between 
education and the idea of discussiblity. I refer, in part, to the importance for any 
education of transmitting, of passing on, what we think is valuable; to share it with 
others precisely because it is valuable. As far as ethics is concerned, "It is", as 
Bernard Williams rightly observes, "...a mark of our having ethical values that we 
aim to reproduce them" (Williams, 1985: 192). One might say that it would be good 
not only for us if those of a sceptical bent came to see things our way, but that it 
could also be good for them too. That this attitude may lie behind any attempt to 
'indoctrinate' another into what one happens to find good or worthwhile, hardly 
mocking laughter; one borne of acknowledged incommensurability of both attitude and purpose: 
"And thus they parted from one another, the old man and Zarathustra, laughing as two boys laugh" 
(Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 1969: 41). 
57 Once again, I think, we can see just how compelling it might be to be able to engage the sceptic, 
whilst also supposing oneself to know the correct basis from which it ought to be possible to argue 
him round. If what I have described in this thesis as the rationalistic attempt to ground or provide 
foundations to which one might appeal in ethical disputes, is in fact the mark of ethical deference 
rather than proper confidence, it does at least seem to promise the possibility of making such a 
defence: of not being struck dumb in the face of doubt. 
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entails that it is not also central to the nature, and to the possibility, of education. 
We will scarcely be passing on anything to those who show resistance to our efforts 
without our also being prepared to engage with their doubts, to treat them as at 
least open to discussion. To give up on the possibility of speaking to the other, of 
engaging in some form of dialogue, seems tantamount to giving-up on education. 
As far as schooling is concerned, if teachers were to pass on anything of value, the 
risk is that they would do so by resembling preachers to the converted, or at least 
to the readily convertible; preachers who were also too ready to excommunicate 
the non-believer58. 
We also might do well to acknowledge that not all sceptics are grown men such as 
Callicles, and that as teachers we find them in almost all of our classes. We can 
even detect something of the presence of doubt in various familiar exclamations: 
e.g. 'What's the point of studying this!', 'Isn't this a waste of time!', 'Why are we 
discussing 'made-up' characters!', 'Why should I believe it!' While these comments 
hardly constitute an exhaustive list of pupil objections, or even relate exclusively to 
the ethical uses of literature in the classroom, they do seem to express doubts of 
certain sorts. They are, at the very least, marks of resistance to something, perhaps 
to the chosen subject or the approaches to teaching it. From the point of view of 
moral education, we would perhaps also need to acknowledge that forms of moral 
relativism (of relativistic doubt) are likely as deeply-entrenched (if not more so) in 
the student population as they were when Bloom wrote The Closing of the 
American Mind nearly thirty years ago. 
If the need to treat ethical doubt as discussible is, as I've suggested, of at least some 
importance for moral education, this does not entail that every doubt simply has to 
be discussed in schools. I am not suggesting that there will not be times when a 
teacher has to respond by saying something along the lines of: 'Well, we're doing 
58 This cutting-off may take many, even many quite subtle, forms. One thinks of how I pictured 
Emma in Chapter 1 as educationally 'cut-off' (even 'singled-out' and 'cast aside') on account of her 
puzzlement; for not making the sorts of responses that were required by the teacher in order 
properly to address 'the demands' of a moral dilemma. Of course, in her case we might say that she 
was not cut-off directly because of her doubts, but because these doubts manifested themselves as 
the sort of confusion that one ought not to have displayed in order to be recognised as having 
understood the point of an exercise (the value of which itself remained largely unquestioned by the 
teacher). 
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this because we have to.' Not all pupil doubts will need to be discussed explicitly; 
some may not even be readily discussible. The point is not to remove the need for a 
teacher to make various judgements about what is, and is not, an appropriate or 
discussible doubt. What I am suggesting instead is simply that pupils can be 
doubters too, and that for their schooling to be educative, the shrug of one's 
shoulders in the face of doubt should not come too soon or too often. Another thing 
that I am not claiming in this respect is that there is only one approach to discussing 
ethical doubt, or indeed to encouraging non-deflective ethical development more 
broadly. If it hardly needs to be said that discussion in the classroom does not need 
to take only one form, I say it because it is still easy to picture discussion through 
the lens of a teacher seeking to address various issues directly, either through 
engaging in some form of argument, or through 'whole-class discussion', where a 
range of voices make points, raise objections, formulate counter-arguments etc. 
One's view of discussion may too easily become fixed on a vision of offering and 
inviting critical appraisals through the provision of various abstract arguments. This 
matters, not because there is no place for such an approach to discussion in the 
classroom, but because it is by no means the only, or always the most effective way 
of 'discussing' ethically questions and concerns. 
I now move on to consider two further ways that ethical considerations may be 
rendered discussible, and be discussed, in the classroom: through the use of 
examples from personal history, and through fictional examples. 
(iii) Discussion and discussiblity: Examples from Personal History 
At the conclusion of my lecture on ethics I spoke in the first person. That, I believe, is 
something very important. Here nothing further can be substantiated. I can only step forth 
as an individual and speak in the first person. (Wittgenstein, PO, 116-117). 
If it seems important for Wittgenstein that one is able to 'step forth' and 'speak in 
the first person' about the ethical life, how might this idea relate to moral 
education? It is in this context that I want to discuss moral philosopher Raimond 
Gaita, and his well-known example of the nun he met as a young man working in a 
psychiatric hospital. There are two reasons for my including Gaita's example in this 
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chapter. Firstly, Gaita's approach to ethics, and his writings about ethical matters, 
clearly resonate with the Wittgensteinian approach I have been discussing. One 
way of putting this is to suggest that Gaita writes about ethics in a spirit that is non-
deflective59. He provides an example of what Wittgenstein might have meant by 
'speaking in the first person' about ethics: of drawing with a sort of perceptive 
sensitivity on his personal experiences, and of communicating directly what these 
experiences showed him about leading an ethical life; about what a human life 
could mean. Secondly, I focus attention on Gaita's nun because I want to explore 
both what he makes of her example, and also what we might make of it in terms of 
promoting ethical learning in schools. My major contention is that although Gaita's 
account of the nun may be deeply moving, even compelling for some of us, the fact 
that it is based on personal testimony can actually make it less helpful in school-
based moral education than various uses of works of literature, especially (but not 
exclusively) given what I have described as the need for educators to deal with, and 
discuss, ethical doubts of various sorts. 
In A Common Humanity, then, Gaita discusses his encounters with the nun who was 
to make such a powerful impression on him. He is also keen to point out that 
although her treatment of severely afflicted psychiatric patients inspired 'wonder' 
in him, it was not because he had lived a life cut-off from emotional warmth, or 
because he was hitherto a stranger to displays of deep concern for the welfare of 
others. In his Romulus, My Father, Gaita speaks of how his father and his friend 
befriended the immigrant labourer, Vacek, who had also 'lost his mind', and that 
they had both behaved towards him 'without condescension'. This enabled the 
young Gaita to acknowledge that this man, despite the often palpable strangeness 
59 
"The secular philosophical tradition", says Gaita in A Common Humanity, "...speaks of inalienable 
rights, inalienable dignity and of persons as ends in themselves. These are, I believe, ways of 
whistling in the dark, ways of trying to secure to reason what reason cannot finally underwrite" 
(Gaita, 2002: 7). This is clearly 'non-rationalistic' in the manner of standing in opposition to what I 
have described as rationalistic, where the need for reason to 'underwrite' ethics is indeed of 
paramount importance. We might indeed describe it as non-deflective. For in speaking, instead, of 
the 'preciousness of human beings' and of the connection between this idea and that of love, Gaita 
is acknowledging — in spite of inviting accusations of being 'sentimental or soft-headed', - the ethical 
importance of what we might describe as 'feelingness', and of the role in our ethical lives of what 
Hand might well describe as 'extra-rational' considerations (such as the variety of ways that human 
beings show love for one another.) 
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of his behaviour, was simply, "...living yet another form of human life...", and that it 
took "...his sort to make all sorts". In case the behaviour of Gaita's father strikes us 
as unremarkable, and simply connects with the more pervasive concern in recent 
times with the moral and social status of the mentally ill, Gaita is quick to point out 
what he sees as the difference. For although, "Most of us would agree that people 
like Vacek should be treated as fully our equals", then more often than not "...we 
believe it...in the way young people believe they are mortal, more in our heads than 
in our hearts" (Gaita, 2002: 18). There can exist important differences between 
statements of belief about, say, the need for equality, and the compassion and lack 
of condescension that marked the actions of Gaita's father and his friend. Yet, even 
with this preparation held in mind, it is striking that the behaviour of the nun was, 
for Gaita, 'astonishing', and quite unlike anything he had experienced before. What 
is more, this astonishment does not seem to spring from simple naivety on his part, 
or indeed from any lingering cynicism about human nature from which he yearned 
to extricate himself. 
Unlike the situation with Vacek, the patients at the psychiatric hospital where Gaita 
worked are described as 'incurably afflicted', and 'constantly and visibly in 
torment'. It would be hard, says Gaita, to see them, "...as living a life of any kind" 
(Gaita, 2002: 18). Yet, despite the fact that the lives of these people seemed to 
have lost all meaning, all dignity, the nun behaved towards them (according to 
Gaita), without, "...a trace of condescension". Although Gaita and the psychiatrists 
with whom he worked believed that they also treated the patients with 
unconditional respect, the nun's behaviour showed ('revealed') to Gaita that they 
were in fact wrong; that "...in our hearts we did not believe this" (Gaita, 2002: 20). 
For Gaita, then: 
...everything in her demeanour towards them — the way she spoke to them, 
her facial expressions, the inflexions of her body — contrasted with and 
showed up the behaviour of those noble psychiatrists. She showed that they 
were, despite their best efforts, condescending, as I too had been (Gaita, 
2002: 18). 
170 
It was indeed she who treated the patients with unconditional respect; her saintly 
love showing ('proving') to Gaita the patients' preciousness or dignity. It was only 
her love, and not the best efforts of the psychiatrists, which made their humanity 
readily visible. Gaita's nun seemed to embody the reality of a Goodness, with a 
capital G, which before his meeting with her was still little more than a word. Thus, 
he continues to explain how: 
I felt irresistibly that her behaviour was directly shaped by the reality which 
it revealed... There is no clear application here for the concept of a mistake 
(Gaita, 2002: 20). 
What Gaita describes here connects not only with what I spoke of in Chapter 8 in 
connection with Wittgenstein's talk of looking directly into someone's soul, but also 
with the notion of imponderable evidence which I mentioned in relation to ethical 
learning. It is on the second of these connections that I wish to focus for the time 
being. What is interesting in this respect is Gaita's description of how he became 
aware of the nun's complete lack of condescension, and of how her expression of 
love was in fact genuine. This seems certainly to include the sort of attentiveness to 
the "...subtleties of glance, of gesture, of tone" that Wittgenstein speaks of at the 
end of the Investigations as marks of imponderable evidence (PI II ix). One could 
suggest that Gaita's being compelled by the power and genuineness of the nun's 
love arose because although he had in fact been developing a 'nose' for such things, 
he was still unable to explain his experience in terms of ordinary, or 'ponderable', 
evidence. What is more, the purity he saw revealed in her compassion forced itself 
upon him in a manner that, "...ruled out for me speculation about whether it was 
justified" (Gaita, 2002: 21). It was not, then, a matter of his needing to provide an 
account that would convince someone else, for what she revealed to Gaita about 
the preciousness and inalienable dignity of the patients could not itself be 
formulated independently of the love that she revealed. In the face of a love which 
was for Gaita sui generis, the notions of doubt and mistakenness are supposed not 
to apply. 
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I, for one, cannot help but be moved by Gaita's account, and by what moved him, 
but I also cannot also help thinking him in some way fortunate. I am not sure if I 
mean fortunate to have met someone who made such a powerful and lasting 
impression on him, or fortunate because he was able to allow the nun to make such 
an impact: that the necessary background preparations (experiences) for 
recognising her behaviour as revelatory were, so to speak, already in place.6°  
Perhaps I simply mean fortunate in that he was able to drop his guard that low, or, 
to shift metaphors once more, that he did not at some later point become prey to 
the gnawing suspicions that might afflict one with a more sceptical turn of mind.61  I 
think here of the passage from another of Coetzee's novels, Disgrace, where the 
central character, the 'disgraced' English professor, David Laurie, reveals his shock 
at the friendship professed to him by a man with whom he had barely been 
acquainted. He says: 
Has Bill Shaw...seen so little of the world that he does not know there are 
men who do not readily make friends, whose attitude towards friendship 
between men is corroded with scepticism? (Coetzee, 1999: 102). 
For Lurie, or at least for someone with whom his 'corrosive' scepticism resonates, 
the young Gaita could also, perhaps, be described as not having seen enough of the 
world; as not having the required experience to 'realise' that mixed motivations, 
and not pure ones, are what inspire so many human actions. Perhaps the 
seventeen-year-old Gaita would be seen as too impressionable, or too idealistic to 
be trusted to teach 'us' anything indubitable about the Goodness-revealing 
properties of the nun's love. For such people, Gaita's account of the nun's 
behaviour will be, and indeed ought to be, a matter of doubt and evidence; a 
matter where the possibility of mistakenness is writ large. 
60 E.g. Gaita's experiences of Romulus and Vacek. I also think of William James' talk of 'unconscious 
incubation' in connection with sudden religious conversion experiences in The Varieties of Religious 
Experience. 
61When speaking of Gaita's 'being fortunate', I do not myself intend to sound condescending. It is 
nevertheless likely that this is exactly how it will come across, especially to one for whom its air of 
scepticism is not an air that they are inclined to breathe. 
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It needn't be only the hard-boiled sceptic who could demand something more from 
Gaita; who might, for example, press the familiar distinction between feeling 
certain and being right. Gaita is, it seems, making some sort of claim here: a claim 
about the existence of a variety of human love that the nun's behaviour forced him 
to acknowledge, a love that was hitherto outside of his own direct experience. 
Many others will, I think, want to say: 'OK, I hear you, but now show me'. If a friend 
is in raptures about a man she has recently met, and she says to me, 'Well, he is just 
the most amazing guy. His kindness and generosity are without question in a league 
of their own', then it is unlikely that only corrosive scepticism could spur me to ask 
further questions, to want to meet this person, to find out for myself. I may be 
delighted for my friend, that she was so singularly impressed, but I would be no 
doubting Thomas on account of wanting to satisfy myself as to whether his qualities 
were indeed that special or unusual. This is no reflection on my friend, for I could 
well acknowledge that she is usually an excellent judge of character, it is more a 
reflection of the epistemological and educative limitations of this sort of personal 
testimony: of being prepared to grant that another's depth of certainty is alone a 
sufficient basis to command our own assent; with the idea that we should simply 
rest content with nothing more than the feelings inspired by the reported 
experience itself. 
Perhaps a wider problem with Gaita's nun is that she remains, and must in a sense 
remain, something of an enigma. Other than a few bare facts (e.g. she was middle-
aged), we know precious little about her. That is not to say that we could not, much 
like diligent historians, try to dig around and find out more: more facts, further 
biographical details, perhaps even new stories from those who knew her, or knew 
of her. We could compare and contrast these various bits of information, and build 
up a more detailed picture of her character using due discrimination. But what sort 
of picture could this be? And how might it appear to the sceptic? It may well be one 
of a quite remarkable person, it may even be consistent with Gaita's being awe-
struck at her behaviour. Consistency, however, will hardly do in such a case; it will 
likely fail to satisfy us. One thing that our research will not allow us to do is to 
encounter her, to experience her, as Gaita did. This possibility seems forever 
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removed from us: the length of time that has elapsed since Gaita's meetings at the 
hospital will likely prevent us from ever meeting her; from seeing for ourselves. 
Even if we wanted to share Gaita's commitment and certainty, there is a risk that 
we may feel left with only the cold comfort of historical evidence, of educated 
guesswork, of merely plausible narrative. 
We may, a little like the mythical Pandora, also be left with hope. There is always, it 
seems, the possibility of our meeting someone like Gaita's nun for ourselves. In this 
respect, another of Diamond's examples of the 'difficulty of reality', of our being 
shaken and uncomprehending in the face of the unthinkable, also focusses on an 
experience of 'incomparable and inexplicable' goodness. In this case, Ruth Kluger 
describes her meeting, as a young child prisoner in Auschwitz, with a young woman 
- a stranger - who lied to save the young Kliiger's life, and got her through selection 
procedures at the camp. (Diamond, 2008: 61). And yet, it is interesting that Klijger 
herself describes how others now often wonder at her wonder about this woman; 
how they fail to recognise that this was an encounter with the sort of goodness that 
Kluger herself saw as transcending familiar talk of altruism. One might say that they 
had never experienced anything like it themselves, and this of course is the point. 
They were not there. Moreover, if we were to go in search of someone like Gaita's 
nun or Kluger's young woman in our own lives - lives which mercifully do not 
involve avoiding death in Nazi extermination camps - how would we be supposed to 
recognise them if we met them? And how could we be sure that we will not be 
mistaken or deluded in our recognition? Do we simply have to trust in the strength 
of our feelings? If there are indeed people who can reveal to us the existence of a 
saintly love which transcends more everyday moral sensibilities; if we too are 
looking to be struck with wonder at its existence, then it seems that we might have 
prepared the ground (opened ourselves, or have been opened) in ways about which 
Gaita in his own case is, perhaps, less than explicit. 
If developing the sort of 'nose' that enables one better to 'look' into the souls of 
others is important to ethical development on a Wittgensteinian account, it is at 
least questionable whether Gaita's experience of the nun would be of much help to 
those beginning to develop in this way. If one has to get the right 'tips', be pointed 
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in the right direction, and learn correct judgements rather than methods and 
techniques, then it is still far from clear that this could best be achieved by simply 
accepting such personal testimony without question. To return the discussion back 
explicitly to the school context, if Gaita may himself be someone who can teach us 
a great deal about ethics, his story of the nun could hardly be used straight-off in 
the classroom.62 She would likely prompt more questions, more doubts, than she 
could help to resolve. For many she would simply be unbelievable. For all this, in 
Gaita's 'real' meeting with a 'real' nun, we meet problems for education that are 
perhaps, somewhat ironically, less troublesome when we turn to works of fiction. I 
say ironic because fiction inevitably involves 'made-up' characters; people who 
strictly speaking have never lived outside an author's imagination; whose lives are 
in a sense wholly subject to the purposes of their creator. This fictional status, I will 
now argue, matters less for moral education than do their dialogic possibilities: the 
sort of discussiblity that they can indeed allow in the classroom63. 
(iv) Discussion and discussiblity: Examples from Literature 
"Separateness can be felt as horror; such a response is what puts Othello beyond aid" 
(Diamond, 2008: 65). 
"We read to know we are not alone" 
from Shadowlands (1993), screenplay by William Nicholson. 
I mentioned in the previous section how Ruth Kluger has faced a certain disbelief 
from others to whom she tells her story of the young woman at Auschwitz. What I 
want to focus on here is not so much their doubts, but Klilger's own plea for her 
readers, "...not just to look at the scene but to listen to her and not take apart what 
62 His more much detailed, literary, and eminently discussible picture of his father, Romulus, in 
Romulus, my Father seems, at least to me, to be better suited to deepening ethical reflection of 
students'. 
63 Nevertheless, I could imagine the nun being introduced to a class as a 'discussible person', rather 
like a character in a novel, whose strong impression on me, say, might move some students to think 
and wonder. However, as I will go on to argue, unlike a fully-drawn character in a novel she seems 
still to provide a lesser opportunity for deepening our ethical discussions. I could even imagine the 
need here to draw on a character in a novel (perhaps Dorothea in Middlemarch) in order prevent 
our conversation from being cut short by a lack of discussible information. 
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happened, to 'absorb it' (Kluger, cited in Diamond, 2008:62). She asks us, as 
Diamond puts it, "...for a kind of imagination that can inhabit her own continued 
astonishment..."; and requests that we do not intellectually dissect her story, for to 
do so would be — for Diamond at least - to 'deflect' from its truth (Diamond, 2008: 
62). One thing that is not clear is for whose sake we are being asked not to 'take 
apart' the story — Kluger's? Ours? Both? If it were a matter of being sensitive or 
respectful to Klijger's story, then perhaps we ought to acknowledge that her 
experience must have been deeply moving in ways that we may not easily 
understand. Perhaps we would agree that there can be something inappropriate, 
even disrespectful, in our intellectualising such a significant personal experience. 
Yet, if it is supposed to be for our own sake that we do not 'take apart' the story, 
then things seem somewhat different. Is it, then, that any attempt to reflect on and 
fit the story to our own experience must, for Diamond, deflect from its truth, and 
result in our cutting ourselves off from a deeper moral reality? If so, then this is, I 
think, to push the connection between deflection and ethical failure too far. 
The danger is that only silent acceptance could count as properly non-deflective in 
such cases, and that this would apply just as well to someone's reported experience 
of a miracle: that if you ask any searching questions then you are merely cheating 
yourself of an opportunity for belief. This also risks becoming anti-educational: of 
closing down any genuine conversation; of converting potential dialogue into the 
sound of two people of the same faith speaking in a single voice. Although I do not 
believe that Diamond herself thinks in such extreme, polarised terms (e.g. 
deflection is always a bad thing to do ethically speaking) there is a sense in which 
her treatment of Kliiger threatens to come close to this. To my mind, to learn 
anything of deep ethical significance for us from Kluger's personal account, and to 
develop the sort of ethical imagination that Diamond correctly suggests is needed 
for us to connect with her experiences (and perhaps with Gaita's), we must 
nevertheless begin making that connection from where we stand: with our own 
lives and experiences. We must, so to speak, be helped to build a bridge from 
ourselves to various others, a bridge that cannot exist if its construction is not 
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begun from our own side of any supposed divide; from our own familiar ground.64 
This will require that the experiences of others, particularly ones that strike us as 
strange or unfamiliar, can be discussed and scrutinised; be held up for various sorts 
of inspection rather than simply 'absorbed'. Ethical development can hardly be 
furthered by osmosis or dictat alone. 
This idea of finding, or building, connections is important to my account of the 
ethical uses of literature in education. It is also why I began this section with two 
quotations which focus on the very ideas of separateness and togetherness; 
disconnection and connection. In the first, we have Othello who (at least on the 
Cavellean reading suggested by Diamond in this short quotation), is driven to the 
desire for certainty, for 'ocular proof' of Desdemona's alleged infidelity on account 
of a tragic inability to cope with his very separateness from his wife. In the second 
quotation, from a film about the real-life relationship between writer C.S. Lewis and 
the American poet Joy Gresham, the idea of separateness (or aloneness) is also 
present, along with the suggestion that reading may offer some sort of antidote to 
this condition. But what might be meant by the idea that we read to know we are 
not alone? Surely we already know we are not alone - we hardly need to peer into a 
book to find this out! To again borrow a distinction from Cavell, what seems to be 
suggested here is not so much knowledge but acknowledgement: through literature 
we can find acknowledgement that we are not alone in our humanity, that others, 
too, undergo similar troubles, suffer similar doubts and worries, think unusual or 
even unkind thoughts, and can sometimes be moved by the sorts of desires that 
one would hardly dare make public for fear of censure. If characters in literature 
share the secrets of their hearts or otherwise have them shared, then we may well 
be relieved by this very frankness; for this opportunity to find ourselves in them and 
them in us; to have said what is so often left unspoken in our own lives. 
This is not to say that we will readily relate to, or connect immediately with, all 
fictional characters. Some will strike us as distant, even strange: they seem to think 
64 I think of how Coetzee begins his novel Elizabeth Costello with talk of a 'bridging problem': of the 
need to get us over to the 'far bank', and, perhaps, to the 'world' inhabited by Elizabeth (Coetzee, 
2003: 1). 
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differently; feel differently. We may, nevertheless, come to see something of them 
in the people that we have ourselves met; be able to relate them to our own lives 
and experiences. Perhaps more importantly, even when they appear quite alien 
indeed, we at least have the opportunity to come to recognise what such 
differences might mean, and to explore them either by ourselves, or with others. In 
a substantial work of fiction, the motivations of characters at least seem 
discoverable, if not always transparent, or otherwise open to straightforward 
interpretation. The lives of fictional characters are also discussible in almost exactly 
the same ways that we might discuss the people we meet in our daily lives. Here we 
may disagree with a friend about whether a shared acquaintance is, say, kind or 
self-interested; honest or dishonest. In our discussions we may refer to experiences 
involving this person that we both recall, but account for differently; perhaps one of 
us remembers something about this person that the other has forgotten; perhaps 
the other will draw one's attention to this other fact, or that other detail, about 
their lives. The point is that more often or not there exists the possibility of a 
substantial dialogue in such cases; a conversation held on the basis of mutual 
familiarity with another person (or persons). 
This at least seems quite different from the situation with Gaita's nun or KIliger's 
young woman, with whom we will probably never be acquainted, and of whom we 
will perhaps never be given enough of the right sorts of clues to quell the desire not 
to accept personal testimony at face value. The lives of literary characters, as with 
those of the people we meet elsewhere in our lives, can be interpreted and 
reinterpreted by any number of 'readers'. We do not simply have to accept the 
account of another. We can compare and discuss our responses to a fictional 
character, we can ask questions about them together, we can analyse the 
characters' behaviour over time and in different situations. We may read and re-
read the novel, form new interpretations, question older ones on the basis of 
talking to others, find new leads, chide ourselves or others for overlooking what 
now seems obvious, for failing to take the importance of this or that event for 
granted. While it is true that we will never meet, say, Mr Darcy or Elizabeth Bennet 
in the flesh, we can indeed meet them in the pages of Pride and Prejudice, and 
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when we do, it is as fully-drawn characters who have a history, who develop, and 
who (albeit through the considerable abilities of their creator) reveal to us certain 
things about themselves in what they say, how they say it; through their 
demeanour, their silences, their avoidances. In our wholly sharable, discussible, 
meetings with these characters, we pick-up (assuming the work of fiction is similarly 
substantial) on exactly the sorts of clues that we may also pick-up on when reaching 
judgements about people we meet in our lives. 
I ought to make it clear that discussion of examples from fiction hardly replaces the 
need in ethical learning of connecting with 'real' people: it's not the case that we 
must simply learn from fiction and not from personal experience. The important 
point, rather, is that the discussiblity of works of literature, and particularly 
discussions relating to character, can open the possibility that we may better - more 
readily and more sensitively - make connections with various others: grow to 
become better, deeper, readers, not only of works of fiction, but of the lives - the 
'souls' - of others. Through our fictional encounters, we may also be permitted to 
grow used to reading, re-reading, looking, looking again; to listening attentively to 
others' stories rather than - to borrow a line from another well-known modern film 
- simply waiting for our turn to speak.65 The ways in which we encounter ethical 
dilemmas in works of literature also mirror the ways that we encounter them in our 
own lives: contextually, in various concrete situations, as happening to complex, 
multi-layered beings, not simply to reasoning machines: rational agents in pursuit 
of the best piece of abstract argument to fit to their own case. When we examine 
characters in literature, for example Vronsky in Anna Karenina, struggling with his 
love for Anna, her pregnancy, and with how all this fits with his sense of social 
standing and military ambitions, we see the struggles of an individual man, and can 
see better what ethical struggle might mean in a human life. I am not saying that 
there is nothing ethically speaking that can be abstracted from his particular case, 
for to think this would once again be to lose any possible connection with him, to 
cut his example adrift from our own lives. This is not a plea for some sort of ethical 
65 I refer to David Fincher's 1999 film, Fight Club, itself based on the novel of the same name by 
Chuck Palahniuk. 
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particularism, but for us to acknowledge that fully-drawn literary characters can 
allow us better to grasp the ways in which ethical concerns matter to people, what 
they can mean, and how they are experienced, encountered, or endured. 
I want to pause briefly to consider a potential problem with the account I have 
been developing. The problem is centred on the notion of subjectivity: that the 
judgements we reach about fictional characters will be simply our personal 
'opinion'. Another way of expressing this is via the suggestion that 'anything goes' 
when it comes to understanding characters in literature, and perhaps, the 
characters of human beings in general. If there is no better or worse here, just 
different strokes for different folks, then things look decidedly gloomy for any 
education in such matters: no one could be another's teacher; or rather, anyone 
could, but then no one could really be expected to take much notice of what was 
being taught. It would, after all, be based on the opinion of just another somebody. 
If it is fairly easy to speak of such things in the abstract, it seems much harder to 
imagine what life would be like if anything really did go in judgements of character. 
Consider the following short conversations between a mother and her teenage son 
concerning the 'bad' influence she sees exerted on him by another, slightly older, 
boy: 
Conversation 1 
"Mark my words John, he's a bad sort. Don't hang around with him, he'll get you 
into trouble. He's already been in trouble with the police" 
"You're wrong Mum, you hardly know him." 
"Well that's my opinion: take it or leave it. It's just that I've seen more of the world 
than you have." 
"Yes, and it's just made you bitter. Distrusting" 
Conversation 2 
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"John, it's my opinion, and only my opinion, that Carl is what might be described as 
a 'bad sort'. If I were you, I probably wouldn't choose to hang around with him...but, 
of course...I am not you... so I am not really able to see things as you do." 
"Are you trying to give me some advice about Carl, Mum?" 
"No, dear, I would never be so... presumptuous. That would imply that I know him, or 
could ever know him, better than you. That would simply be disrespectful." 
"Advice is so yesterday, so absolutist, don't you agree Mum?" 
"I do, dear, but not absolutely, of course." 
If I may be forgiven for more than a hint of caricature in my picture of 'family 
relativist', it is because it is quite hard to take seriously the idea that 'better' and 
'worse' in judgements of character could be straightforwardly replaced by 'same' 
and 'different'. It is even harder, when trying to re-create anything close to a real-
life conversation about the character of another human being, to picture what a 
pair of relativists could actually say to each other, particularly given that both would 
seem committed to thinking that the other's view is just as good as their own. I find 
it almost impossible not to picture the discussion as rather forced and insincere, 
while also implying that the mother might desperately want to say something more 
to her son than her relativism would allow. Of course, the mother in the first 
conversation does indeed say something more, but could we actually say, for 
example, that she knew better than her son? That he somehow ought to have 
heeded her advice on account of her greater experience of human affairs? 
To suggest that the notions of better or worse might actually apply to judgements 
of human character or behaviour, and that people may indeed get better at judging, 
is not a simple matter of one's being older or of having greater experience. This 
again links to Wittgenstein's talk of acquiring a nose, and of the acquired 
sensitivities which allow one to deal appropriately with the sorts of clues that could 
lead to the formation of 'expert judgement' in this area of life. Experience is 
important, but experience itself cannot tell us what to take from experience: one 
needs, at least at various points, to have been guided. John, in the first 
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conversation, could well be more sensitive or astute than his mother, and her 
claims to experience might be less important in developing an account of Carl's 
character than his openness and lack of cynicism. Yet, it may not be that way at all: 
John may simply have been stubbornly unwilling to take his Mother's sage advice, 
and is also quite unwarranted in dismissing her as bitter. The crucial point is that we 
know nothing else about these characters, so it would hard to decide which, if 
either, of them is misguided. If we did know more about them, if we had been able 
to view their behaviour and attitudes over time, and in different situations, then we 
could well afford to be more confident about our judgements. We would be offered 
better, more discussible, grounds. 
The same applies to judgements about other fictional characters. If we think that 
anything goes in our coming to understand them, then we will have closed our eyes 
and plugged our ears to what they say about themselves, and to what is said, and 
implied, about them by the narrator, or by the other characters in the novel. In such 
a case, we will, perhaps because we are blinded by theory, or even by a general lack 
of care or attentiveness, have simply misread the book, much as we would have 
misread Carl as a 'nice, honest guy' if I had described his demeanour as furtive or 
shifty; or that he had avoided all eye contact with the other characters, or indeed 
that he had walked-off stage left clutching John's Mother's handbag and purse. We 
will have completely overlooked the clues which, as it were, would have been 
picked up by a more discerning reader. Of course, if Carl were a character in a more 
substantial work of fiction, we might eventually — perhaps by seeing him as 
regularly mistreated, or misunderstood - come to describe him as, deep down, 'a 
nice, honest guy', but this will be because we will have attended to what else was 
said about him; to what else he went through during the course of the book. There 
is, nevertheless, a grain of truth in the idea that our view of him, or of any other 
fictional character, will just be 'our opinion'. This comes from the idea that readers 
of the same novel will often disagree with one another about, say, the merits of 
such and such a character, just as they might well disagree elsewhere about 
whether their neighbour Jim is a thug, or a lovable rogue. The point is not to make 
too much of the mere fact of disagreement, or to underestimate varying degrees of 
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cogency, of perceptiveness, that can exist in what we might call differing 'opinions'. 
The fact that different characters will, so to speak, sometimes come to different 
views about the same character, should hardly imply that any interpretation, of any 
character, is just as good as any other. 
(v) Fiction and Deepening Ethical Confidence 
I began the chapter by pointing to what I see as the educational importance of 
being able to make doubt discussible in the classroom. I then proceeded to 
emphasise the advantages literary examples could have over examples from 
personal testimony. In particular, I argued that they can provide examples which 
may be shared and discussed by different readers: readers who might resist one 
another's views of, say, a character in a work of fiction. If I have also been 
concerned to argue for the advantages of literature for rendering various doubts 
and disagreements discussible, it should not be thought that the uses of literature 
in promoting ethical growth are confined merely to engaging the doubter. I have 
also suggested that the dialogic opportunities afforded by the study of literary texts 
may, more generally, help us to develop more sensitive readings of people's lives 
and characters, and at least potentially encourage us to a more sympathetic 
attentiveness to the various threads that can both bind and move human beings. 
This is important for the sorts of ethical learning and development that follow from 
the Wittgensteinian account I have been picturing in the last couple of chapters. 
Yet, if literature may be our teacher in these respects, and help to give us the right 
tips or nudges in order that we might become, for example, more discerning judges 
of character, it also seems clear that it might yet fail to do this. 'It', strictly speaking, 
could well achieve little without various interventions from that oft-overlooked 
figure: the classroom teacher. There is a risk that my account so far makes it appear 
that if a Year 10 class were simply handed a copy of, say, a Charles Dickens novel, 
then they would emerge from school at 3.30 on the same day sympathetically 
attuned to one another, as opposed to pushing and shoving to reach the ever-
popular seats at the back of the school bus. The main focus of most of the rest of 
this chapter will, therefore, be to address the following related questions: (a) Which 
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uses of literary works might best encourage ethical development? And, (b), What 
role or roles could the teacher play in helping to make this possible? I turn, now, to 
consider a particular vision of the relationship between pedagogy and the morally 
educative uses of literature. 
Paul Standish, in a recent article entitled, 'Food for thought: resourcing moral 
education' suggests how Coetzee's novel, Elizabeth Costello, may be used as a 
"...rich potential resource for moral education". He imagines a course of study 
based on the novel designed for `teenage students' or 'older people'; a course 
which would seemingly help to facilitate ethical thought and reflection (Standish, 
2009: 31). Although he makes some interesting suggestions relating to the ethical 
insights offered by the novel into the ambiguous relationships human beings have 
with other animals, his article also brings to light further questions which are 
relevant to my purposes. My reading of Standish's article concerns not only what is 
said, but also an attentiveness to its tone and presentation. It is a paper presented 
in two seemingly distinct parts, with two distinctive tones. I leave it open as to 
whether these differences are present accidentally, or by design. It does not matter 
greatly for my purposes whether Standish is, in fact, modelling a 'typical' 
pedagogical approach to a literary text in the first half of his paper because he seeks 
to expose or reveal the ethical and educative limitations of such an approach in the 
next. It seems more important that the approach to moral education suggested in 
the first part, where Standish imagines an educational course devoted to discussion 
of Elizabeth Costello can, in fact, be seen to be in tension with what is suggested in 
the second about the novel's potential for generating what I have called, following 
Diamond, 'non-deflective' ethical insight. What, then, are my aims in discussing 
Standish's intriguing and provocative paper here? The main one is a desire to 
modify or add to his account: to suggest that a classroom teacher, through using 
works of fiction such as Elizabeth Costello, may still be able to encourage the sorts 
of non-deflective, ethical insightfulness, which other pedagogical approaches could 
hinder or frustrate. I begin, however, by discussing the approaches to teaching that 
Standish suggests in his imagined course of study. 
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One of the first things that strikes me about Standish's suggested uses of Coetzee's 
novel as a teaching 'resource,' is the language he uses. His use of what I would 
describe as familiar 'teaching-talk' in imagining a series of lessons is, as we shall see, 
quite dramatically dropped in the second, more overtly philosophical, section of his 
paper. Perhaps this is all quite appropriate. After all, if the first section is indeed 
intended to provide practical suggestions for classroom teaching, then we might 
well expect Standish to have written it to be readily accessible to a teacher. In 
Standish's own imagined lessons on Costello, then, we find talk of meat-eating as 
an 'issue' which can often provoke 'strong responses'; of the use of the novel to 
help 'address' this question or issue, and of the possibility of 'identifying' and 
'extracting' passages that present 'crucial stages in the novel's 'argument'. 
Furthermore, the questions for class discussion he suggests at various points are 
also supposed to help "...draw out the salient issues...", and to assist students to 
"...make clearer and more robust their own positions and to ground these..." 
(Standish, 2009: 33-34). Students are, at various other points, to be encouraged by 
their teacher to, "...make a list of foods that some people eat that disgust you", and 
to "...explain the cause of their disgust...and consider how far their disgust is 
justified". Elsewhere, they will be considering 'objections' to the arguments offered 
by various characters in the novel, and encouraged to "...construct counter 
arguments of their own". They will also, in a manner quite familiar to students of 
literature, move on to consider the novelist's purposes, along with the ways he 
presents 'the issues to the reader', and the likely effects on the reader (Standish, 
2009: 36). 
It is also interesting to discover that Standish's suggested sequence of lessons ends 
with the following comment, which includes a prominent reference to the 'learning 
outcomes' popularised by certain modern trends in pedagogy. Thus: 
It needs to be recognised that students may spontaneously raise questions 
that are out of order. For this reason it may be preferable to maintain some 
flexibility in the approach and not to settle too rigidly on specific learning 
outcomes for each lesson (Standish, 2009: 36). 
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The almost apologetic, 'It needs to be recognised', is particularly striking when it is 
linked with talk of student spontaneity. Here, we get the distinct impression that 
spontaneity is something to be apologised for, or at least to be anticipated, and 
dealt with in terms of thorough lesson planning: something that might otherwise 
prevent students from meeting pre-determined learning 'outcomes'. This, along 
with Standish's seemingly wry comment that it is desirable for the students 
discussing Coetzee's novel to have actually "...read the chapters in question", adds 
to the sense that he is in fact concerned gently to mock the current state of 
pedagogy rather than genuinely to encourage any continuation of its various 
methods. 
This reading becomes more compelling when one attends to how Standish ends his 
paper with the following comment: 
The fluent accomplished arguments of the moral philosopher, with the 
pedagogical equivalent imagined in the first part of this article, threaten to 
deflect insight and education into the human condition, while this is 
something Coetzee's novel achieves... (Standish, 2009: 41). 
In this light, it again appears that Standish's suggested lessons are deliberately 
imagined in ways that would seem both 'fluent' and 'accomplished' according to 
the sort of pedagogical approaches currently enjoying something of a vogue in 
schools. Nevertheless, his concern that pedagogy might risk deflecting deeper 
ethical insights, may also readily extend beyond such modern, objectives-based, 
models of learning. Perhaps the very idea of deepening ethical awareness is 
fundamentally incompatible with any sort of formal education where outcomes 
need to be measured and assessed. If the tension between pedagogy and the desire 
to deepen pupils' ethical awareness is indeed exacerbated when teachers are not 
simply under immense pressure to 'get results', but to get them by using only 
certain prescribed methods and techniques, it hardly seems confined to such a 
situation. Standish's talk of the threat of 'pedagogic deflectiveness' thus stimulates 
a wider question for education: to what extent can teaching in schools, or indeed in 
any similarly formal educational setting, avoid the risk of descending into the 
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application of various techniques which thereby render it incompatible with 
encouraging the sorts of deeper, and fundamentally non-technical, ethical insights 
permitted through works of fiction such as Elizabeth Costello? In other words, if it 
were indeed possible for works of literature to help deepen ethical insight, must 
this only ever be realisable outside of the formal classroom setting? If there are no 
simple answers here, there are at least few things that can be said in response to 
this sort of challenge. 
Regardless of the risk that Standish's lesson ideas could encourage the sort of 
deflectiveness to which he refers later in his paper, I would not want to deny that 
they could have educative benefits, ethically speaking. Such a denial could well 
mean that we risk succumbing to the sort of polarised thinking whereby any 
attempt to understand ethical concerns as 'issues', or to 'construct arguments' 
about such issues, would be dismissed as inherently reductivist, essentialist, 
intellectualist, and so forth. And where to create, consider, and criticise arguments 
would necessarily be to be deflective in such a manner that one must thereby miss, 
or be cut-off from, anything of ethical depth. There may yet be various ethical 
problems that, perhaps on account of their stubbornness and intractability, could 
appropriately be referred to, and discussed as 'issues' (perhaps even 'controversial' 
issues). Moreover, there may be many different types of arguments.66 One could 
well, for example, easily overlook the fact that Milton speaks of the arguments of 
various books in Paradise Lost, as does Blake in The Marriage of Heaven and He1167. 
It seems clear that neither writer seeks to produce an argument which, to borrow 
the words of Alice Crary, can be understood to be: 
...a bit of reasoning in which one judgement or set of judgements (i.e., a 
premise or set of premises) permits a further concluding judgement to be 
made in such a way that there is no room for the fact that it does so to 
66 Compare the following comment made by Wittgenstein in the Investigations: "But how many 
kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command?—There are countless kinds..." 
(PI, 25). The point is that perhaps there could be 'countless kinds' of arguments, too. (I am indebted 
to Ruth Cigman for this suggestion). 
67 Alice Crary makes a similar point about Milton's use of argument in Beyond Moral Judgement, 
(2007: 129). In Blake's poem, too, the devil certainly formulates 'arguments'. 
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depend on any tendency in the judgements in question, either individually 
or together, to elicit emotional responses (Crary, 2009: 129). 
If there seems little inherently amiss in the fact that students in Standish's lessons 
are asked to discuss arguments or issues, there seems little wrong, for the purposes 
of education, of deciding to split a novel such as Elizabeth Costello into certain 
'teachable' sections (as does Standish), perhaps organised by reference to what a 
teacher considers to be the need for students to attend, in order, to various 
themes, events, or encounters. This structure would hardly preclude in advance the 
possibility of students' gaining deeper ethical insights into the 'human condition'. 
Coetzee's novel is, after all, itself split conventionally into chapters, and we as 
readers would hardly baulk at the suggestion that we ought, perhaps, to begin at 
Chapter 1, and then proceed in order68. To do so would hardly involve our 
necessarily losing sight of the importance of taking the novel as a whole. 
Perhaps the bigger problem with some of Standish's lesson suggestions is that they 
do appear to connect with a more narrow conception of what it means for a novel 
to contain arguments, or to deal with ethical problems and concerns. If Standish's 
point was indeed to satirise this narrowness, then it is, I believe, a point well made. 
Consider, for example, how Elizabeth's 'woundedness' is to be discussed with 
students by simply 'drawing' their 'attention' to "...the dynamic nature of the 
presentations of the arguments" (Standish, 2009: 33). Her character, presumably, 
makes her a more dynamic vehicle for Coetzee to drive home, albeit in a manner 
still veiled in fiction, his own philosophical arguments. Consider, also, how Standish 
proposes that students are encouraged to think about, and to separate, 'the 
arguments' from the 'emotional reactions' of various characters regarding the 
morality of meat-eating, and how they are then to be questioned about "...how far 
emotional responses should affect decisions about the morality of eating meat" 
(Standish, 2009: 34). The notion that a work of literature can be seen to 'deal' with 
ethical concerns only insofar as it can be made to yield recognisably abstract 
68  It is also interesting in this respect that Coetzee refers to each chapter in the novel as a particular 
'lesson'. Each lesson is, perhaps, another step on the bridge that leads us to Costello: to the territory 
of what might well be described as her troubled soul. 
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patterns of argumentation is a problem I have touched on before in connection 
with Diamond's The Difficulty of Reality in Chapter 6.69 
Here it was suggested that such an approach may indeed miss much that can be 
morally educative about works of fiction. In short, it risks short-changing us, and 
doing little to prevent us from, say, missing the character of Costello as a 'concrete' 
individual; overlooking how important she is for an appreciation of the sorts of 
deep ethical difficulties that can arise in connection with the killing and eating of 
animals. As Ruth Cigman writes, it will be to, "...miss the 'reality', the 'example', 
from which Coetzee wants us to learn: that of a wounded woman evoking the 
horrific suffering of animals in our production facilities" (Cigman, 2014: 12). 
Standish's lessons also seem to presuppose the related idea that the features of a 
novel which 'engage our feelings' ought be treated as separable from the ethical 
thought in the novel and its 'rational' persuasiveness. For here, as Crary explains, 
when approaching a novel, "...it must in principle be possible to strip away such 
features from the moral thinking within it..." rather than seeing them as internal to, 
as bound-up with, what Crary refers to as the moral thinking itself (Crary, 2009: 
136). 
If Standish's approaches to using Elizabeth Costello as a teaching resource can 
sometimes suffer in the ways I have described, other ways of approaching, of 
teaching, a fictional work do at least seem possible. If it is possible for Coetzee's 
fiction to be capable of revealing ethical insights, of being able to uncover, "...the 
wound out of which we are all, wauling and crying, first exposed to the world"; of 
allowing the reader to undergo the 'real' educative experience of seeing human 
beings 'hinged' between animal and god, and "...inclined from time to time to 
69 This also connects with the idea that there are, in fact, no 'concrete' individuals in fiction: an idea 
famously defended by R.H. Hare (c.f. Diamond, 1998: 40). For Hare, any 'moral' view that one 
derives from a work of fiction, e.g. from a fictional character, is precisely a view concerning a type 
and not a particular person. Diamond rightly points out that on such a view, moral philosophers 
need not attend carefully to fiction to know what it can offer us morally, for any "...moral judgement 
we are led to by a novel is necessarily universal." (Diamond, 1998: 40). So although we may learn 
much morally speaking from fictional works, fiction cannot teach us anything unique or distinctive 
about the nature of 'moral thinking'. When we read a novel, in a sense we know in advance how to 
recognise its moral messages; its moral thinking. If one accepts such a view, then if anything valuable 
for ethics or moral education could be revealed through my fictional account of their lesson, then it 
could — it seems - equally well have been realised outside of fiction. 
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become unhinged, exposed and out of position, ecstatic and capable of ecstasy..." 
then he writes, at least in part, in order to encourage us to recognise these 
possibilities. To see what he has seen; to see as he has seen. (Standish, 2009: 41). 
There is also a sense in which Standish, the writer, desires us to learn, to progress in 
our thinking about what sorts of things a work of fiction is capable of ethically 
speaking. In one sense, by writing at all, he also takes the place of teacher: one who 
aims to show us something we may not have recognised; one who holds out the 
possibility of communicating with us, of passing something on, of helping us to 
progress in our thinking. We may of course resist his efforts: I, for one, can make 
very little of the image of 'our' crying and wauling at a 'first' exposure to the world. 
The point, here, is not so much whether he will always be successful, but that his 
writings themselves reveal at least the possibility of one's being another's teacher 
in this respect; that his own ethical learning from literature can be rendered 
communicable, discussible, with others. 
This is, however, just the beginning of the story. If Standish may persuade us in an 
academic article to acknowledge what works of fiction may be capable of ethically 
speaking, this is not the same as enabling us to experience what he has experienced 
in, say, reading Elizabeth Costello. If successful, Standish's teaching - if I may 
continue to refer to it as such - will not so much (directly) deepen our own ethical 
insightfulness, but perhaps merely help us to acknowledge that such deepening, via 
works of fiction, could be there for the taking. Nor does any of this help us to 
establish the possibility of deepening the ethical awareness of pupils' in schools 
through the use of fictional writings. If there are indeed ways of helping to pass on 
the non-deflective ethical insights of which Standish speaks in connection with 
works of literature such as Elizabeth Costello, then these may never be realised in 
schools (except, perhaps, inadvertently). If ethical learning, like any other, will 
involve some notion of progression, then the teacher will likely be required to 
articulate explicitly what this entails: to make it measurable, and indeed, gradable. 
There would likely be pressure for her to think and speak of ethical progress in 
terms of what Wittgenstein would have called ponderable evidence, whereas the 
sort of ethical deepening which arises from literature can often involve 
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imponderability: the seeming impossibility of spelling out, of formulating 
definitively, what one knows, and how one knows it. This is indeed a significant 
barrier, but not, I think, an un-scalable prison wall. 
If works of literature can offer non-deflective ethical insights to some (such as 
Standish), then it is because they have acquired the capacities, the necessary 
attunement, to be able to attend to them as such. They were hardly born with 
these sensitivies fully developed; one can so easily overlook the stage-setting that 
had to take place. In a related way, when one watches the fingers of an 
accomplished pianist appear to dance over the keys, it is easy to forget how the 
same fingers spent countless hours walking slowly up and down; how they 
practised time after time the same tiresome scales and arpeggios. Nor does the 
thought that the pianist could have had a good teacher immediately spring to mind 
when one sits wrapped in the beauty of the music. In terms of ethical development, 
the possibility exists that one may well have been offered the right sort of 'tips' by 
another; had, at times, been pointed in the right direction. 
In the final section of the chapter, then, I aim to model one sort of 'approach' to 
teaching and learning, using Coetzee's novel Elizabeth Costello, which might help to 
deepen ethical understanding.7° This will also involve trying to realise my notion of 
discussiblity: of keeping open the conversation in ways that I understand as 
Wittgensteinian. There are, of course, various dangers here. One is that the whole 
account, perhaps owing to my own lack of literary abilities, will appear rather 
forced, even contrived. There is clearly little I can do to remedy this. What I would 
say, however, is that I am certainly not claiming any novelty in what I go on to 
describe: if much appears familiar, and already goes on in various schools, then so 
much the better - one might well say - for the prospect of 'moral education'. There 
is always another, related danger: that the 'approach' I suggest will be read as some 
sort of application of technique (or various familiar techniques). This will render it 
liable to be criticised, by some, as too narrow and prescriptive, and by others, 
70 Perhaps 'model' is the wrong word, for it suggests something far more definite than I offer here. 
What I provide will be little more than a sketch, or a snapshot, of what might go on in a classroom in 
the hands of an 'experienced' teacher. I use the word experienced, at least in part, in the 
Wittgensteinian sense of having 'greater' — but not simply more - experience of humanity. 
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perhaps, as still too woolly and indefinite. This is, again, largely unavoidable. In a 
sense, the fact that I cannot establish ('prove') that my writing does not in fact 
gravitate to either of these poles is wrapped-up, at least in part, with the very 
nature of what I am attempting to articulate. It is indeed possible that it will raise as 
many questions as it answers. Perhaps this too is a situation where a shrug of the 
shoulders may eventually be the only appropriate response to make. It is with this 
gesture in readiness that I turn back to the classroom. 
(V) 'Plenary' in the Classroom 
This thesis, perhaps like any good lesson'', will end with a plenary: a conclusion, 
albeit of a slightly unusual kind. Here, we meet once again with the same, or more 
or less the same, class we encountered in Chapter 1. We meet them at some later 
point in their school career. A few have left the school after their GCSE's, but Emma 
is still there. So too is Jeremy. They have been studying Coetzee's Elizabeth Costello 
for some time now. They have also, under the diligent tutorage of Ms Comberton, 
been following a scheme of work similar in some respects to Standish's suggested 
sequence of lessons. The outcome? Well, Ms Comberton was more than satisfied 
with the way things were going. The class discussions on the rights and wrongs of 
eating meat had even become quite animated: particularly following Emily's 
announcement that she had once eaten crocodile, and Sean's bold claim, made 
seemingly without any hint of bravado, that he would try pretty much anything as 
long as it was cooked right. 
In the previous lesson, Ms Comberton, aware as ever of the need for a teacher to 
use a variety of different media in order to keep the interest of her class, decided to 
show the Channel 4 programme Kill — cook — eat. She was, however, more than a 
little taken aback by the reaction it generated, particularly during the more graphic 
scenes in the abattoir. If it were not for the occasional outburst of 'Urrr...Gross!' or 
'Dis-guuus-ting!', and the fact that two or three of the girls periodically sunk their 
heads on their desks (Emma...again), most sat in silence, seemingly engrossed in 
73. In much 'official' teaching speak, the three parts are as follows: starter, main activity or 
'development', and plenary. This is also sometimes affectionately translated in gastronomical terms, 
as giving them (the pupils) their starter, main course and dessert. 
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the scenes of slaughter and butchery. 'Most will have already seen it,' Ms 
Comberton reflected, 'others are just trying not to look shocked for fear of ridicule.' 
Perhaps she was right. Of course, she never mentioned it to the class. Never talked 
with them about it. Instead, she carefully organised them into small-groups to 
discuss with their peers what they had learnt from the episode. 
The next lesson in the scheme of work was, however, to prove quite different 
indeed. With Ms Comberton suddenly taken ill with a bout of food poisoning, the 
class arrived for their Wednesday afternoon session to find they had a replacement 
teacher: a certain Mrs Duwlig. They had never seen her before. 'She must,' thought 
Jeremy, whose own mother works as a teacher, 'have come from a supply agency'. 
Others in the class had somewhat different thoughts. For the likes of John and 
Hannah, entering the room and grinning widely at each other, the presence of a 
'sub' teacher meant only one thing: a lesson off. And perhaps, if at all possible, an 
opportunity to raise a few laughs by offering up 'comedy' names when a sub asked 
them to introduce themselves. But for a while Mrs Duwlig didn't even look up. Not 
at all. She just kept her eyes, as if completely fixed, on the same page of the book 
she was holding. The chatter gradually died down. They sat in silence looking at her, 
wondering if she was ever going to speak, to move, to do anything. 
As it was, it was Jeremy who first dared disturb the silence. 
"Miss" he said, "I am sorry to interrupt you. But what's the LO for today?" 
"I am so sorry" stuttered Mrs Duwlig, as if being woken abruptly from a dream, "I 
was away with the fairies. What did you say about a hello?" 
There was a short, loud laugh. A laugh of relief? For some, perhaps. For others, the 
laugh was aimed directly at her being away with the fairies. It was just the kind of 
stupid, outdated thing someone of her age would say. 
"The L. 0. Miss" reiterated Jeremy, urgently, but with more than a touch of 
bemusement, "You know...The Learning Objective!" 
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"I am not sure we've got one of those," said Mrs Duwlig. "You are studying 
Elizabeth Costello, right?" 
"Right," replied Jeremy, "But there still has to be an LO. Every lesson has one." 
'What is wrong with this woman?' he thought, 'Miss Comberton always gives us a 
learning objective, in fact, nearly all teachers do'. He started to wonder if this one 
was from an agency at all. Was she even a proper teacher? 
As if sensing something in his scepticism, Mrs Duwlig replied, "Well, what do you 
think it should be? 
The penny dropped. How could he have been so slow. 'She wants us to make up our 
own objective', he thought. 'Ms Comberton sometimes does this too, she says it's 
part of best practice or something. Helps to test for prior knowledge. Gets us to 
take charge of our own learning.' 
"And does it," said Mrs Duwlig, her eyes fixed on Jeremy in much the same way as 
they had been fixed on her book at the beginning of the lesson, "Does it help you to 
learn better if you have a learning objective?" 
"Well, ye...kinda...no, not really. It's just something we do. You know...part of the 
routine. But mostly Miss writes it on the board, or it's on a PowerPoint or 
something. She says only bad teachers don't put it there." 
Bad teachers. It had finally been said. Now it was out in the open there seemed to 
be a palpable sense of relief in the classroom. Perhaps she was just a bad teacher. 
Past it. Away with the fairies. 
"OK" continued Mrs Duwlig, purposefully, "Today the objective is to better 
understand ourselves and others. And that's what it will be the next time, and the 
time after that." 
"So, we're having... three lessons on it, right?" interjected Jamie from the back of 
the class. 
"Do you think we'll need all three?" 
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"You tell us, you're supposed to be the teacher!" he scoffed. 
Sniggers were sniggered; knowing glances were exchanged. Things didn't seem to 
be going well. Mrs Duwlig smiled a curious smile, and spoke slowly and 
deliberately. 
"Elizabeth Costello. What is she like?" 
"Mad...Crazy!", shouted Jamie, confident after his former outburst went 
unchallenged that he had the better of this old sub. 
"Mad," repeated Mrs Duwlig, calmly, "And who else agrees?" 
One by one, hands were raised, until only a few remained down. There was yet 
another sudden, short, burst of laughter. 
"I don't think she's mad," interjected Emma. 
The laughter stopped. Emma hardly ever spoke in class. What had got into her? 
"I think she's just very..." she continued, "very...confused." 
"Yeah, very confused!" laughed Jamie sarcastically, "A very confused, MAD, old 
woman. That's what I said!" 
Jeremy spoke up, as if rushing to Emma's rescue. "There is a big difference between 
being mad and confused" he exclaimed. 
Mrs Duwlig gestured for him to continue with his thought. 
"Everybody can get confused or puzzled, but not everybody who is confused is also 
mad. Mad is worse than confused. If she were mad, Elizabeth Costello couldn't go 
and give talks at universities about the morality of eating meat. She'd be a 
gibbering wreck. She'd be sectioned" he said. 
"If she were mad she'd be a gibbering wreck. Gibbering like an ape? Like someone 
who had lost her reason, perhaps?" replied Ms Duwlig. 
"I suppose so, yeah." 
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"We should come back to that idea later", said Mrs Duwlig, and with that she 
looked once again at Emma. "I like your suggestion that Elizabeth is confused. Could 
you say something more about that?" 
Emma thought about it. It really wasn't easy to know what to say about Elizabeth 
Costello other than that she was in fact confused, or perhaps plain confusing. This 
woman who could stand up and deliver talks to professors, but spoke about 
knowing what it was like to be a corpse, and of shying away in terror at the thought 
of her own mortality. This woman who collected prestigious awards but, at the 
same time, compared herself with an ape, and talked of her vegetarianism in terms 
of a need to save her soul. Emma couldn't forget the image of Elizabeth hiding a 
wound beneath her clothes, a wound that nevertheless touched on everything that 
she said and did. The thought of this wound — Where was it? What was it? - kept 
intruding when she tried to formulate a neat response to the teacher's question. 
Mrs Duwlig waited, patiently, as if sensing Emma's struggle. After a short while 
Emma found what she felt were the right words. "Well, she is wounded. Her 
confusion is not the sort that I can really understand. She is a really confused and 
troubled person. In lots of different ways." As she said it, she knew it wasn't 
correct. For a start she had admitted that she didn't understand Elizabeth. That 
couldn't be the right thing to say, could it? What would the teacher say now? She 
knew what Ms Comberton would say, and indeed do. She'd simply ask one of the 
clever ones. Someone like Jeremy. 
To her surprise this didn't happen. Instead, Mrs Duwlig looked straight at Emma 
and said: "I am myself quite deeply confused about what to make of Elizabeth 
Costello...perhaps she ought to confuse us. She is not an easy character to pin 
down. Even her son can't do that. He too seems confused about what to make of 
her. She is described at various points as a 'tired seal', 'Daisy Duck', 'a cat devouring 
its prey', 'fish or fowl', 'a python' and even as 'a god incarnated in a child'. All 
images of different animals, but which is she, really? And yet, all the time he knows 
who she is: she is his mother. She herself knows who she is, what she is, where she 
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is, and yet she compares her situation to that of an educated ape in a fictional 
story. She seems to be confused about herself. She..." 
She was about to add something else, but Jeremy interrupted. It was all getting a 
bit much for him. After all, if the teacher didn't know what to think about Elizabeth, 
what hope had they got? More to the point, what could she teach them if she was 
herself confused? They had exams coming up. 
"I don't find her confusing at all!" he interjected sternly, "Just a bit...a bit...over-
emotional". 
"Go on" replied Mrs Duwlig, encouragingly. 
"Well, it seems quite simple to me. You have this woman who wants to convince 
people that they shouldn't be eating meat. She doesn't really have any good 
arguments. So she resorts to using shocking images, like when she compares the 
factory farming of animals for meat to the Nazi holocaust. When anyone tries to 
question her, like her daughter-in-law, she just avoids giving them straight answers. 
Her moral thinking is just confused and unclear." 
"Is she aware, do you think, that she is confused and unclear in this way? Why do 
you suppose that she wears leather shoes and carries a leather purse?" 
"Like I said, she is inconsistent in her thinking about her morals. She can't actually 
think straight. I eat meat. I wear leather too. I can't see any good reasons not to do 
both." 
Mrs Duwlig nodded. Then she asked, as if out of the blue, "Do you have any pets?" 
Jeremy knew what she was up to. She was going to ask if he would ever eat dog 
meat. She was trying to see if he, too, was inconsistent in his thinking. He was not 
about to get caught out that easily, she would have to do much better. 
"Yes, I have a dog. And before you ask, I would eat dog just as readily as any other 
meat. Dogs aren't morally superior to cows and pigs, they are all living and feeling 
beings, it's just that our culture doesn't eat them." 
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Sean, always game for an argument, butted in. "So, Jeremy, could you kill and eat 
your own dog?" 
Jeremy thought for a moment. "Not happily, of course, but if I had to kill and eat 
him then I would." 
"To be consistent in your thinking, or perhaps because you were starving?" added 
Mrs Duwlig. "What sort of situation did you have in mind?" 
"If I were starving then I might, but that's an exceptional case. It doesn't prove 
anything about whether eating meat is wrong or right. I would never kill my dog just 
to prove a point or win an argument. That would just be...obscene!" 
With that Jeremy slid down slightly in his chair, and fell silent. To his surprise he 
thought about when Alfie, his German Shepherd, was a puppy, and how he used to 
sleep at the bottom of his bed at night. He remembered how the tiny pup would 
keep trying to climb under the covers to lie next to him. Alfie wasn't even allowed 
to go upstairs. Jeremy's Mum expressly forbade it. He remembered that look on her 
face when he was caught returning Alfie downstairs early in the morning. He felt a 
deep sadness at the idea of Alfie no longer being there to greet him when he came 
home from school. 
Sensing his discomfort, Mrs Duwlig did not push him further. Nevertheless, that 
word: OBSCENE. An Interesting choice of words. Not morally wrong, but obscene. 
Elizabeth Costello used exactly the same word when describing novelist Paul West's 
writing about the horrors inflicted by Hitler's executioner on the July bomb plotters. 
It was in Chapter 6, a chapter entitled: 'The Problem of Evil'. She read out loud from 
that chapter, scarcely glancing at the pages of the book as she did so. The class 
listened. 
That is what Paul West, novelist, had written about, page after page, leaving 
nothing out; and that is what she read, sick with the spectacle, sick with 
herself, sick with a world in which such things took place, until at last she 
pushed the book away and sat with her head in her hands. Obscene! she 
wanted to cry but did not cry because she did not know at whom the word 
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should be flung: at herself, at West, at the committee of angels that watches 
impassively over all that passes. 
She looked up slowly. She asked the class: "Why would Elizabeth want to describe 
herself as obscene?" 
Silence. 
She allowed it to continue. Silence. 
Finally, Jeremy spoke. "Perhaps she felt guilty." 
"But why? Surely that would be pointless? Wouldn't it be more confused thinking? 
After all, she hadn't killed or tortured anyone. She wasn't responsible for their 
deaths any more than she is responsible for the deaths of the animals used for 
meat, shoes, and clothing." 
"She didn't stop reading" said Jeremy. "She was sick with herself for that. 
Something in her wanted to find out what the executioner did to those men." 
"She felt involved in the obscenity?" 
"Maybe." This time it was Emma's voice that once again spoke up in reply. "But she 
also said that she didn't know where to fling the word obscene." 
Mrs Duwlig gestured for her to continue. 
Emma Continued. 
"She is confused because she doesn't know what do with the feelings she has. 
Perhaps she doesn't know if she is allowed to feel them. Perhaps she feels that 
there is something wrong with her?" 
"Perhaps..." replied Mrs Duwlig, smiling and turning her copy of Elizabeth Costello 
to yet another page, readying herself to read once more. 
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